T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
references/guides/arxiv_api_protocol.md:5- Finding
Plaintext HTTP Transport for arXiv Citation Verification
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
references/guides/arxiv_api_protocol.md, lines 5–38
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext transmission of bibliographic queries and acceptance of unauthenticated API responses
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown **API base**: `http://export.arxiv.org/api/query`text GET ?id_list={arxiv_id}text GET ?search_query=ti:"{title}"&max_results=5Technical Analysis
The protocol instructs the client to send arXiv identifiers and publication titles to an HTTP endpoint without transport-layer encryption or server authentication.
An attacker with visibility or control over the network path—such as an untrusted Wi-Fi operator, compromised router, malicious proxy, or upstream network intermediary—can observe the requested identifiers and titles. The attacker can also modify the returned Atom feed before it reaches the client.
The protocol treats returned entries and empty feeds as bibliographic evidence. Consequently, a forged response can influence title matching and the derivation of
arxiv_unmatched. Application-level parsing and similarity checks do not establish response authenticity and therefore do not mitigate an on-path attacker who can construct a syntactically valid Atom response.Attack Path
- The Skill processes a citation containing an arXiv identifier or title.
- The client sends the identifier or title to
http://export.arxiv.org/api/query. - An on-path attacker intercepts the plaintext request and learns the research query.
- The attacker returns or modifies a syntactically valid Atom feed.
- The malicious feed supplies a fabricated matching record, removes a legitimate record, or substitutes a misleading title and year.
- The client parses the response and may derive an incorrect bibliographic-integrity signal.
- Downstream citation verification or human review is influenced by attacker-controlled met ...[truncated 584 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Replace the HTTP API base with a verified HTTPS endpoint that provides equivalent arXiv API functionality.
- Prohibit redirects from HTTPS to HTTP and validate the scheme and hostname after every redirect.
- If no authenticated endpoint is available, disable automated arXiv verification rather than silently falling back to plaintext transport.
- If an HTTPS proxy is required, use a trusted, explicitly configured proxy and document the resulting trust boundary.
- Apply response-size limits, strict content-type validation, secure XML parser settings, and schema-level checks. These controls supplement TLS but do not replace it.
- Treat transport failures as unavailable evidence and never convert them into positive or negative citation findings.
- Add tests proving that HTTP URLs and HTTPS-to-HTTP redirects are rejected.
