T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
src/index.js:103- Finding
Unsanitized user queries can be transmitted to cloud providers
- Content
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text.toLowerCase().includes(kw)); } ``` ### Technical Analysis The context stripper is applied only to the `context` argument. The original user-controlled `query` is passed unchanged to `executeCloud()` and then to `openclaw.query()`. Consequently, credentials, personal information, proprietary source code, medical information, financial records, or document content embedded directly in a query are not redacted. This contradicts the documentation's claim that the user's actual questions and secrets never leave the local system. The privacy-routing heuristic does not provide an adequate compensating control. It detects only five broad substrings and does not inspect common secret formats, personal identifiers, access tokens, private keys, source code, or attached document content. The heuristic also cannot prove that a query is safe for external disclosure. ### Attack Path 1. A user submits a complex query containing private informa ...[truncated 1160 chars]- Remediation
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