T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
scripts/setup.sh:85- Finding
Unpinned Remote Plugin and Dependency Code Is Retrieved and Executed
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is mostly coherent for setting up cloud-backed memory, but it installs and builds mutable remote code while also enabling persistent cross-agent storage of conversation and workspace data.
Review the remote repository and setup script before running it. Use a dedicated GCP project with least-privilege credentials, expect prompts and synced markdown files to be stored in Vertex AI Memory Bank, disable autoCapture or autoSyncFiles if you do not want automatic memory storage, and prefer a pinned, verified plugin version over the current git clone/git pull plus npm install flow.
scripts/setup.sh:85Unpinned Remote Plugin and Dependency Code Is Retrieved and Executed
The skill instructs users to run shell commands and a setup script, but it does not declare any tool scope or allowed tools. This weakens security review and execution controls because consumers cannot easily tell that the skill requires command execution and networked installation steps.
The skill prominently advertises auto-recall, auto-capture, file sync, and cross-agent memory, but it does not clearly warn that potentially sensitive prompts, facts, and workspace markdown files may be transmitted to and stored in Vertex AI. In this context, the omission is dangerous because the core feature is persistent third-party storage of user and workspace data across sessions and agents.
The documented curl command sends authenticated requests to a Google Vertex AI endpoint using an access token from gcloud, which is an external transmission of data and credentials in the broad security sense. While expected for legitimate cloud setup, it is still security-relevant because it provisions remote resources and transmits project identifiers and authenticated API calls to a third party.
gcloud config set project YOUR_PROJECT_ID
# Create a reasoning engine for Memory Bank
curl -X POST \
"https://REGION-aiplatform.googleapis.com/v1beta1/projects/YOUR_PROJECT_ID/locations/REGION/reasoningEngines" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
The script enables a GCP API and creates a Vertex AI reasoning engine immediately after basic prompts, without an explicit confirmation describing that billable cloud resources and project state will be modified. In an installation/setup context this behavior is expected, but it is still dangerous because a user may run the script assuming it only performs local configuration and unintentionally incur cost or alter the target project.
The script sends an authenticated POST request with the user's access token to the Vertex AI API to create a remote resource. In this skill's context, external transmission is expected, but it remains security-relevant because it uses live cloud credentials and changes remote infrastructure without a strong approval boundary beyond normal script execution.
# Create reasoning engine
echo "Creating Memory Bank instance (reasoning engine)..."
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST \
"https://${REGION}-aiplatform.googleapis.com/v1beta1/projects/${PROJECT_ID}/locations/${REGION}/reasoningEngines" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $(gcloud auth print-access-token)" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
The script clones code from a remote GitHub repository and then executes npm install and npm run build, which can run arbitrary package lifecycle scripts and build steps from untrusted remote content. This creates a supply-chain execution risk: compromise of the repository or dependencies could lead to arbitrary code execution on the user's machine during setup.
The script offers to restart the OpenClaw gateway, but it does not explain the operational impact such as interrupting active sessions or changing runtime behavior immediately. Although it asks for confirmation, the lack of context can still surprise operators in multi-agent or shared environments.
No suspicious patterns detected.