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Security audit

Agent Well-Known Readiness Audit

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s audit workflow is mostly disclosed, but its installer can overwrite or delete directories outside the intended OpenClaw skills folder if given a crafted install name.

Review before installing. Do not run scripts/install_skill.py with an untrusted --name value, and avoid --force until the installer validates that the destination stays inside the selected skills directory. If you use the skill, keep payment approval in your wallet policy and verify the x402 price, network, and payTo before any paid call.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/install_skill.py:16
Finding

Unvalidated installation name permits directory escape and recursive deletion

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/verify_package.py:30
Finding

Package integrity verification accepts unlisted files that are later installed

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (14)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises broad auditing of arbitrary agent/API origins, OpenAPI/MCP readiness, and install blockers, but the visible content hard-codes a single backend and directs the agent to rely on that hosted service for readiness decisions. This can mislead operators about what evidence is being gathered and may cause trust, payment, or integration decisions to be based on a narrower or opaque backend assessment than the description suggests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises broad auditing of arbitrary agent/API origins, OpenAPI/MCP readiness, and install blockers, but the visible content hard-codes a single backend and directs the agent to rely on that hosted service for readiness decisions. This can mislead operators about what evidence is being gathered and may cause trust, payment, or integration decisions to be based on a narrower or opaque backend assessment than the description suggests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises broad auditing of arbitrary agent/API origins, OpenAPI/MCP readiness, and install blockers, but the visible content hard-codes a single backend and directs the agent to rely on that hosted service for readiness decisions. This can mislead operators about what evidence is being gathered and may cause trust, payment, or integration decisions to be based on a narrower or opaque backend assessment than the description suggests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises broad auditing of arbitrary agent/API origins, OpenAPI/MCP readiness, and install blockers, but the visible content hard-codes a single backend and directs the agent to rely on that hosted service for readiness decisions. This can mislead operators about what evidence is being gathered and may cause trust, payment, or integration decisions to be based on a narrower or opaque backend assessment than the description suggests.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes an auditing skill that evaluates external agent/API origins before integration. This file deletes existing directories, copies the package into a skills directory, creates target directories, and writes a lock file, which are package installation behaviors not justified by the stated auditing purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/install_skill.py (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

python
"version": checksums.get("version", "1.0.0"),
        "installed_at": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ", time.gmtime()),
        "checksums_file": "checksums.json",
        "pinning": "Do not auto-update this skill. Reinstall only after reviewing a new ClawMart version and re-running scripts/verify_package.py.",
    }
    (dest / ".clawmart-lock.json").write_text(json.dumps(lock, indent=2) + "\n")

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill is described as auditing an origin for readiness and install blockers, implying analysis of a target service or API. The implemented behavior instead installs the skill into a local OpenClaw directory and optionally runs a backend verifier after installation, which is semantically different from auditing an origin before integration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The installer executes a bundled verifier program from the package being installed, which means untrusted package content gets code execution during installation. For an audit-oriented skill, this expands capability beyond passive analysis and creates a supply-chain trust problem if the package or verifier is modified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/install_skill.py (reported line 29)May include surrounding context.

python
verifier = package_dir / "scripts" / "verify_package.py"
    if not verifier.exists():
        raise SystemExit("missing scripts/verify_package.py; refusing install without package integrity check")
    return subprocess.call([sys.executable, str(verifier)])


def write_lock(dest: pathlib.Path):

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/install_skill.py (reported line 74)May include surrounding context.

python
verifier = package_dir / "scripts" / "verify_package.py"
    if not verifier.exists():
        raise SystemExit("missing scripts/verify_package.py; refusing install without package integrity check")
    return subprocess.call([sys.executable, str(verifier)])


def write_lock(dest: pathlib.Path):

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/show_examples.py (reported line 16)May include surrounding context.

python
def main():
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Print safe curl examples for this ClawMart package.")
    parser.add_argument("--name", help="Only print one example by name.")
    parser.add_argument("--paid", action="store_true", help="Also show where to place a payment header. Do not paste private keys here.")
    args = parser.parse_args()

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

This JSON manifest-style file enumerates package metadata and bundled files but provides no trigger phrases, activation conditions, or exclusion criteria. For manifest files, missing specificity on when the skill should activate can lead downstream systems to infer overly broad invocation behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The argument parser description says this script prints safe curl examples for a 'ClawMart package', which contradicts the surrounding skill context of auditing agent/API origins for well-known discovery, x402 pricing, OpenAPI/MCP readiness, and install blockers. This appears to be copied documentation from another project and misstates the script's intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.