Security audit

11111

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a narrow UAPI helper for fetching AI translation language/configuration data and does not show hidden, destructive, persistent, or credential-stealing behavior.

Install this only if you want an agent helper for UAPI AI translation language/configuration lookup. Be aware that broad trigger terms may cause it to be selected for general language or translation requests, and only provide a UAPI key when you intentionally want authenticated or rate-limit-resilient calls to UAPI.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The trigger keyword list includes the standalone term 'languages', which is far broader than this skill’s actual scope of only calling GET /ai/translate/languages. In an agent-routing context, this can cause unintended invocation for unrelated language tasks, leading the agent to select the wrong skill and potentially produce incorrect API calls or workflow decisions.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The keyword 'AI translation' is broader than the single endpoint exposed by this skill, which only retrieves translation-language configuration. Because many user requests about AI translation could involve translating text, model choice, settings, or other operations, this ambiguous trigger increases the chance of misrouting to an overly narrow skill.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The display name, short description, and default prompt are all written exclusively in Chinese, which indicates a fixed language presentation without offering the user a locale or language choice. Under the policy rules, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is clearly documented and justified.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

Confidence: 86% confidence
Finding: The entire skill document is written in Chinese and does not indicate that language choice is optional or limited to a China-specific deployment. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

Confidence: 82% confidence
Finding: The document is primarily written in Chinese and presents the skill usage guidance in that locale, while also providing English keywords, without stating that users may choose their preferred language. This can be read as a locale preference baked into the skill instructions rather than an explicit user-selected option.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.