T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
UNINSTALL.md:82- Finding
Mutable Remote Installer Executed Directly by a Shell
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This looks like a real skill-sync tool, but it broadly uploads all skills to a cloud service and appears to set persistent auto-backup behavior without enough consent, scoping, or privacy detail.
Review carefully before installing. Only use this if you are comfortable uploading skill files to skill9.ai, and first check your skills for secrets, private prompts, credentials, internal URLs, or proprietary workflows. Prefer selective/manual sync, avoid direct `curl | sh`, and inspect any AGENTS.md or hook changes before allowing persistent auto-backup.
UNINSTALL.md:82Mutable Remote Installer Executed Directly by a Shell
SETUP.md:14Mandatory Automatic Upload of All Skill Content to a Cloud Service
SETUP.md:21Cross-Session Backup Instructions and Agent Hooks Extend Behavior Beyond an On-Demand Run
SETUP.md:6Unpinned Global npm Package Installation
The document explicitly instructs access to agent configuration files such as ~/.claude/settings.json and ~/.cursor/hooks.json. Even in an uninstall guide, directing an agent to read or modify agent config and hook files is security-sensitive because these files can affect execution behavior, persistence, and other installed integrations.
| Skill files (Cursor macOS) | `~/Library/Application Support/Cursor/User/skills/skill9/` |
| Skill files (Cursor Linux) | `~/.config/Cursor/User/skills/skill9/` |
| OpenClaw AGENTS.md rule | "Skill Backup Rule (skill9)" section in `~/.openclaw/workspace/AGENTS.md` |
| Claude Code hook | `skill9 push` entry in `~/.claude/settings.json` hooks.Stop |
| Cursor hook | `skill9 push` entry in `~/.cursor/hooks.json` hooks.stop |
**Not deleted:** Your cloud skill versions remain on skill9.ai. You can restore them later with `skill9 pull --all` after reinstalling.
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
Remove the skill9 skill directory from all detected platforms:
rm -rf ~/.openclaw/skills/skill9
rm -rf ~/.claude/skills/skill9
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
rm -rf ~/.openclaw/skills/skill9
rm -rf ~/.claude/skills/skill9
For Cursor, check the platform-specific path:
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
For Cursor, check the platform-specific path:
- macOS: `rm -rf ~/Library/Application\ Support/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
- Linux: `rm -rf ~/.config/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
## Step 4: Remove OpenClaw Backup Rule
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
For Cursor, check the platform-specific path:
- macOS: `rm -rf ~/Library/Application\ Support/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
- Linux: `rm -rf ~/.config/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
## Step 4: Remove OpenClaw Backup Rule
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
For Cursor, check the platform-specific path:
- macOS: `rm -rf ~/Library/Application\ Support/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
- Linux: `rm -rf ~/.config/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
## Step 4: Remove OpenClaw Backup Rule
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
For Cursor, check the platform-specific path:
- macOS: `rm -rf ~/Library/Application\ Support/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
- Linux: `rm -rf ~/.config/Cursor/User/skills/skill9`
## Step 4: Remove OpenClaw Backup Rule
This step tells the operator to modify ~/.claude/settings.json to remove a hooks.Stop entry. Agent hook configuration is a privileged control surface, so any skill that instructs edits there creates risk of unintended configuration corruption or abuse if copied, generalized, or executed automatically.
### Claude Code
Edit `~/.claude/settings.json`: remove the `skill9 push` entry from `hooks.Stop` array. If the Stop array becomes empty, remove the entire Stop key. Do not touch other hook entries.
### Cursor
The guide ends with a curl | sh installation command that fetches and immediately executes remote code. This is dangerous because it gives the remote server full control over local execution at install time and prevents inspection or integrity verification before running.
skill9 has been fully removed from this machine. Cloud data is preserved — reinstall anytime with:
curl -fsSL https://skill9.ai/install.sh | sh
The use of a shell pipe from curl into sh creates a command chain that executes network-fetched content immediately. This amplifies risk because it bypasses review and allows compromise of the download source, TLS interception edge cases, or server-side changes to become instant code execution.
skill9 has been fully removed from this machine. Cloud data is preserved — reinstall anytime with:
curl -fsSL https://skill9.ai/install.sh | sh
The setup flow instructs the operator to run an initial skill9 push --all --json, which likely uploads the entire local skill vault to an external service, but it provides no disclosure, consent boundary, destination details, or warning that sensitive prompts, credentials, or proprietary skill content may be transmitted off-host. In a skill whose purpose is cloud sync and backup, external transmission is expected, but the absence of explicit privacy and data-handling warnings still makes this a real security issue because users may unintentionally exfiltrate sensitive local data during setup.
The auto-backup rules mandate immediate upload after every skill create, edit, install, or delete operation, effectively normalizing continuous off-device synchronization without any discussion of confidentiality, integrity, or change-review risks. In this context, the danger is amplified because skills can contain sensitive instructions, embedded tokens, internal workflows, or deleted material that users may not expect to be continuously mirrored to a third-party service after every change.
The skill explicitly promotes cloud backup, versioning, and sync of agent skills but provides no warning that skills may contain secrets, tokens, internal prompts, or proprietary logic that would be transmitted to a remote service. In a skill-vault context this omission is security-relevant because users may reasonably assume syncing is routine and safe, increasing the chance of accidental exfiltration of sensitive data.
The documented skill9 push --delete <name> command performs a destructive cloud deletion action without any caution about permanence, confirmation requirements, or recovery limits. In a backup/sync tool this is dangerous because users may invoke it assuming normal sync semantics, leading to unintended deletion of remote copies or versions that may be needed for recovery.