T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/video_generate.py:33- Finding
Unrestricted Local File Encoding and Transmission
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/video_generate.py, lines 33-43 and 72-79
Vulnerability Type: Arbitrary local file disclosure through insufficient input validation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python if os.path.isfile(image_input): try: mime_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(image_input) if not mime_type: # Fallback or default mime_type = "image/png" with open(image_input, "rb") as image_file: encoded_string = base64.b64encode(image_file.read()).decode("utf-8") return f"data:{mime_type};base64,{encoded_string}" except Exception as e: print(f"Failed to read or encode image file {image_input}: {e}") return None return image_inputThe resulting data is subsequently submitted to the remote Ark service:
python if first_frame_image: image_url_or_base64 = get_image_content(first_frame_image) if image_url_or_base64: content.append( {"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": image_url_or_base64}} )Technical Analysis
The first-frame argument can refer to any file readable by the process. The code does not restrict the file to an approved workspace, validate its binary signature, enforce an image MIME-type allowlist, reject symbolic links, or impose a maximum size.
If MIME-type detection fails, the file is labeled as
image/pngregardless of its actual contents. The complete file is then read into memory, Base64-encoded, embedded in a data URI, and included in a request submitted through the Ark client.Base64 encoding is consistent with the documented first-frame image feature and is not, by itself, evidence of a covert exfiltration channel. However, the missing validation means that credentials, configuration files, private keys, or other non-image data can be transmitted using the same channel. This exceeds the minimum local-file access needed to upload a legitimate ...[truncated 1612 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Resolve the supplied path to its canonical form and require it to remain under an explicitly approved input directory.
- Reject path traversal, unexpected absolute paths, and symbolic links where symlink support is not required.
- Permit only necessary image formats, such as PNG, JPEG, or WebP.
- Validate the actual file signature with a trusted image parser rather than relying only on the extension returned by
mimetypes.guess_type(). - Remove the fallback that labels arbitrary files as
image/png; reject unknown or unsupported content instead. - Enforce a conservative maximum file size before opening the file and use bounded or streaming reads where supported.
- Decode and validate the image to ensure it is structurally valid before transmission.
- Clearly notify the user that the selected local file will be sent to a remote service and require explicit confirmation for local-file uploads.
- Avoid including local paths or file content in error messages and logs beyond what is operationally necessary.
