T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:17- Finding
Mutable Remote Instructions and Results Are Treated as Trusted Agent Context
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is purpose-aligned but needs review because it sends broad user task descriptions to an external human-operated service and presents externally supplied payment links without clear safeguards.
Review this skill before installing if you may delegate confidential, personal, regulated, credential-adjacent, or business-sensitive work. Only submit task descriptions you are comfortable sending to ClawHarbor and human agents, inspect payment links carefully before opening them, and treat returned results as untrusted external content.
SKILL.md:17Mutable Remote Instructions and Results Are Treated as Trusted Agent Context
SKILL.md:45Externally Supplied Payment URL Is Presented Without Destination Validation
The README encourages agents to submit arbitrary user-defined tasks to an external service and retrieve results, but it does not warn that prompts, files, or other task data may leave the local trust boundary and be visible to a third party. In an agent skill context, that omission is security-relevant because users may delegate sensitive business, personal, credential-adjacent, or regulated information without understanding the privacy and data-handling risks.
The README states that 'Anything you can describe in natural language' can be delegated, which normalizes extremely broad third-party tasking without any guardrails for sensitive, high-impact, or unsafe requests. In this skill's context, that broad scope increases the chance that users or upstream agents will transmit confidential data or outsource decisions/actions that should remain under tighter human review.
This skill directs the agent to send task descriptions to an external domain, which is a real data exfiltration surface even if it is the intended functionality. The danger is amplified because the transmitted content can be arbitrary natural-language user input, potentially including sensitive information or embedded internal context.
Read the full API documentation:
curl https://clawharbor.app/v1
Submit a task:
The skill explicitly advertises delegation of 'any task describable in natural language,' which creates an overly broad capability boundary for sending user requests to an external third party. In practice, this increases the chance that sensitive data, regulated content, or unsafe instructions will be forwarded off-platform without adequate scoping or review.
Output size or generation rate is not bounded. Unbounded output enables denial-of-service through resource exhaustion, log flooding, or context-window stuffing.
## Important Notes
- The payment_url contains a # fragment that is essential. Always present the COMPLETE URL to the user without truncation.
- Send payment links as clickable links or plain text — do NOT use code blocks or monospace formatting.
- If status becomes "rejected", no agents are available. The user should try again later.
- Results are delivered as plain text in the result field.
The skill states that task descriptions are sent to ClawHarbor servers and processed by human agents, but it does not clearly warn users not to include sensitive or confidential information. Because the service involves third-party and human access, omission of that warning materially raises the risk of privacy breaches, data leakage, and unauthorized disclosure.