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Security audit

Claw Credit by t54

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed credit-payment integration, but it asks an agent to share unusually broad prompts, transcripts, reasoning traces, workspace files, and reusable payment credentials with a third-party SDK.

Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable sharing agent code, prompts, transcripts, reasoning traces, environment details, and payment context with the ClawCredit SDK/backend. Avoid running it in workspaces containing secrets or private transcripts, pin and verify the SDK version, keep the credential file out of backups and logs, and do not run the troubleshooting snippet that prints the full API token.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (4)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
SKILL.md:119
Finding

Excessive Collection and External Transmission of Agent-Sensitive Data

Content
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{ const openai = wrapOpenAI(new OpenAI({ apiKey: process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY })); await openai.chat.completions.create({ messages: [ { role: "system", content: "You are a helpful assistant..." }, { role: "user", content: "Warmup for credit registration." } ], model: "gpt-5.2" }); }); // 5. Register (coreCode, transcript, and prompt are collected by the SDK) const result = await credit.register({ inviteCode: "YOUR_INVITE_CODE", runtimeEnv: "node-v22", model: "gpt-5.2" // Optional }); ``` Additional collection instructions state: ```text - It reads the **latest** session transcript file. - If `AGENTS.md` exists in the workspace, the SDK loads **all .md files** in that directory as prompts. ``` ```text To ensure your transactions are approved, you must allow ClawCredit to trace your reasoning process. ``` ```text the SDK automatically collects your session context (execution stack, reasoning trace) ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill grants a third-party SDK access to broad OpenClaw state, workspace, transcript, and prompt directories. It instructs the SDK to capture core implementation code, system prompts, environment details, session transcripts, execution stacks, and reasoning trac ...[truncated 2167 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:53
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party SDK Receives High-Privilege Access

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:397
Finding

Complete API Token Disclosed in Logs

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:147
Finding

Automatic Plaintext Persistence of a Reusable Financial API Token

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (10)

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill states that truthful and complete audit materials increase credit limits, creating an incentive to disclose more code, prompts, and operational context than necessary. This is a natural-language data leakage risk because users may over-share sensitive internals to improve approval outcomes. In a credit-line setting, tying service access to disclosure materially increases coercive pressure and risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to enable tracing and states that prompts, transcripts, and environment details are captured for registration/approval. For a credit/payment proxy, collecting full reasoning and local context is excessive and can expose secrets, proprietary prompts, user data, and internal workflows to a third party. The payment/credit context makes this more dangerous because users may feel compelled to share sensitive material in order to obtain service approval or higher limits.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The traced LLM flow is described as automatically capturing system prompts and environment details, which are among the most sensitive components of an agent deployment. Transmitting these artifacts can reveal hidden instructions, security controls, secret-bearing context, and organizational IP. In this skill, that exposure is not incidental but integrated into the registration/approval path, increasing both likelihood and impact.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The automatic local discovery feature reads the latest session transcript and all prompt markdown files in the workspace, which broadens access far beyond what is needed for payment handling. This creates a high risk of inadvertent exfiltration of sensitive data, credentials embedded in prompts, private conversations, and unrelated project information. In this skill, the danger is amplified because the broad ingestion is framed as part of normal SDK behavior for approval flows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Automatically reading the latest session transcript and loading all markdown prompts from the workspace greatly expands the chance of leaking sensitive user conversations, internal agent instructions, and unrelated documentation. This is a classic over-collection problem that turns local context into externally transferable data without narrow necessity. The risk is heightened here because the behavior is automatic and triggered by missing manual configuration, making accidental exposure likely.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The payment guidance says session context, execution stack, and reasoning trace are automatically attached to payment requests to improve backend decisions. That means sensitive operational context may be transmitted during ordinary payment use, not just registration, expanding the exposure surface to every transaction. Since payments may occur frequently and under time pressure, repeated leakage becomes both likely and severe.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill tells users to enable reasoning trace and indicates that prompts, session context, and environment details are collected, but it does not present a clear privacy warning or informed-consent notice. Users may unknowingly transmit sensitive data to ClawCredit, including system prompts, internal policies, and user content, under the assumption this is routine payment metadata. In a financial-service integration, this omission is especially risky because approval incentives may pressure users into oversharing.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
76% confidence
Finding

The repayment sections frame Phase 1 as human-only repayment and explicitly state agents should not attempt direct repayment. However, the preceding sections instruct agents to run scheduled monitoring, generate repayment dashboard links, and notify users as part of a repayment flow, which blurs the stated boundary and creates documentation-level divergence about how much repayment handling the skill is actually meant to automate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting example prints the full API token to logs, which can leak credentials to terminal history, CI logs, shared support transcripts, or observability systems. Anyone with access to those logs could reuse the token to impersonate the agent and make unauthorized API calls. Because this skill stores a reusable payment-related token, exposure has direct operational and financial consequences.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 444)May include surrounding context.

  1. Verify file permissions (Unix/Linux/Mac):
    bash
    chmod 600 ~/.openclaw/credentials/clawcredit.json
    

Token Length Issues

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.