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Security audit

Outlook Api

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill coherently documents an Outlook integration, but it grants broad email, calendar, contact, connection, and credential-handling authority without enough safety guidance.

Install only if you are comfortable giving this skill access to a Maton API key connected to Outlook. Use narrowly scoped Microsoft permissions where possible, explicitly confirm any send, move, delete, or connection-management action, specify the intended connection when multiple accounts exist, and do not print or share MATON_API_KEY values.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:455
Finding

Plaintext Disclosure of the Maton API Key

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 455
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext sensitive credential exposure
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

bash
echo $MATON_API_KEY

Technical Analysis

The troubleshooting instructions print the complete MATON_API_KEY bearer credential to standard output. Displaying a secret is unnecessary for determining whether the environment variable is configured.

The exposed value may persist in terminal scrollback, agent tool output, CI/CD logs, shell-session recordings, debugging captures, or support transcripts. The project uses this credential in the Authorization header for gateway.maton.ai and ctrl.maton.ai, making possession of the value sufficient to authenticate to those services within the key's authorized scope.

The documented third-party network communication itself is disclosed and necessary for the Skill's managed OAuth proxy architecture. The vulnerability is specifically the unnecessary plaintext display of the credential.

Attack Path

  1. A user or agent encounters an authentication problem and follows the troubleshooting instructions.
  2. echo $MATON_API_KEY prints the complete bearer credential.
  3. The output is retained in terminal scrollback, agent logs, CI logs, a session recording, or material shared with support.
  4. An attacker or unauthorized operator obtains access to that retained output.
  5. The attacker inserts the exposed value into an Authorization: Bearer header.
  6. The attacker authenticates to the documented Maton gateway or connection-management endpoints.
  7. Subject to the API key's permissions and connected Microsoft OAuth scopes, the attacker accesses or modifies Outlook resources or connection state.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation may allow impersonation of the API-key holder against Maton services. Depending on the key's authorization scope and active Outlook connections, pot ...[truncated 519 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Remove the command that prints the credential.

  2. Test only whether the variable is populated:

    bash
    if [ -n "${MATON_API_KEY:-}" ]; then
      echo "MATON_API_KEY is set"
    else
      echo "MATON_API_KEY is not set"
    fi
    
  3. Avoid printing, logging, tracing, or including the key in diagnostic reports.

  4. Add explicit guidance that users must redact authorization headers and credentials before sharing logs or terminal output.

  5. Advise immediate rotation of any key previously printed into retained or shared output.

  6. Where supported, use narrowly scoped, short-lived, and revocable credentials and restrict the associated Microsoft OAuth scopes to those required by the task.

  7. Ensure logging systems redact values associated with MATON_API_KEY and Authorization headers.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (6)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This endpoint enables deletion of mail folders, a destructive action that can remove large collections of user email or disrupt mailbox organization if the agent is induced to pass the wrong folder identifier. Because the skill documentation presents the operation directly with no guardrails, an agent could be tricked into destructive parameter use through prompt ambiguity or malicious instructions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 181)May include surrounding context.

Delete Mail Folder

bash
DELETE /outlook/v1.0/me/mailFolders/{folderId}

List Child Folders

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This endpoint allows permanent or semi-permanent deletion of email messages, which can destroy records, evidence, or business-critical communications if an attacker or ambiguous prompt causes the wrong message ID to be used. The danger is amplified by email's sensitivity and by the absence of confirmation and recovery guidance in the skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 283)May include surrounding context.

Delete Message

bash
DELETE /outlook/v1.0/me/messages/{messageId}

Move Message

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

This endpoint enables deletion of calendar events, which can cause missed meetings, business disruption, or silent tampering with a user's schedule if misused. In an agentic environment, destructive scheduling operations are particularly sensitive because users may not notice immediately and the docs provide no warning or confirmation pattern.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

Delete Event

bash
DELETE /outlook/v1.0/me/events/{eventId}

Contacts

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This endpoint allows deletion of contacts, which can result in loss of personal or business relationship data and downstream workflow issues if the wrong contact ID is provided. The risk is lower than mailbox-wide destructive actions but still material because the skill surfaces the operation without user-safety checks or reversibility guidance.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 390)May include surrounding context.

Delete Contact

bash
DELETE /outlook/v1.0/me/contacts/{contactId}

Query Parameters

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The invocation guidance is broad enough that an agent may select this skill for many generic Outlook-related requests without clearly scoping whether the user intended read-only access, sensitive mailbox access, or state-changing operations. In a managed-OAuth email skill, over-broad routing increases the chance of unintended access to messages, contacts, and calendar data or accidental execution of higher-risk actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documentation exposes destructive operations such as deleting connections and later deleting folders, messages, events, and contacts, but does not warn that these actions may be irreversible or require explicit user confirmation. In an agent setting, this omission raises the likelihood of accidental data loss if the model follows user prompts too literally or misinterprets intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.