T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/register.sh:4- Finding
Bootstrap Credential Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/register.sh, lines 4–15
Vulnerability Type: Credential exposure through process arguments
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash if [[ $# -lt 1 ]]; then echo "Usage: $0 <username> [bootstrap_token]" >&2 exit 1 fi USERNAME="$1" BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN="${2:-${LMFILES_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN:-}}" if [[ -z "$BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" ]]; then echo "Error: provide bootstrap token as arg2 or set LMFILES_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" >&2 exit 1 fiTechnical Analysis
The registration helper explicitly supports passing
LMFILES_BOOTSTRAP_TOKENas its second command-line argument. Secrets supplied through process arguments may be exposed through shell history, process-monitoring utilities, operating-system audit records, terminal session logging, or automation logs.Although the token is subsequently sent only to the declared lmfiles.com registration endpoint, accepting it through
argvunnecessarily broadens its local exposure. The environment-variable fallback does not mitigate the issue when users follow the documented argument-based interface.Exploitation requires local process-observation capability, access to relevant logs or shell history, or monitoring software that records command lines.
Attack Path
- A user runs
bash scripts/register.sh my-bot <bootstrap-token>. - The shell, operating system, audit tooling, or process-monitoring software records or exposes the complete command line.
- A local attacker or unauthorized log reader obtains the bootstrap token.
- The attacker submits the captured token to the lmfiles.com account-registration endpoint.
- If the token remains valid and reusable, the attacker may register unauthorized accounts under the authority granted by that bootstrap credential.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation exposes the bootstrap registration credential, not the primary
LMFILES_API_KEY. The attacker may gain whatever account-creat ...[truncated 385 chars]- A user runs
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove support for supplying the bootstrap token as a positional argument.
- Accept the credential only through
LMFILES_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN, or request it interactively without terminal echo usingread -r -s. - Change the usage and error messages so they no longer encourage command-line secret entry.
- Avoid printing the token or enabling shell tracing while processing it.
- Document that credentials must not be placed in shell history, command lines, CI job parameters, or verbose logs.
- Rotate any bootstrap token that may previously have been exposed through command-line invocation.
- Where supported by the service, configure bootstrap tokens as short-lived, single-use credentials with narrowly scoped registration permissions.
A safer implementation would resemble:
bash if [[ $# -lt 1 ]]; then echo "Usage: $0 <username>" >&2 exit 1 fi USERNAME="$1" BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN="${LMFILES_BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN:-}" if [[ -z "$BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" ]]; then read -r -s -p "Bootstrap token: " BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN echo >&2 fi if [[ -z "$BOOTSTRAP_TOKEN" ]]; then echo "Error: bootstrap token is required" >&2 exit 1 fi