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Security audit

CLAUDE.md Auto Discovery

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not destructive, but it automatically loads local CLAUDE.md files into privileged agent context without enough scoping or user control.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It should only be used in repositories where you trust the CLAUDE.md files in the project and its parent directories. Prefer an implementation that runs only on explicit request, shows exactly which files will be loaded, and treats repository instructions as untrusted reference text rather than privileged system instructions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:12
Finding

Untrusted Project and Ancestor Files Can Be Loaded as Privileged Agent Instructions

Content
View full analysis
MAX_CHARS: combin ...[truncated 4442 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill is configured to run automatically on every user message, which creates an overly broad trigger surface for reading local project files without an explicit user request. In this context, the skill then traverses directories, loads CLAUDE.md content, and injects it into system context, increasing the risk of prompt injection, unintended disclosure of sensitive instructions, and surprising behavior across all conversations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The implementation states that the skill reads CLAUDE.md files, processes @include directives, and injects the resulting content into system context, but the description does not warn the user that local files are being automatically consumed. This reduces informed consent and makes prompt-injection risk worse, because attacker-controlled repository files can influence model behavior through hidden context loading.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 4

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Automatically discovering and loading CLAUDE.md files from ancestor directories creates an implicit trust chain where higher-level files can silently inject instructions into the model context. This is dangerous in prompt-injection terms because unrelated or malicious parent-directory content can override project-local intent and steer agent behavior without visibility or approval from the user.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The script automatically reads local CLAUDE.md files from the current and ancestor directories and prints their contents for injection into model context, which can expose sensitive local instructions, secrets, internal paths, or policy text without any explicit consent or warning. In an agent-skill context, this is particularly risky because the discovered content is not just displayed but may directly influence downstream model behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

All user-facing natural-language content in the file is presented in Chinese, with no indication that the user can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally region-specific. This can be a language/locale policy concern when a skill implicitly forces one language without opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

User-facing descriptive text and docstrings are written in Chinese, which can impose a language preference on users or maintainers without opt-in. The file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or provide an alternative language option.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.