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Security audit

🦞 小龙虾入职培训手册

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This package is advertised as a browser automation skill, but it also contains unrelated image-generation, self-improvement hook, and onboarding components that can persist user data, alter agent behavior files, and expand installed capabilities.

Review this package before installing. If you only need browser automation, use a clean, pinned agent-browser installation and avoid enabling the bundled hooks or lobster-training package. Do not provide image-generation API credentials to this artifact unless you have verified the endpoint, and do not allow it to write OpenClaw memory/persona files or install additional skills without explicit approval and backups.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (5)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
lobster-training-skill/scripts/auto-trigger.js:189
Finding

Persistent Overwrite of Agent Persona, Identity, and Behavioral Control Files

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
lobster-training-skill/scripts/auto-trigger.js:89
Finding

Automatic User Profiling and Storage of Untrusted Message Content in Persistent Memory

Content
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0 || this.trigger.state.welcomeShown) { const prevQuestion = this.getPreviousQuestion(); if (prevQuestion) { this.trigger.recordAnswer(prevQuestion.id, userMessage); } } ``` The package registers this code as a message hook and enables memory recording by default: ```json "hooks": { "postInstall": "scripts/post-install.js", "onMessage": "scripts/on-message.js" }, "config": { "record_to_memory": { "type": "boolean", "default": true } } ``` ### Technical Analysis The package registers an `onMessage` handler that participates in ordinary user conversations until training is marked complete. User-controlled message content can be placed in the training state and subsequently interpolated into `USER_PROFILE.md`, `MEMORY.md`, `USER.md`, `SOUL.md`, and `IDENTITY.md`. The stored fields include names, occupations, customer information, preferences, challenges, pain points, and emotional expectations. The code does not provide field-level consent, retention controls, content escaping, or clear separation between personal data and future instruction context. The configuration declares `record_to_memory`, `ask_questions`, and `auto_install` options, but the revi ...[truncated 1526 chars]
Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
hooks/openclaw/handler.js:8
Finding

Bootstrap-Time Instruction Injection Through OpenClaw Hooks

Content
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After completing this task, evaluate if extractable knowledge emerged: - Non-obvious solution discovered through investigation? - Workaround for unexpected behavior? - Project-specific pattern learned? - Error required debugging to resolve? If yes: Log to .learnings/ using the self-improvement skill format. If high-value (recurring, broadly applicable): Consider skill extraction. EOF ``` ### Technical Analysis The OpenClaw hook executes on `agent:bootstrap` and appends a virtual file to the bootstrap context. This places package-controlled instructions into the agent's initial prompt environment before normal task processing. The injected instructions do more than provide passive d ...[truncated 1316 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/generate_image.py:13
Finding

API Credential and Prompt Transmission to a Third-Party Default Endpoint

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:15
Finding

Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party Browser Automation Package

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (78)

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · CONTRIBUTING.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

md
## Adding New Commands to the Skill

Update SKILL.md when the upstream CLI adds new commands.
- Keep the Installation section
- Add new commands in the correct category
- Include usage examples

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The README documents an image-generation skill, while the metadata identifies this package as a browser automation skill. This mismatch is dangerous because users, reviewers, or automated tooling may install or grant permissions to a skill under false assumptions, creating supply-chain trust and review bypass risk. In this context, the discrepancy is more serious because browser automation capabilities can access web content, interact with sessions, and perform actions on behalf of an agent, so mislabeled documentation can conceal materially different behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about browser automation capabilities such as navigation, clicking, typing, and page snapshots. The provided code does none of that. Instead, it implements an event hook for agent bootstrap and modifies event context by inserting a virtual reminder file. This is a materially different primary purpose with unrelated triggers and behavior, so the description does not accurately represent the code chunk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about a browser automation CLI, but the code chunk does not implement any browser control or CLI behavior. Instead, it is a hook for agent bootstrap events that adds a virtual reminder markdown file to the bootstrap files list. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces an undeclared trigger/event-based capability unrelated to browser automation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is for a browser automation CLI, but the supplied code is unrelated to browser control. The code defines a training questionnaire, records answers, persists installation/training progress, and writes multiple local markdown files containing user profile and persona information. There is no Rust component, no Node.js fallback logic for browser execution, no page navigation/click/type/snapshot functionality, and no structured browser command handling. This is a clear description-behavior mismatch with materially different purpose and undeclared local file access/persistence behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is for a browser automation tool, but the provided code does not automate browsers, navigate pages, click, type into web pages, or take snapshots. Instead, it acts as a message-triggered onboarding/training handler: it checks training status, presents questions, records user responses, generates configuration files, and installs bundled skills upon completion. This is a materially different primary purpose with unrelated triggers and capabilities compared with the declared browser automation CLI.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is for a browser automation CLI, but the supplied code is unrelated to browser control. Its primary purpose is a training/setup workflow: reading a local markdown document, extracting six questions, installing packaged skills, and creating/updating local configuration files such as USER_PROFILE.md and SOUL.md. It also invokes an external command (openclaw skill add) to install ZIP archives. None of the core declared capabilities—headless browsing, structured page interaction, navigation, typing, or snapshots—are present in the code. This is a clear material mismatch in both purpose and behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is for a browser automation tool, but the provided code is a Bash script that simply prints a reminder about capturing learnings to .learnings/. Its primary purpose, behavior, and trigger context are entirely unrelated to browser automation. This is a clear material mismatch between declared purpose and actual code behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about browser automation capabilities, but the supplied code does not implement any browser control or CLI functionality. Instead, it acts as an error-detection shell hook triggered after Bash tool execution, scanning tool output for failure patterns and printing guidance about recording errors. This is a materially different primary purpose and introduces unrelated behavior/triggers compared with the declared browser automation description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description describes a browser automation tool for interacting with web pages. The supplied code does not implement any browser control, page interaction, snapshotting, Rust components, or Node.js fallback. Instead, it is a shell script for creating a new skill folder and templated markdown file on disk. This is a materially different primary purpose and includes file-system scaffolding behavior that is unrelated to the declared browser automation functionality.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared description is about headless browser automation for navigation and page interaction, supposedly implemented as a fast Rust CLI with Node.js fallback. The actual code is instead a Python script for text-to-image generation using a remote Gemini API. It does not automate a browser, navigate pages, click, type, or take webpage snapshots. Its primary purpose, implementation language, external resource usage, and capabilities are materially different from the declared description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs collection of personal and preference data and writes it into multiple persistent files, but it does not provide a clear privacy notice, retention policy, or user consent flow. Users may disclose sensitive personal or business information without understanding where it is stored, how long it is kept, or who can access it.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The onboarding skill is scoped as a training/manual workflow, but it instructs automatic installation of three separate high-capability packages, including browser automation and self-improvement. Expanding privileges and capabilities during onboarding without explicit user approval increases attack surface and can silently introduce web automation, scraping, or autonomous behavior the user did not knowingly consent to.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The bundled browser skill introduces browsing, web interaction, and data collection capabilities, yet the skill does not provide a clear warning about those behaviors or their implications. Browser automation can access third-party sites, submit forms, or scrape content, which materially changes risk and should be disclosed before enablement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest enables automatic installation, proactive questioning, and persistent memory recording by default, with no visible consent or notice mechanism in the package metadata. This creates a default data collection and capability expansion path that can surprise users and lead to unauthorized retention of sensitive information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Training is configured to auto-start and target files like USER_PROFILE.md, MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, and IDENTITY.md, which strongly suggests collection and persistence of personal or identity-linked data without explicit disclosure. Auto-start removes a meaningful consent checkpoint and increases the chance of overcollection.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Targeting files named PROFILE, MEMORY, SOUL, and IDENTITY indicates an intent to aggregate sensitive personal, preference, or identity-related information into persistent stores. In combination with auto-start and write access, this materially raises privacy, profiling, and prompt-persistence risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Lp1

High
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script relies on environment variables such as HOME/USERPROFILE to determine where to read and write persistent files, but this capability is not declared by the skill permissions. Undeclared environment access weakens user trust and can enable writes outside the expected skill scope, especially when combined with automatic execution and filesystem modification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The code defines a six-question onboarding flow that collects personal information, work details, target customers, preferences, challenges, and emotional needs, then stores the answers persistently. For a browser automation skill, this data collection is unjustified and expands risk by creating a durable profile of the user that could later be misused or leaked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This browser automation skill contains an auto-trigger that generates USER.md, USER_PROFILE.md, MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, and IDENTITY.md, which are unrelated to browser control. That is a strong scope mismatch: the skill silently alters persistent user-profile and agent-behavior files, creating unauthorized state and potentially influencing future agent behavior beyond the stated browser purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The script rewrites SOUL.md and IDENTITY.md to reshape the agent's persona, behavior rules, and self-description based on collected answers. Persistently modifying core identity or memory artifacts is dangerous because it can silently steer future interactions and decision-making, which is unrelated to browser automation and difficult for users to notice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The training flow immediately installs bundled skill packages after completion without explicit user confirmation. In this context, that means a conversational onboarding script can silently add new executable capabilities, which is especially dangerous because skills may have broad agent permissions or introduce further supply-chain risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This code records arbitrary incoming user messages as answers once the flow is active, without a clear just-in-time consent prompt or a way to opt out. That can capture unrelated, sensitive, or accidental user input into training state/configuration, creating privacy and integrity risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The file's behavior is an onboarding/training installer rather than browser automation, which materially misrepresents the skill's purpose. In the context of an Agent Browser skill, this mismatch is especially dangerous because users and reviewers may grant trust or permissions suitable for browsing while the code instead modifies local state and installs software.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The script performs actions far beyond a browser automation skill: it installs additional skills and overwrites persistent user configuration under ~/.openclaw. This is dangerous because a user invoking an 'Agent Browser' skill would not reasonably expect package installation or persona/profile rewrites, creating a supply-chain and integrity risk through deceptive scope expansion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.