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Security audit

Parliament CLI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a straightforward UK Parliament lookup skill, with the main caution being its unpinned global npm CLI install.

Before installing, consider whether you trust the npm package publisher and whether a global install is acceptable in your environment. A pinned version or isolated install would reduce supply-chain risk, but the reviewed skill instructions themselves are coherent and limited to public Parliament data lookup.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:9
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Package Installed as a Global Executable

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:9-18; the global installation command is also documented at SKILL.md:31
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
"openclaw":
  {
    "emoji": "🏛️",
    "requires": { "bins": ["parliament"] },
    "install":
      [
        {
          "id": "npm",
          "kind": "node",
          "package": "@shan8851/parliament-cli",
          "bins": ["parliament"],
          "label": "Install parliament-cli (npm)",
        },
      ],
  },

The corresponding setup instruction at line 31 is:

markdown
- `npm install -g @shan8851/parliament-cli`

Technical Analysis

The Skill requires installation of @shan8851/parliament-cli without pinning an exact version or providing a verified integrity digest. It also directs users to install the package globally. The audited project contains no source code for this dependency, lockfile, package archive, checksum, or provenance evidence that would allow its effective behavior to be reviewed from the project itself.

npm packages may execute lifecycle scripts during installation. A mutable package release can also alter the installed parliament executable after this Skill has been reviewed. Global installation increases exposure by making that executable broadly available in the installing user's environment.

This does not prove that the current package is malicious. The vulnerability is the unverified, mutable supply-chain trust boundary created by automatically installing and executing an external package.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package repository, build pipeline, or another component involved in publishing @shan8851/parliament-cli.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious package version under the same package name.
  3. A user or agent follows the ...[truncated 1258 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than using a mutable package reference.
  2. Record and verify the package artifact's cryptographic integrity and trusted publication provenance.
  3. Include the dependency's auditable source or a reproducible-build reference so its installation and runtime behavior can be independently reviewed.
  4. Prefer a project-local or isolated installation over npm install -g to reduce environmental exposure.
  5. Disable npm lifecycle scripts during installation where they are unnecessary, and separately verify that the CLI functions correctly without them.
  6. Review the selected package version, including its transitive dependencies, lifecycle scripts, executable entry point, network behavior, and release history.
  7. Use a lockfile or equivalent controlled dependency manifest in an isolated wrapper project and apply automated dependency and provenance checks before upgrades.
  8. Document a controlled upgrade process requiring security review before changing the pinned version or integrity value.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep