Security audit

Turn Any Book into a Working Agent 一键把书变成员工

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill has a coherent book-to-agent purpose, but it turns untrusted book text into persistent agent instructions and filesystem paths without enough safeguards.

Review this carefully before installing. Use it only with trusted books or in a sandbox, inspect every generated SKILL.md before adding it to a real skill library, replace book-derived directory names with safe slugs, and pin dependencies in a virtual environment. Do not let generated skills auto-install or auto-activate without human approval.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error

Location: SKILL.md:62
Finding: Untrusted book content is embedded into executable skill instructions
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

Location: SKILL.md:281
Finding: Path traversal through an unvalidated book-derived agent name
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:374
Finding: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (7)

Ae1

High

Category: analysis-evasion
Confidence: 100% confidence
Finding: Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 237)May include surrounding context.
md
output = sys.argv[2] if len(sys.argv) > 2 else 'SKILL.md'

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The skill description and generated prompts are written as if the skill operates in Chinese by default, and later generated activation phrases and outputs are also hard-coded in Chinese. There is no indication that users can opt into another language or that the locale restriction is required for a region-specific purpose.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The activation phrase is a natural-language template ('请作为《{book_title}》专家帮助我...') that is broad enough to overlap with ordinary conversation and can trigger unintentionally. In multi-skill environments, ambiguous invocation increases the chance of accidental activation of a generated expert persona, leading to unintended behavior or unsafe delegation.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 92% confidence
Finding: The documented activation method tells users to invoke the skill with a common conversational phrase, without any delimiter, namespace, or trigger constraints. That makes accidental invocation and cross-skill collisions more likely, especially because the generated agent names are based on arbitrary book-derived text.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The advertised example trigger is overly generic and encourages deployment with a phrase that could appear in normal user requests. This is risky because the skill generates new agents dynamically, so ambiguous examples normalize unsafe invocation patterns at scale.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: The Windows example repeats the same broad natural-language activation guidance, reinforcing an unsafe invocation pattern across platforms. Repetition in examples increases the likelihood that users and downstream tool builders adopt ambiguous triggers unchanged.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The documentation states generated agents will not exceed the book's knowledge scope, but the implementation always adds generic capabilities such as '提供专业咨询和建议' and '制定行动计划' regardless of extracted source content. This creates a trust mismatch: users may rely on the generated agent as if it were strictly grounded in the uploaded book when it is actually granted broader advisory framing.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.