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Security audit

Anysearch

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a legitimate web search skill, but its broad activation rules and credential handling deserve review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable sending search terms, identifiers, and URLs to AnySearch. Prefer anonymous mode or an environment variable for the API key, avoid the --api_key flag, keep the skill .env file restricted to ANYSEARCH_API_KEY only, and do not use this skill for secrets, private internal URLs, or sensitive regulated data without explicit approval.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/anysearch_cli.sh:38
Finding

API Key Exposure Through Process Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null) ``` The shell command handlers also accept the secret directly through a command-line option: ```bash --api_key) API_KEY="$2"; shift 2 ;; ``` The Python implementation exposes the same user-facing option: ```python parser.add_argument("--api_key", default=os.environ.get("ANYSEARCH_API_KEY", ""), help="API key (optional)") ``` ### Technical Analysis The Bash implementation constructs an `Authorization` header containing the AnySearch API key and passes that header to `curl` as a command-line argument. As a result, even a key originally loaded from a protected environment file is copied into the argument vector of the spawned `curl` process. Depending on operating-system settings, process arguments can be visible through process inspection utilities, process accounting, endpoint monitoring, diagnostic collection, crash reports, or command execution logs. The explicitly supported `--api_key` option introduces an additional exposure route because the secret may also be recorded in shell history and appears in the parent CLI process arguments. This network authent ...[truncated 1304 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/anysearch_cli.py:18
Finding

Overbroad Environment-File Loading Permits Process Environment Injection

Content
View full analysis
/dev/null || true)" [[ -z "$line" || "$line" != *=* ]] && continue local key="${line%%=*}" local val="${line#*=}" val="$(echo "$val" | sed 's/^[\"\x27]\|[\"\x27]$//g')" export "$key=$val" done < "$env_path" fi done } ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill only requires one configuration value, `ANYSEARCH_API_KEY`, but both implementations accept every key-value assignment found in either `scripts/.env` or the parent `.env` and export those values into the process environment. This exceeds the minimum configuration privilege needed for the declared functionality. Environment variabl ...[truncated 2103 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (15)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
- name: ANYSEARCH_API_KEY
    required: false
    description: "API key for higher rate limits. Anonymous access available with lower rate limits."
    storage: ".env file, environment variable, or --api_key CLI flag"
---

## Overview

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/anysearch_cli.py (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

python
fi

_load_env() {
  for env_path in "$SCRIPT_DIR/.env" "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_path" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/anysearch_cli.sh (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

sh
fi

_load_env() {
  for env_path in "$SCRIPT_DIR/.env" "$SCRIPT_DIR/../.env"; do
    if [[ -f "$env_path" ]]; then
      while IFS= read -r line || [[ -n "$line" ]]; do
        line="${line%%#*}"

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises and instructs use of shell, file reads, environment variables, and network access, but does not declare an explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That makes the skill easier to invoke with broader-than-necessary capabilities and reduces the host's ability to enforce least privilege or warn users about what resources may be touched.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill description says it is a real-time search service but does not clearly disclose that user queries and requested URLs may be transmitted to an external provider. This creates a privacy and data-handling risk because users and orchestrators may not realize potentially sensitive prompts, identifiers, or internal URLs are leaving the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The trigger conditions are very broad, covering generic information retrieval, fact-checking, web browsing, and multi-intent queries. In practice this can cause the skill to activate for many ordinary prompts, increasing unnecessary external requests and the chance that user data or browsing targets are sent to a third-party service without a clear need.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/anysearch_cli.py (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

python
"params": {"name": tool_name, "arguments": arguments},
    }
    try:
        resp = requests.post(ENDPOINT, json=payload, headers=_build_headers(api_key), timeout=30)
        resp.raise_for_status()
    except requests.exceptions.HTTPError as e:
        print(f"HTTP Error: {e}", file=sys.stderr)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The script unconditionally exports LANG and LC_ALL to en_US.UTF-8, which imposes a specific language/locale setting on every execution. This is a natural-language policy concern because it removes user locale choice and no opt-in or justification is provided in the file.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/anysearch_cli.py (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

python
export LANG=en_US.UTF-8
export LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8

ENDPOINT="https://api.anysearch.com/mcp"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"

if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/anysearch_cli.sh (reported line 5)May include surrounding context.

sh
export LANG=en_US.UTF-8
export LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8

ENDPOINT="https://api.anysearch.com/mcp"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"

if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/shared/constants.json (reported line 2)May include surrounding context.

json
export LANG=en_US.UTF-8
export LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8

ENDPOINT="https://api.anysearch.com/mcp"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"

if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/shared/doc_spec.md (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

md
export LANG=en_US.UTF-8
export LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8

ENDPOINT="https://api.anysearch.com/mcp"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"

if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/anysearch_cli.sh (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

sh
'{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":$name,"arguments":$args}}')

  local response
  response=$(curl -s -X POST "$ENDPOINT" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    "${auth_args[@]}" \
    -d "$payload" \

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The specification explicitly supports fetching arbitrary user-supplied URLs and returning full page content, but it does not document safety boundaries, privacy implications, or restrictions on sensitive/internal targets. In an agent context, this can enable unintended outbound requests, retrieval of sensitive content, or SSRF-style abuse if the implementation does not strictly constrain reachable destinations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The specification includes a Chinese-only query_format example and multiple Chinese-language search examples, which can steer the skill toward a specific language/locale. The document does not state that this is optional, user-selected, or required for a region-specific mode, so it appears to impose a locale preference without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.