T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:59- Finding
Execution of an Unpinned Remote Installation Script
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed self-custodial Lightning wallet skill, but it gives agents real spending authority and includes unsafe setup, secret-output, and persistent-service patterns that require careful review.
Review this before installing. Use testnet/signet first, keep only small funds available to the agent, set strict spend caps, avoid unbounded `sz fetch` or payment commands, and do not run the one-line remote installer unless you independently verify what it executes. Treat any mnemonic or `SZ_PASSPHRASE` as full wallet access, and do not enable the systemd service until you have reviewed the unit, environment file, firewall effects, and removal path.
SKILL.md:59Execution of an Unpinned Remote Installation Script
SKILL.md:83Installation of a Persistent Systemd Service from Unverified Code
references/json-contracts.md:115Recovery Mnemonic Exposed Through Recommended Automated Setup Output
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
---
name: saturnzap
description: "Non-custodial Lightning wallet for AI agents via `sz` CLI: send/receive sats, pay invoices, auto-pay HTTP 402 (L402), manage channels and liquidity. Use when: (1) paying for API access with Lightning, (2) creating or paying BOLT11 invoices, (3) checking wallet balance or channel health, (4) managing peers and channels. NOT for: on-chain-only Bitcoin transactions, custodial Lightning services."
homepage: https://github.com/lqwdtech/SaturnZap
metadata:
{ "openclaw": { "emoji": "⚡", "os": ["linux"], "requires": { "bins": ["sz"], "env": ["SZ_PASSPHRASE"] }, "optionalEnv": ["SZ_MCP_MAX_SPEND_SATS", "SZ_CLI_MAX_SPEND_SATS", "SZ_NETWORK", "SZ_REGION", "SZ_MAINNET_CONFIRM",
Piping a network response directly into sh creates a classic command-chaining execution path with no inspection boundary, making arbitrary code execution trivial if the downloaded content is malicious or altered. In an agent context this is especially dangerous because automated systems may run the command without human scrutiny.
# Install (one-time) — one-line installer handles uv + the vendored ldk-node wheel
curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lqwdtech/SaturnZap/main/install.sh | sh
# Or, if you prefer the explicit uv invocation:
# uv tool install saturnzap \
Documenting service installation and systemd management expands the skill's capability from wallet actions into host-level persistence and service control. In an agent context, this is dangerous because it could let an AI install or manage long-running software on the host, increasing blast radius well beyond payments and enabling persistence or unauthorized system modification.
The manifest description limits the skill away from 'on-chain-only Bitcoin transactions', implying a Lightning-focused wallet scope. However, the file documents direct on-chain wallet operations such as sz address and sz send, which are substantive Bitcoin on-chain transaction capabilities rather than merely Lightning channel management implementation details.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
sz setup --auto
# 2. Pay for API access (L402, with spending cap)
sz fetch "https://api.example.com/data" --max-sats 100
# 3. Check if operational
sz status # parse: synced, peer_count > 0, usable_channel_count > 0
The documentation actively tells users not to use this skill for on-chain-only Bitcoin transactions, then later provides wallet commands for obtaining an on-chain address and sending on-chain sats. That is a direct contradiction in operator guidance, not merely an omission or nuance.
Writing the mnemonic backup to a local file creates durable secret persistence: anyone who can read that file can fully recover the wallet and spend all funds, independent of the local app. Even with mode 0600, plaintext seed storage on disk is highly sensitive and especially risky on multi-user systems, backups, synced home directories, or compromised hosts.
export SZ_PASSPHRASE="your-secure-passphrase"
# Initialize wallet (first time only — generates BIP39 seed, starts node)
# RECOMMENDED for agent hosts: write the mnemonic to a mode-0600 file instead
# of stdout, so it never lands in tool-call transcripts or orchestrator logs.
sz init --backup-to ~/.saturnzap-mnemonic --no-mnemonic-stdout
Installing a persistent systemd service for a wallet increases the attack surface because the node remains continuously available and holds operational access to encrypted wallet state whenever the passphrase is injected for startup. On a compromised host, persistence can make it easier for an attacker to trigger payments, inspect wallet metadata, or abuse the always-on network service over a longer window.
at rest. Use only if the file itself is protected (`0600`, encrypted home dir,
etc.).
**4. Optional systemd service.** `sz service install` is **optional**. It keeps the
Lightning node running across reboots, which is necessary for payments to clear
reliably. The service runs as the invoking user, writes state under
`~/.local/share/saturnzap/<network>/`, and does not escalate privileges beyond
The example output includes a mnemonic seed phrase, which is the wallet's root secret and grants full recovery and spending authority. In agent ecosystems, examples often get copied into logs, tests, prompts, or screenshots, so normalizing secret-bearing output materially increases risk of credential leakage and wallet compromise.
The manifest frames the skill as a non-custodial Lightning wallet and specifically excludes on-chain-only Bitcoin transactions. However, this contract documents sz address, sz send <address>, and sz balance fields for on-chain funds, which are substantive wallet capabilities beyond a Lightning-only scope.
The L402 fetch flow can automatically spend funds in response to a 402 challenge, but the documentation does not prominently warn that a network request may trigger payment. In an agent setting, this creates a real risk of unintended financial loss, especially if the agent follows links or accesses untrusted endpoints within a configured max-sats threshold.
Fetching and executing a remote install script in one step bypasses normal integrity review and gives the remote source immediate code execution on the host. If the upstream repository, network path, or referenced script is ever compromised, users and agents could execute arbitrary attacker-controlled shell commands.
# Install (one-time) — one-line installer handles uv + the vendored ldk-node wheel
curl -LsSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/lqwdtech/SaturnZap/main/install.sh | sh
# Or, if you prefer the explicit uv invocation:
# uv tool install saturnzap \
Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.
**4. Optional systemd service.** `sz service install` is **optional**. It keeps the
Lightning node running across reboots, which is necessary for payments to clear
reliably. The service runs as the invoking user, writes state under
`~/.local/share/saturnzap/<network>/`, and does not escalate privileges beyond
opening port 9735 via UFW if UFW is active.
**What this skill does NOT do:**