ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

zqcc Qichacha Relay

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a disclosed connector for a paid enterprise-data API, with credential and billing risks that users should handle carefully but no artifact-backed hidden or malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable sending enterprise-research queries to zqcc.mkstone.club with a paid AppKey. Keep ZQCC_APP_KEY out of prompts, logs, screenshots, repositories, and shared terminal output; be especially careful with the config command because it prints a usable Authorization header. Use separate session IDs for separate users or matters, and limit returned company, contact, litigation, and executive data to what the task requires.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly instructs use of shell commands and bundled scripts (`./scripts/zqcc.sh`, `curl`, `jq`) but does not declare corresponding permissions or execution capabilities. Undeclared shell capability weakens policy enforcement and review because a host may expose command execution paths that users and security controls were not clearly told this skill needs; in this skill, that shell access is used with a paid secret (`ZQCC_APP_KEY`), increasing the risk of credential exposure or unintended outbound requests if the script behavior changes or is compromised.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The config command prints a ready-to-use Authorization header containing the live app key directly to stdout. This can leak credentials through terminal scrollback, shell history capture workflows, logging systems, CI job output, screen sharing, or accidental paste into tickets and chats, enabling unauthorized use of the zqcc account.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.