T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:30- Finding
Automatic Installation and Execution of an Unpinned Remote Go Package
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a legitimate market-analysis purpose, but it tells the agent to silently install or update an unpinned external Go binary before running analysis.
Install only if you are comfortable with an agent running a third-party signalbot binary. Prefer installing a pinned, verified release yourself, avoid automatic @latest updates, and review any cron jobs before enabling scheduled analysis or generated posts.
SKILL.md:30Automatic Installation and Execution of an Unpinned Remote Go Package
OPENCLAW_USAGE.md:27Unverified Latest Release Binaries Are Installed into a Global Executable Path
The skill explicitly says to auto-install the package '无需询问用户', meaning a system-changing command may be run without user knowledge or consent. This is dangerous because it violates least surprise and safe-agent boundaries, and could expose the environment to malicious or compromised upstream code.
The skill authorizes automatic updates without warning the user that a local binary will be modified. Silent updates are risky because they change the execution environment, may introduce unreviewed behavior, and can be abused through dependency or repository compromise.
The guide instructs users to download release binaries with curl directly into /usr/local/bin and make them executable, but provides no integrity verification, signature checking, or trust warning. This creates a real supply-chain risk: if the release asset, repository, network path, or mirror is compromised, users may install and run attacker-controlled code with broad system impact.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/signalbot
cp /path/to/signalbot/skills/signalbot/SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/signalbot/
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/signalbot
cp /path/to/signalbot/skills/signalbot/SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/signalbot/
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/skills/signalbot
cp /path/to/signalbot/skills/signalbot/SKILL.md ~/.openclaw/skills/signalbot/
The trigger conditions are broad enough to match many ordinary market-related prompts, making unintended invocation likely. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill also contains automatic execution and installation behaviors, so accidental triggering could lead directly to host actions the user did not request.
The skill directs the agent to automatically install a Go package from the network via go install ...@latest without user approval. This is dangerous because it causes a system-changing action and executes unpinned third-party code supply-chain style, which exceeds the expected scope of a market-analysis skill.
The '推文生成指南' requires generating a '中文行情分析推文', which forces a specific language for output. There is no indication that the user can choose another language or opt into Chinese, making this a natural-language locale policy issue.
The skill instructs the agent to autonomously update the binary to @latest, which is a system-modifying network operation unrelated to a single analysis request. This creates supply-chain and change-control risk because unreviewed code can be fetched and executed without user awareness.
The markdown provides multiple openclaw cron add examples that will run on a schedule and generate reports or alert tweets automatically. The file does not warn users that these jobs operate unattended and may repeatedly call external services or produce output without manual review.
The skill requires using shell/exec tooling to probe the environment (which signalbot) and then conditionally proceed with binary execution. While limited in scope, this expands the agent from analysis into host inspection and command execution, increasing attack surface and enabling follow-on actions such as installation or arbitrary local binary execution.