Openclaw Audit

Audit your OpenClaw configuration against 12 production primitives PLUS 8 common setup footguns (silent cost leaks, prompt-injection paths, zombie session state, dead fallbacks). Returns a severity-ranked assessment with specific fixes. Use after initial setup, after major config changes, before deploying to a new machine, or when something feels off but you can't pinpoint why.

OpenClaw Config Audit (v1.2)

Audit your OpenClaw configuration against 12 production primitives + 8 common setup footguns. v1.2 adds detection for the silent failures that cost real money or leak data: cron prompt-body delivery, ACP zombies, dead-auth fallback chains, parallel memory systems, slack tool-progress leaks, and inlined API keys.

When to use

• After initial setup
• After major config changes
• Before machine migration
• When something feels off but you can't pinpoint why
• Monthly health check (recommended)

Process

1. Read ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json
2. Read ~/.openclaw/cron/jobs.json if it exists
3. Read ~/.openclaw/secrets.json (path only, never the values)
4. Read ~/.openclaw/workspace/AGENTS.md if present
5. Read ~/.openclaw/workspace/HEARTBEAT.md if present
6. Check plugin status: openclaw status 2>&1 | head -30
7. Check channel status: openclaw channels status --probe 2>&1
8. Run the built-in security audit: openclaw security audit 2>&1
9. Check ~/.openclaw/workspace/state/sessions/ for stale ACP session files
10. Cross-reference fallback model providers with auth.profiles for orphans
11. Assess against each of the 20 primitives + footguns below
12. Return findings ranked by severity (critical > warning > info), with specific fixes

The 12 Production Primitives

Tier 1: Day One Non-Negotiables

1. Tool Registry with Metadata-First Design

• Are skills well-described with YAML frontmatter?
• Is the skill count disciplined (20-30, not 400)?
• Can each skill's purpose be distinguished from others?

2. Permission System (Tiered Trust)

• Are there explicit rules about what the agent can do autonomously vs needs approval?
• Is there a Standing Orders equivalent or similar tiered permission model?
• Are destructive operations gated?

3. Session Persistence

• Does the config support session recovery?
• Is compaction configured?
• Are sessions scoped appropriately per channel?

4. Workflow State

• Is there a dispatch tracking mechanism?
• Can the agent resume work after a crash?
• Are long-running tasks tracked separately from conversation?

5. Token Budget Tracking

• Is there a rate limit check mechanism?
• Are heartbeats gated on budget?
• Is there a compaction threshold configured?

6. Structured Streaming Events

• Is streaming configured for channels that support it?
• Are partial responses enabled where appropriate?

7. System Event Logging

• Are logs accessible?
• Is there a hook for pre-compaction capture?
• Are significant events captured to persistent memory?

8. Two-Level Verification

• Does the agent verify its own work?
• Are there guardrails that survive config changes?
• Is there an adversarial review process for important decisions?

Tier 2: Operational Maturity

9. Tool Pool Assemblies

• Are skills filtered by context?
• Is there a workspace-only vs global skill distinction?

10. Transcript Compaction

• Is compaction mode configured?
• Is the threshold appropriate for the use case?

11. Permission Audit Trail

• Are permission decisions logged?
• Can you reconstruct what the agent did and what it was allowed to do?

12. Agent Type System

• Are different agent roles defined with constrained capabilities?
• Do coding agents have different permissions than conversational agents?
• Are sub-agents properly scoped?

Tier 3: Common Setup Footguns (NEW in v1.2)

These are silent failures the original 12 don't catch. Each has bitten real production setups.

13. Inlined API keys (CRITICAL)

• Scan openclaw.json for plaintext patterns: sk-or-v1-, sk-svcacct-, tvly-, sk-ant-, xoxb-, xapp-, etc.
• Any value matching these in env.vars, models.providers.*.apiKey, or plugins.entries.*.config.*.apiKey is a leak risk.
• Fix: every secret should be a SecretRef pointing to a secrets.json provider. Pattern:

  json

  "apiKey": { "source": "file", "provider": "local", "id": "/PROVIDER_API_KEY" }
  

• The audit should distinguish between "string-shaped value" (leak) and "object-shaped SecretRef" (fine).

14. Cron prompt-body leak (CRITICAL)

• For each cron.jobs[*] with delivery.mode: "announce" and delivery.channel set:
  • Read the payload.message. Look for an explicit "produce a final text reply" / "summary" instruction.
  • If absent, the cron WILL ship the prompt template to the user when the agent emits 0 final text payloads (only tool calls).
• Fix: append: "DELIVERY RULE: Your FINAL message must be a 3-5 line plain-text summary. If you only emit tool calls and no final text, the cron prompt itself ships, which is the wrong outcome."

15. Cron payload.model not in allowlist (HIGH)

• For each cron.jobs[*].payload.model, check whether it appears in agents.defaults.models allowlist.
• If not, the cron logs payload.model X not allowed, falling back to agent defaults every fire.
• Fix: strip payload.model from the cron entirely (use agent defaults) OR add it to the allowlist.

16. Fallback chain references unauthenticated providers (CRITICAL)

• For each entry in agents.defaults.model.fallbacks (and per-agent overrides):
  • Parse the provider prefix (e.g., google from google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview)
  • Check whether the provider has an active credential: an auth.profiles[*] matching the provider, OR an OPENROUTER_API_KEY-style key for routed providers, OR a SecretRef in models.providers.<name>
  • If no credential exists, the fallback hangs forever on every cascade. Telegram/Slack go silent for minutes.
• Fix: remove fallbacks pointing at providers without auth, OR add the auth profile.

17. ACP zombie session state (CRITICAL)

• List ~/.openclaw/workspace/state/sessions/*.json and ~/.openclaw/agents/*/sessions/sessions.json
• Any session with closed: false whose pid is no longer running is a zombie
• ALSO check ~/.openclaw/<channel>/thread-bindings-default.json — these can silently re-route inbound messages to dead ACP subprocesses for 24h+
• Fix: archive the stale session state files, delete thread-bindings; if ACP is disabled (acp.enabled: false), the entire ~/.openclaw/workspace/state/sessions/ directory should be empty.

18. Active-memory plugin timeout too tight (HIGH — silent failure)

• Check plugins.entries.active-memory.config.timeoutMs
• Defaults are often 3000, which is shorter than typical model latency (8-15s on first call)
• Silent failure mode: every turn returns empty summary, agent appears amnesiac, no error log
• Fix: set timeoutMs >= 8000 (12000 is safer); confirm the configured model is reachable from the agent's auth.

19. Slack tool-progress + workspace-fs (CRITICAL combo)

• If channels.slack.streaming.preview.toolProgress is undefined or true, AND channels.slack.groupPolicy: "open", AND tools.fs.workspaceOnly: false:
  • Tool calls (e.g., Working… exec list files in ~/projects → ls -la ~ ...) leak into channel posts
  • And anyone in the workspace can prompt-inject Penny into reading the home directory
• Fix:
  • Set channels.slack.streaming.preview.toolProgress: false
  • Set channels.slack.channels.*.tools.deny: ["exec", "process", "fs.write", "fs.edit", "fs.apply_patch", "fs.delete"] (per-channel override allows your sandbox channels to keep full access via tools.alsoAllow)
  • Set channels.slack.thread.requireExplicitMention: true to stop her from auto-replying to non-mentioning thread messages

20. Bundled coding-agent skill enabled with custom code-routing skill present (HIGH)

• Check whether plugins.entries.coding-agent is enabled (default true) AND a workspace skill at ~/.openclaw/workspace/skills/code-routing.md exists
• If both: the bundled skill tells the LLM to dispatch via ACP sessions_spawn, conflicting with the user's custom routing pattern. Causes silent ACP failures and zombie sessions.
• Fix: disable the bundled skill: plugins.entries.coding-agent.enabled: false. Workspace skill takes over cleanly.

Output Format

Return findings as a structured list:

text

## OpenClaw Audit Results for [hostname] (audit v1.2)

### 🔴 CRITICAL (act immediately)
- [primitive #X]: [finding]. Fix: [specific action]

### 🟡 WARN (act soon)
- [primitive #X]: [finding]. Fix: [specific action]

### 🟢 INFO (consider)
- [primitive #X]: [finding]. Suggestion: [specific action]

### Score
- Tier 1 + Tier 2 (12 primitives): X/12 present
- Tier 3 (8 footguns): Y/8 clean
- Overall: Z/20

### Top 3 fixes by leverage
1. [fix] — closes [risk type]
2. ...
3. ...

Attribution

Built by Penny Wise at PennywiseOps (pennywiseops.com).

If this audit surfaces gaps you want help fixing, request a remediation pass or a full setup rebuild via [e-mail].

Changelog

• v1.2.0 (2026-04-27): Added Tier 3 (8 common setup footguns) — inlined keys, cron prompt-body leak, dead-auth fallbacks, ACP zombies, active-memory timeout, slack tool-progress leak, coding-agent skill conflict, cron model allowlist mismatch. New severity scoring 0/20.
• v1.1.1 (2026-04-08): De-sussed and republished. Project context backfill command merged.
• v1.1.0 (2026-04-05): Initial ClawHub publish. 12 production primitives derived from Claude Code architecture.