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Security audit

Value Tracker

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a local value-tracking utility that writes task records to a local JSON file; it has a low-risk packaging issue because it ships with populated operational history.

Before installing, be aware that logged task descriptions and notes are stored locally in data.json and can be included in exports. Review or clear the bundled data.json and avoid logging sensitive business, customer, credential, or personal information unless you are comfortable retaining it locally.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
data.json:3
Finding

Plaintext Operational Metadata Distributed with the Skill

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: data.json, lines 3–256
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive operational data exposure
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Data

json
{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-26T22:05:08.819698",
  "date": "2026-01-26",
  "category": "tech",
  "task": "integration_setup",
  "hours": 2.0,
  "notes": "Toast API"
},
{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-26T22:05:08.888779",
  "date": "2026-01-26",
  "category": "tech",
  "task": "integration_setup",
  "hours": 1.5,
  "notes": "Microsoft Graph (Outlook)"
},
{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-26T22:05:09.081477",
  "date": "2026-01-26",
  "category": "tech",
  "task": "automation_created",
  "hours": 1.0,
  "notes": "Morning Briefing cron"
},
{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-26T22:05:09.244674",
  "date": "2026-01-26",
  "category": "research",
  "task": "competitive_analysis",
  "hours": 3.0,
  "notes": "Bulla Gastrobar deep dive"
},
{
  "timestamp": "2026-01-26T22:05:09.631587",
  "date": "2026-01-26",
  "category": "sales",
  "task": "pipeline_review",
  "hours": 0.5,
  "notes": "Pipedrive analysis"
}

Technical Analysis

The distributed data file contains 30 timestamped operational records in plaintext. These records disclose third-party integrations, scheduled automation names, business research subjects, communication tooling, sales systems, and project-related activities.

The records are not required for the application to function. The tracker can operate with an empty data structure such as {"entries": []}. Shipping runtime-generated operational history in the package therefore creates unnecessary information exposure.

No credentials, authentication tokens, or direct secrets were identified in the reviewed data. Exploitation requires access to the project directory, repository, release archive, backup, or another copy of the package.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker obtains read a ...[truncated 1092 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the distributed file with a clean initial state:

    json
    {
      "entries": []
    }
    
  2. Exclude runtime-generated data.json files from version control and release archives, while retaining a sanitized template such as data.example.json.

  3. If demonstration records are necessary, use clearly synthetic organization names, timestamps, integrations, and activities.

  4. Add a release-stage check that detects populated runtime data, credentials, tokens, personal information, and internal project names.

  5. Store user-generated records in a user-specific application data directory rather than inside the installed Skill directory.

  6. Restrict file permissions where records may contain confidential descriptions or notes.

  7. Document data-retention, backup, sanitization, and deletion procedures for users.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tracker.py (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

python
return {"entries": []}

def save_data(data):
    """Save data to file."""
    with open(DATA_FILE, 'w') as f:
        json.dump(data, f, indent=2)

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This markdown file documents that tasks are stored in data.json and can be exported as JSON for dashboards, which may include sensitive business details from task descriptions. While it notes backups, it does not warn users that logged content may persist locally and be exposed through exports or downstream tools.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.