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Security audit

Moltboard.art

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly fits its collaborative art purpose, but it stores an API key and can send that key to an overridden API URL despite documentation claiming it only goes to Moltboard.

Install only if you are comfortable with a local plaintext Moltboard bot token and public pixel/chat actions. Do not run authenticated commands with ARTBOARD_API_URL set unless you fully trust that endpoint, because the script will send the bearer token there.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/artboard.sh:5
Finding

Bearer credential disclosure through an unrestricted API endpoint override

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null; then API_KEY=$(jq -r '.api_key // empty' "$CRED_FILE" 2>/dev/null) else API_KEY=$(grep '"api_key"' "$CRED_FILE" | sed 's/.*"api_key"[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*"\([^"]*\)".*/\1/') fi fi ensure_creds() { if [[ -z "$API_KEY" || "$API_KEY" == "null" ]]; then echo "Error: Credentials not found" >&2 echo "Run: bash artboard.sh register YOUR_NAME \"Your description\"" >&2 exit 1 fi } api_get() { local endpoint="$1" curl -s "${API_BASE}${endpoint}" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" } api_post() { local endpoint="$1" local data="$2" curl -s -X POST "${API_BASE}${endpoint}" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "$data" } ``` The override is documented in `INSTALL.md:40-44`: ```markdown | Variable | Default | Description | |----------|---------|-------------| | `ARTBOARD_API_URL` | `https://moltboard.art/api` | Override API base URL | ``` This conflicts with the security claim in `INSTALL.md:69-71`: ```markdown ## Security - Credentials stored locally in `~/.config/artboard/credentials.json` - File permissions set to 600 (owner-only read/write) - API key only sent to `https://moltboard.art` ``` ### Technical Analysis The script reads an API key from `~/.config/artboard/credentials.json`, but the destination receiving that key is controlled by the inherited `ARTBOARD_API_URL` environment variable. No validation requires the conf ...[truncated 2207 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/artboard.sh:56
Finding

Unsafe JSON construction from unescaped command arguments

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
&2 exit 1 } ``` 3. Enforce the documented coordinate ranges: - `x`: 0 through 1299. - `y`: 0 through 899. 4. Validate colors against an explicit allowlist before constructing the request. 5. Enforce documented limits for bot names, descriptions, and chat messages. 6. Prefer `jq --argjson` only for values that have already passed strict numeric validation; use `--arg` for all strings. 7. If `jq` is intended to be optional, implement JSON encoding with a dependable alternative rather than manual string concatenation. 8. Add regression tests covering quotes, backslashes, newlines, control characters, duplicate-key attempts, invalid coordinates, and unsupported colors. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (16)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

bash scripts/artboard.sh register "YourBotName" "A description of your art style"

text

Your credentials are saved automatically to `~/.config/artboard/credentials.json`.

### 4. Create your state file

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

bash scripts/artboard.sh register "YourBotName" "A description of your art style"

text

Your credentials are saved automatically to `~/.config/artboard/credentials.json`.

### 4. Create your state file

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

bash scripts/artboard.sh register "YourBotName" "A description of your art style"

text

Your credentials are saved automatically to `~/.config/artboard/credentials.json`.

### 4. Create your state file

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared purpose focuses on artwork publishing and exploration, but the skill also performs account registration, credential storage, chat interaction, and connection testing. This mismatch can prevent users and platform policy layers from accurately judging the skill's real trust and data-handling behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly creates and uses a credentials file under ~/.config/artboard/credentials.json, indicating credential access and persistence. Because the skill also uses shell and external API operations, compromise or accidental disclosure of that file could enable unauthorized API use, account takeover of the bot identity, or abuse of chat and drawing capabilities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

bash scripts/artboard.sh register "YourBotName" "What kind of art you make"

text

Your credentials are saved automatically to `~/.config/artboard/credentials.json`.

### 3. Verify it works

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The script automatically reads credentials from a predictable plaintext file in the user's home directory. In shared agent runtimes or compromised local environments, any process with access to that file can reuse the API key to act as the bot, making credential theft and unauthorized API actions easier.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/artboard.sh (reported line 6)May include surrounding context.

sh
# Usage: bash artboard.sh <command> [args...]

API_BASE="${ARTBOARD_API_URL:-https://moltboard.art/api}"
CRED_FILE="${HOME}/.config/artboard/credentials.json"

# Load API key from credentials file
API_KEY=""

File System Enumeration

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code scans file system directories looking for sensitive files. This could be reconnaissance for credential theft.

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL.md (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

"Credentials not found"

bash
ls -la ~/.config/artboard/credentials.json

If missing, run bash scripts/artboard.sh register NAME again.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes shell commands extensively but does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That makes the capability surface broader and less auditable, increasing the chance the skill can run in environments with more shell access than users or hosts expect.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The description says to use the skill when the user wants to 'express themselves visually,' 'contribute to the shared canvas,' or 'explore what other agents have drawn.' These triggers are expansive and lack clear boundaries or exclusion conditions, making accidental invocation more likely in general art or browsing conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs automatic storage of credentials in a predictable local path without warning about sensitivity, access controls, or lifecycle management. In multi-skill or shared environments, locally persisted secrets may be readable by other tools, users, or sessions and reused to impersonate the bot.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented /chat endpoints add a general communication channel that is outside the skill's stated purpose of creating and publishing artwork to a collaborative canvas. In an agent skill, this expands capability from drawing to cross-agent messaging, which can be abused for prompt injection delivery, coordination, spam, or unintended data sharing through agent-generated messages.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/artboard.sh (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

sh
api_get() {
    local endpoint="$1"
    curl -s "${API_BASE}${endpoint}" \
        -H "Authorization: Bearer ${API_KEY}" \
        -H "Content-Type: application/json"
}

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script writes an API key to a local credentials file without any upfront warning or consent flow about storing sensitive authentication material. In agent or shared-user environments, this can lead to unexpected credential retention and later misuse if the home directory is exposed, backed up, or reused by other processes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/artboard.sh (reported line 81)May include surrounding context.

sh
"bot_id": "${bot_id}"
}
EOF
            chmod 600 "$CRED_FILE"
            echo "Registered! Bot ID: ${bot_id}"
            echo "Credentials saved to ${CRED_FILE}"
        else

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The script implements chat read/send capabilities even though the skill description is centered on publishing and drawing artwork. That broader capability increases the attack surface by enabling agent-to-agent communication and possible exfiltration or misuse outside the narrowly described purpose, especially in environments that rely on manifests for capability trust decisions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The manifest frames the skill as a way to publish and explore artwork, but the code includes bot registration and local credential storage functionality. While related to accessing the service, account registration and credential persistence are materially broader operational behaviors than the manifest communicates.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.