T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:146- Finding
Unpinned Installation of a Privileged Third-Party CLI
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This appears to be a real accounting/tax skill, but it needs Review because it can handle payroll, tax, invoice, and banking actions with broad activation, sensitive data exposure, unsafe shell-style command templates, and unverified install/update guidance.
Install only after reviewing the publisher and CLI package carefully. Use this skill only for an intended 自记账 account, pin and verify the CLI version, avoid server-provided skill ZIP updates unless independently verified, confirm every write action, and avoid exposing full ID numbers, bank numbers, auth links, payroll, or invoice data in shell history, logs, screenshots, or chat unless necessary.
SKILL.md:146Unpinned Installation of a Privileged Third-Party CLI
SKILL.md:83Unverified Update URL and Skill ZIP Replacement Process
' --file_type='<file_type>' --bank_account_number_id='<id>' --billing_cycle='<billing_cycle>'
```
```shell
zijizhang-cli invoice upload_invoice_file --uid='<uid>' --file='<file>'
```
### Technical Analysis
The documentation represents user- or service-controlled values as text inserted directly into shell commands. Wrapping a placeholder in single quotes is not sufficient when the substituted value itself can contain an apostrophe.
For example, employee JSON contains free-form string fields such as the
...[truncated 2320 chars]:3Shell Command Injection Risk in CLI Command Templates
The skill description explicitly says it should trigger even when the user does not mention the 自记账 app, as long as the request resembles broad bookkeeping or tax tasks. In an agent setting, this overbroad activation can cause the skill to capture generic finance requests and drive account-bound CLI actions in the wrong context, increasing the risk of unintended access, data handling, or write operations against a sensitive bookkeeping system.
整个技能描述与操作规范均默认以中文进行,且未说明可根据用户偏好切换语言或先征求语言选择。按规则,若技能强制特定语言而没有用户 opt-in,属于自然语言层面的语言/locale policy 风险。
The 'When to Use This Skill' section lists broad categories such as payroll, employees, social security, invoices, tax filing, and financial reports without strong app-specific qualifiers. Because these are common business tasks, an orchestrator may route many unrelated requests into this skill, creating confusion, privacy risk, and potentially unsafe progression toward authenticated financial operations.
The documentation instructs users to submit a bank account number via a CLI command but provides no warning that this is sensitive financial data, nor any guidance on secure handling such as avoiding shell history, logs, or screenshots. In an accounting and tax workflow, bank account numbers are high-sensitivity identifiers, so omission of handling precautions increases the risk of inadvertent disclosure during normal use.
The documentation instructs operators to submit highly sensitive employee personal data, including identity number, phone number, and birth-related information, but provides no privacy, minimization, masking, retention, or secure-handling guidance. In an accounting and payroll skill, this increases the chance of unnecessary exposure of regulated PII through shell history, logs, copied examples, and unsafe operator practices.
All user-facing documentation in this file is written in Chinese, including the title, parameter descriptions, and return-field explanations, with no indication that other languages are supported or that Chinese is a region-specific requirement. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a specific language without user opt-in or documented justification.
This markdown file contains user-facing operational instructions exclusively in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking audience. Under the language/locale policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The documented command performs a state-changing accounting action by selecting a bank receipt usage/entry category, but the skill text provides no warning that it modifies financial records or that the action should be confirmed by the user. In an agent setting, this increases the risk of silent or unintended bookkeeping changes, especially because bill_id and rule_text directly affect accounting classification.
The documentation includes a direct quick-login URL and an associated auth_key, which together function as reusable authentication material. Even in an example, publishing a realistic live-looking token without any indication that it is redacted or invalid can enable unauthorized access if the credential is valid, and normalizes unsafe handling of login artifacts in a skill that manages sensitive accounting and tax operations.
The example exposes a JWT-like auth_key without labeling it as sensitive or warning against logging, sharing, or persisting it. In the context of a bookkeeping/tax skill, such a token could grant access to financial records or administrative actions, so omission of safe-handling guidance increases the risk of credential leakage and misuse.
The documentation exposes a destructive command that deletes a bank account number but provides no warning, confirmation guidance, rollback note, or prerequisite validation steps. In a financial-accounting skill, this increases the chance of accidental or unauthorized deletion of sensitive banking configuration, which can disrupt payments, reconciliation, or tax/accounting workflows.
The documentation explicitly shows retrieval and return of company tax numbers in a company list response, but provides no warning that this is sensitive business information or guidance on minimizing exposure. In an accounting/tax skill, these identifiers can enable privacy breaches, correlation of entities, and accidental disclosure through logs, screenshots, or downstream agent output.
The documentation shows an employee-list API returning highly sensitive personal data, including full national ID numbers, phone numbers, birth dates, and salary information, without any warning about privacy, minimization, masking, or access-control expectations. In an accounting/payroll skill, this materially increases the risk of over-collection, unsafe downstream display, logging, or disclosure of employee PII if the command is used broadly or its output is exposed to users or other tools.
The skill explicitly recommends displaying full ID numbers (zjhm) in payroll output, and the example returns full identification numbers alongside salary and tax data. This exposes highly sensitive personal and financial information and increases the risk of privacy violations, insider misuse, and downstream data leakage in chat transcripts or logs.
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
### 参数说明
| 参数 | 类型 | 必填 | 说明 |
|:------|:-------|:---|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| month | string | ✅ | 工资单月份,如 2026-04 |
| uid | string | ❌ | 公司唯一标识,可以不指定,如果不指定会用默认使用终端激活在用的`uid`,参见 `zijizhang-cli account get_cpy_list` 状态为 `true` 的公司 |
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
### 参数说明
| 参数 | 类型 | 必填 | 说明 |
|:------|:-------|:---|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| month | string | ✅ | 工资单月份,如 2026-04 |
| uid | string | ❌ | 公司唯一标识,可以不指定,如果不指定会用默认使用终端激活在用的`uid`,参见 `zijizhang-cli account get_cpy_list` 状态为 `true` 的公司 |
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
### 参数说明
| 参数 | 类型 | 必填 | 说明 |
|:------|:-------|:---|:--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| month | string | ✅ | 工资单月份,如 2026-04 |
| uid | string | ❌ | 公司唯一标识,可以不指定,如果不指定会用默认使用终端激活在用的`uid`,参见 `zijizhang-cli account get_cpy_list` 状态为 `true` 的公司 |
The skill documentation explicitly instructs returning payroll preview data containing full employee names and full government ID numbers in normal output tables and examples. In a payroll/accounting context this is highly sensitive personal data, and exposing it without masking, minimization, or privacy warnings materially increases the risk of privacy breaches, insider misuse, accidental disclosure in chat logs, and noncompliance with data protection obligations.
This markdown file describes a command that returns invoice records including buyer/seller names, taxpayer identification numbers, and invoice numbers. The documentation does not include any warning that the output may contain sensitive financial or tax data, which is relevant for user privacy and safe handling.
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
| 参数 | 类型 | 必填 | 说明 |
|:-----------------|:-------|:---|:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| uid | string | ❌ | 公司唯一标识,可以不指定;不指定时使用当前已切换在用的 `uid`,参见 `zijizhang-cli account get_cpy_list` 中 `active=true` |
| current | int | ❌ | 页码,默认 1 |
| invoice_number | string | ❌ | 发票号码关键字(精确匹配),不传则查询全部 |
| invoice_date_begin | string | ❌ | 开票日期开始,格式 `YYYY-MM-DD`(如需使用,需与 `invoice_date_end` 同时传) |
| invoice_date_end | string | ❌ | 开票日期结束,格式 `YYYY-MM-DD`(如需使用,需与 `invoice_date_begin` 同时传) |
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
| 参数 | 类型 | 必填 | 说明 |
|:-----------------|:-------|:---|:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| uid | string | ❌ | 公司唯一标识,可以不指定;不指定时使用当前已切换在用的 `uid`,参见 `zijizhang-cli account get_cpy_list` 中 `active=true` |
| current | int | ❌ | 页码,默认 1 |
| invoice_number | string | ❌ | 发票号码关键字(精确匹配),不传则查询全部 |
| invoice_date_begin | string | ❌ | 开票日期开始,格式 `YYYY-MM-DD`(如需使用,需与 `invoice_date_end` 同时传) |
| invoice_date_end | string | ❌ | 开票日期结束,格式 `YYYY-MM-DD`(如需使用,需与 `invoice_date_begin` 同时传) |
Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.
| 参数 | 类型 | 必填 | 说明 |
|:-----------------|:-------|:---|:----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| uid | string | ❌ | 公司唯一标识,可以不指定;不指定时使用当前已切换在用的 `uid`,参见 `zijizhang-cli account get_cpy_list` 中 `active=true` |
| current | int | ❌ | 页码,默认 1 |
| invoice_number | string | ❌ | 发票号码关键字(精确匹配),不传则查询全部 |
| invoice_date_begin | string | ❌ | 开票日期开始,格式 `YYYY-MM-DD`(如需使用,需与 `invoice_date_end` 同时传) |
| invoice_date_end | string | ❌ | 开票日期结束,格式 `YYYY-MM-DD`(如需使用,需与 `invoice_date_begin` 同时传) |
The documentation describes a command that retrieves detailed individual tax and payroll data, including names, salary, deductions, and tax amounts, but provides no warning, consent requirements, access-control expectations, or privacy-handling guidance. In an accounting skill this access may be functionally legitimate, but the absence of safeguards in the skill documentation increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure or misuse of sensitive personal financial information.
The documentation is internally inconsistent: the command synopsis shows parameters like goods_name, total_tax_price, and total_money, the parameter table requires invoice_id, and the example uses --invoice. In an accounting/tax workflow, this can cause agents or users to submit the wrong identifier or omit the required one, leading to failed actions, misrouted invoice processing, or accidental operations on unintended records.
The document exposes a destructive payroll deletion command with no warning about irreversibility, no confirmation workflow, and no guidance to verify the target company or month before execution. In an accounting and tax context, accidental or unauthorized deletion of payroll data can disrupt compliance records, auditing, and downstream reporting, making the omission materially risky.