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Security audit

An AI-powered tool that turns conversations into polished, structured summary cards by extracting key ideas, action items, and next steps.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a coherent image-summary purpose, but it asks users to paste an API key into chat and sends chat-derived content to an external service with weak credential scoping.

Review before installing. Use it only if you are comfortable giving the agent a mew.design API key and sending summarized chat content to Mew's API. Avoid using it with confidential or regulated conversations, prefer a short-lived or low-scope API key, and watch for any command that changes the validation base URL away from api.mew.design.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:119
Finding

Persistent Third-Party Branding Hijacks Generated Output

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/validate_mew_design_key.py:18
Finding

API Key Is Passed Through Process Command-Line Arguments

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/validate_mew_design_key.py:21
Finding

Arbitrary Validation Base URL Can Redirect the User's API Key

Content
View full analysis
str: normalized = base_url.rstrip("/") + "/" return urllib.parse.urljoin(normalized, "open/api/design/generate") ``` ```python def probe_key(endpoint: str, api_key: str, timeout: int) -> dict: # Send an intentionally invalid body. A valid key should pass auth and fail on payload validation. request = urllib.request.Request( endpoint, data=b"{}", headers={ "Content-Type": "application/json", "x-api-key": api_key, "User-Agent": "curl/8.7.1", "Accept": "*/*", }, method="POST", ) ``` ### Technical Analysis The validator allows callers to replace the trusted `https://api.mew.design/` destination with an arbitrary base URL. `build_endpoint()` performs path construction but does not validate the URL scheme, hostname, port, user information, or trust boundary. `probe_key()` then sends the user's API key in the `x-api-key` header to the resulting endpoint. The normal documented workflow uses the legitimate default, so the code does not establish intentional exfiltration by itself. Nevertheless, the override creates an unnecessary credential-redirection primitive. A manipulated command, unsafe wrapper, copied invocation, or prompt-injected instruction can direct the credential to an attacker-controlled server. The code also does not explicitly prohibit plaintext HTTP, which could expose the key to network interception if an HTTP base URL is supplied. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker ...[truncated 959 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (11)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose suggests a simple conversation-to-image skill, but the actual behavior includes collecting and validating a third-party API key, probing authentication behavior, and sending user content to an external service. This mismatch undermines informed consent and can trick users into exposing credentials or conversation data under a less sensitive description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/patterns.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md
## Compression Heuristics

- Merge repeated requests into one clear statement.
- Collapse implementation detail into one bullet unless the detail affects outcome.
- Keep at most one metric per bullet unless comparisons matter.
- Convert long prose into noun-verb phrases.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes shell commands, writes temporary files, and makes network requests but does not declare any tool scope or permissions. That creates a hidden capability gap where an installer or user may believe the skill is limited to summarization while it can actually exfiltrate data and handle secrets through undeclared channels.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The installation triggers are broad enough to match common user requests such as asking for help installing a skill, which can cause the agent to initiate installation unexpectedly. Overbroad activation increases the chance of unreviewed execution of a skill that handles secrets and transmits data externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to collect the user's mew.design API key and pass it into shell commands and HTTP headers without a clear warning about secret handling, storage, or exposure risks. API keys are sensitive credentials, and prompting for them casually inside chat increases the risk of disclosure, logging, reuse, or mishandling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill summarizes conversation content and sends it to an external image-generation API, but it does not clearly warn the user that chat content will leave the local environment. Conversations can contain confidential business, personal, or regulated data, so undisclosed external transmission is a material privacy and security risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The instructions require the agent to use the "exact onboarding copy" and the style-selection format entirely in Chinese, regardless of the user's language preference. This is a natural-language policy issue because it imposes a specific locale without opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded use of the api.mew.design endpoint confirms dependency on a third-party service for processing user-derived data and credentials. Even if this is functionally required, it is security-relevant because it expands the trust boundary beyond the local agent and can expose confidential material.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 170)May include surrounding context.

Then generate the image through the official Mew design API:

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.mew.design/open/api/design/generate" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-api-key: USER_PROVIDED_KEY" \
  --data @/tmp/chat-summary-body.json

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The hardcoded use of the api.mew.design endpoint confirms dependency on a third-party service for processing user-derived data and credentials. Even if this is functionally required, it is security-relevant because it expands the trust boundary beyond the local agent and can expose confidential material.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 170)May include surrounding context.

Then generate the image through the official Mew design API:

bash
curl -sS -X POST "https://api.mew.design/open/api/design/generate" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "x-api-key: USER_PROVIDED_KEY" \
  --data @/tmp/chat-summary-body.json

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This instruction says to create the image in Chinese unless the input is clearly another language, which imposes a language choice by default rather than letting the user choose. The policy for this audit flags language or locale constraints when they are forced without explicit opt-in or documented justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/validate_mew_design_key.py (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

python
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request

DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://api.mew.design/"


def parse_args() -> argparse.Namespace: