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Security audit

feishu-task-integration-skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a plausible Feishu task-sync tool, but it can automatically share task data with an undeclared hardcoded Feishu user and can over-read or log task data.

Review this skill before installing. Do not use it with real task data until the hardcoded Feishu Open ID and named default recipients are removed, recipients are explicitly configured or confirmed, raw API response logging is disabled, task listing is actually scoped to the intended user, and credential/config file handling is tightened. Expect todo titles, descriptions, due dates, assignees, and completion actions to be sent to Feishu.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:23
Finding

Hardcoded and Undisclosed User Automatically Receives Task Access

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:266
Finding

User-Scoped Task Listing Retrieves and Logs an Unfiltered Token-Visible Task Collection

Content
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Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
scripts/feishu_task_integration.py:183
Finding

Complete Feishu API Responses Are Written to Standard Output

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (30)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Claiming mature bidirectional synchronization and status management when only partial local-to-Feishu actions exist creates a trust and transparency failure. Users may rely on missing sync behavior for operational workflows, resulting in stale task state, unintended assignments, and unnoticed external transmission of work data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Claiming mature bidirectional synchronization and status management when only partial local-to-Feishu actions exist creates a trust and transparency failure. Users may rely on missing sync behavior for operational workflows, resulting in stale task state, unintended assignments, and unnoticed external transmission of work data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Claiming mature bidirectional synchronization and status management when only partial local-to-Feishu actions exist creates a trust and transparency failure. Users may rely on missing sync behavior for operational workflows, resulting in stale task state, unintended assignments, and unnoticed external transmission of work data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/configuration.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

问题1: 认证失败

text
错误: Invalid access token
解决方案:
1. 检查App ID和App Secret是否正确
2. 确认应用权限配置完整

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises network, file read/write, and environment-backed behavior through its described integration flow, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. This increases the risk of over-broad execution in an agent environment because reviewers and runtime policy engines cannot easily constrain what the skill is allowed to access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The markdown promotes automatic synchronization with Feishu but does not clearly warn that task titles, deadlines, assignees, and related metadata will be transmitted to a third-party service. This can lead users to expose potentially sensitive business information without informed consent, especially in enterprise agent environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The configuration section instructs users to place app_secret in a JSON file but gives no warning about credential sensitivity, storage protections, or exclusion from version control. This creates a realistic risk of secret leakage through local files, repositories, logs, or shared environments, which could enable unauthorized Feishu API access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The guide explicitly recommends recording complete API requests and responses, which in this context can include Bearer tenant access tokens, app credentials, user identifiers, task descriptions, and other potentially sensitive business data. In a task-sync integration, such logs could enable token reuse, unauthorized API access, privacy leakage, and broader compromise if logs are centrally aggregated or insufficiently protected.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This code accesses sensitive credentials via FEISHU_APP_ID and FEISHU_APP_SECRET, and falls back to reading them from a local config file. Although there are internal comments, there is no user-facing disclosure in the CLI flow warning that the script will read credentials from the environment or disk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill hard-codes a current user ID and loads another specific user ID from local config, then automatically adds them as followers/assignees during task creation. This exceeds the stated local-to-Feishu synchronization behavior and can silently disclose task metadata to unintended third parties or assign work without the caller's explicit consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The complete_task function issues a PATCH request that marks a remote Feishu task as completed, which changes task state in an external system. While the function has developer-oriented docstrings and prints API responses, it lacks any explicit confirmation prompt or warning to the user before performing this destructive-style action.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The function claims to fetch a specific user's tasks but ignores the user_id parameter and retrieves a general task listing instead. In a multi-user or shared tenant context, this can expose unrelated users' tasks and cause downstream logic to act on the wrong records.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/feishu_task_integration.py (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        
        try:
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            if result.get('code') == 0:
                self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/feishu_task_integration.py (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        
        try:
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            if result.get('code') == 0:
                self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/feishu_task_integration.py (reported line 182)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        
        try:
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            if result.get('code') == 0:
                self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/feishu_task_integration_clean.py (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        
        try:
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            if result.get('code') == 0:
                self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/feishu_task_integration_clean.py (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        
        try:
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            if result.get('code') == 0:
                self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/todo_handler_clean.py (reported line 194)May include surrounding context.

python
}
        
        try:
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            if result.get('code') == 0:
                self.tenant_access_token = result['tenant_access_token']

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The code sets self.feishu_enabled = False with a comment stating Feishu integration is temporarily disabled, but add_todo() and complete_todo() still invoke Feishu API operations unconditionally. This mismatch can mislead operators into believing network sync is disabled when task content is still transmitted externally, creating unintended data disclosure and control-flow risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

Todo content is persisted to /home/gary/.openclaw/workspace/todo_data.json without any notice, consent flow, retention policy, or access control checks. Users may place sensitive personal or work data in todos, and silent local persistence increases privacy exposure, especially on shared systems or poorly protected workspaces.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes '双向同步' and support for task status synchronization, which implies reading Feishu task state back into local todos. In this file, the implemented behavior is limited to creating Feishu tasks when adding todos and marking Feishu tasks complete when local items are completed; there is no code that fetches remote status changes and updates local state accordingly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill transmits raw todo content and metadata to the Feishu API without clear user disclosure or opt-in at the point of use. Because todo text may contain sensitive internal plans, names, deadlines, or secrets, silent third-party transmission can cause privacy, compliance, and confidentiality issues.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This external HTTP POST sends user-supplied todo content, descriptions, due dates, and assignee information to Feishu. In the context of an agent skill, undisclosed outbound transmission is security-relevant because it expands the trust boundary and can leak sensitive operational data to an external service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/todo_handler.py (reported line 146)May include surrounding context.

python
data["members"] = members
            
            response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
            result = response.json()
            
            if result.get('code') == 0:

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

User-facing docstrings, status messages, and command responses are consistently written in Chinese, and the file does not indicate that language selection is configurable or limited to a region-specific deployment. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a single language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This code sends the user-provided todo content and generated description to the Feishu API using requests.post, but the file provides no explicit warning, confirmation, or user-facing notice that task text will be synced to an external service. The nearby comments are implementation-focused and not a disclosure to the user, so this network transmission lacks the warning required for code files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.