T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- references/install/overview.md:14
- Finding
- Unverifiable External Package Receives High-Trust Hermes Integration## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/install/overview.md:14-25, 46-63`; `references/connectors/hermes.md:52-60, 90-96` **Vulnerability Type**: T08: Insecure Dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium The Skill instructs users to download and install an external Python wheel that is not included in the audited project. The documentation states that version `0.1.3` has not yet been published under the new name, so neither its source nor its final artifact could be reviewed during this audit. ### Relevant Code Segments `references/install/overview.md:46-63`: ```text gh release view v0.1.3 --repo OpenSenseNova/SenseNova-Skills-ProactiveAgent --json tagName,isDraft,isPrerelease,assets gh release download v0.1.3 --repo OpenSenseNova/SenseNova-Skills-ProactiveAgent --pattern sn_proactive_agent-0.1.3-py3-none-any.whl --pattern SHA256SUMS ``` ```text pipx install --python "$SNPA_PYTHON" "$SNPA_PACKAGE" ``` `references/connectors/hermes.md:52-60`: ```text sn-proactive-agent setup --harness hermes --web-only --hermes-root "$SNPA_HERMES_ROOT" --dry-run ``` ```text sn-proactive-agent setup --harness hermes --web-only --hermes-root "$SNPA_HERMES_ROOT" ``` The associated instructions state that the installer backs up and changes the Hermes TUI entry point and build artifacts, adds and builds a Web-only bridge, installs hooks and Python observation components, and enables a plugin. `references/connectors/hermes.md:90-96` documents that the resulting bridge uses the current window's native `prompt.submit` interface to submit approved actions and that completed turns contain the full question-and-answer content. ### Technical Analysis The effective runtime and connector implementation are supplied by a future private GitHub Release rather than by files present in the audited project. Consequently, the implementation that receives access to conversation data and modifies Hermes cannot be verified from this rep ...[truncated 2708 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Include the exact runtime and connector source corresponding to the distributed wheel in an auditable tagged release. 2. Publish reproducible build instructions, locked dependencies, and build provenance so reviewers can verify that the wheel corresponds to the reviewed source. 3. Sign the release artifact using a pinned, independently trusted maintainer identity, such as Sigstore provenance or another verifiable code-signing mechanism. 4. Pin and document the expected artifact digest in a separately authenticated channel instead of relying only on a checksum distributed beside the wheel. 5. Require verification of both the cryptographic signature and the exact version before installation. 6. Document every file, configuration key, hook, plugin, build artifact, endpoint, and data field accessed or modified by the connector. 7. Obtain explicit user consent before enabling full question-and-answer capture, with a lower-data or redacted mode where possible. 8. Minimize connector privileges and filesystem access. Run the service under a dedicated account or operating-system sandbox where practical. 9. Restrict the service to loopback interfaces by default and apply authentication if access beyond loopback is supported. 10. Add an auditable uninstall and rollback verification process that confirms restoration of modified Hermes files and removal of connector configuration. 11. Do not enable installation instructions for version `0.1.3` until the final artifact, source tag, provenance, and signatures are available and have been independently reviewed.