T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:23- Finding
Hardcoded and Undisclosed User Automatically Receives Task Access
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a plausible Feishu task-sync tool, but it can automatically share task data with an undeclared hardcoded Feishu user and can over-read or log task data.
Review this skill before installing. Do not use it with real task data until the hardcoded Feishu Open ID and named default recipients are removed, recipients are explicitly configured or confirmed, raw API response logging is disabled, task listing is actually scoped to the intended user, and credential/config file handling is tightened. Expect todo titles, descriptions, due dates, assignees, and completion actions to be sent to Feishu.
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:23Hardcoded and Undisclosed User Automatically Receives Task Access
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:266User-Scoped Task Listing Retrieves and Logs an Unfiltered Token-Visible Task Collection
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:183Complete Feishu API Responses Are Written to Standard Output
Claiming mature bidirectional synchronization and status management when only partial local-to-Feishu actions exist creates a trust and transparency failure. Users may rely on missing sync behavior for operational workflows, resulting in stale task state, unintended assignments, and unnoticed external transmission of work data.
Claiming mature bidirectional synchronization and status management when only partial local-to-Feishu actions exist creates a trust and transparency failure. Users may rely on missing sync behavior for operational workflows, resulting in stale task state, unintended assignments, and unnoticed external transmission of work data.
Claiming mature bidirectional synchronization and status management when only partial local-to-Feishu actions exist creates a trust and transparency failure. Users may rely on missing sync behavior for operational workflows, resulting in stale task state, unintended assignments, and unnoticed external transmission of work data.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
错误: Invalid access token
解决方案:
1. 检查App ID和App Secret是否正确
2. 确认应用权限配置完整
The skill advertises network, file read/write, and environment-backed behavior through its described integration flow, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This increases the risk of over-broad execution in an agent environment because reviewers and runtime policy engines cannot easily constrain what the skill is allowed to access.
The markdown promotes automatic synchronization with Feishu but does not clearly warn that task titles, deadlines, assignees, and related metadata will be transmitted to a third-party service. This can lead users to expose potentially sensitive business information without informed consent, especially in enterprise agent environments.
The configuration section instructs users to place app_secret in a JSON file but gives no warning about credential sensitivity, storage protections, or exclusion from version control. This creates a realistic risk of secret leakage through local files, repositories, logs, or shared environments, which could enable unauthorized Feishu API access.
The guide explicitly recommends recording complete API requests and responses, which in this context can include Bearer tenant access tokens, app credentials, user identifiers, task descriptions, and other potentially sensitive business data. In a task-sync integration, such logs could enable token reuse, unauthorized API access, privacy leakage, and broader compromise if logs are centrally aggregated or insufficiently protected.
This code accesses sensitive credentials via FEISHU_APP_ID and FEISHU_APP_SECRET, and falls back to reading them from a local config file. Although there are internal comments, there is no user-facing disclosure in the CLI flow warning that the script will read credentials from the environment or disk.
The skill hard-codes a current user ID and loads another specific user ID from local config, then automatically adds them as followers/assignees during task creation. This exceeds the stated local-to-Feishu synchronization behavior and can silently disclose task metadata to unintended third parties or assign work without the caller's explicit consent.
The complete_task function issues a PATCH request that marks a remote Feishu task as completed, which changes task state in an external system. While the function has developer-oriented docstrings and prints API responses, it lacks any explicit confirmation prompt or warning to the user before performing this destructive-style action.
The function claims to fetch a specific user's tasks but ignores the user_id parameter and retrieves a general task listing instead. In a multi-user or shared tenant context, this can expose unrelated users' tasks and cause downstream logic to act on the wrong records.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
try:
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
try:
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
try:
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
try:
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
try:
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
try:
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']
The code sets self.feishu_enabled = False with a comment stating Feishu integration is temporarily disabled, but add_todo() and complete_todo() still invoke Feishu API operations unconditionally. This mismatch can mislead operators into believing network sync is disabled when task content is still transmitted externally, creating unintended data disclosure and control-flow risk.
Todo content is persisted to /home/gary/.openclaw/workspace/todo_data.json without any notice, consent flow, retention policy, or access control checks. Users may place sensitive personal or work data in todos, and silent local persistence increases privacy exposure, especially on shared systems or poorly protected workspaces.
The manifest describes '双向同步' and support for task status synchronization, which implies reading Feishu task state back into local todos. In this file, the implemented behavior is limited to creating Feishu tasks when adding todos and marking Feishu tasks complete when local items are completed; there is no code that fetches remote status changes and updates local state accordingly.
The skill transmits raw todo content and metadata to the Feishu API without clear user disclosure or opt-in at the point of use. Because todo text may contain sensitive internal plans, names, deadlines, or secrets, silent third-party transmission can cause privacy, compliance, and confidentiality issues.
This external HTTP POST sends user-supplied todo content, descriptions, due dates, and assignee information to Feishu. In the context of an agent skill, undisclosed outbound transmission is security-relevant because it expands the trust boundary and can leak sensitive operational data to an external service.
data["members"] = members
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
result = response.json()
if result.get('code') == 0:
User-facing docstrings, status messages, and command responses are consistently written in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that language selection is configurable or limited to a region-specific deployment. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a single language without user opt-in.
This code sends the user-provided todo content and generated description to the Feishu API using requests.post, but the file provides no explicit warning, confirmation, or user-facing notice that task text will be synced to an external service. The nearby comments are implementation-focused and not a disclosure to the user, so this network transmission lacks the warning required for code files.