T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:614- Finding
Maton API Key Disclosed in Troubleshooting Output
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed Maton API gateway skill, but it needs review because it gives an agent broad live-service action capability, including deletion, posting, file, admin, and business-data operations, with limited guardrail guidance.
Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent act through your Maton-authorized third-party connections. Use the narrowest OAuth scopes available, verify the selected connection before actions, require explicit confirmation for deletes, public posts, financial/admin changes, and bulk mutations, never print or share MATON_API_KEY, and validate any pre-signed media upload destination before sending local files.
SKILL.md:614Maton API Key Disclosed in Troubleshooting Output
references/linkedin/README.md:222LinkedIn Media Upload Trusts an Unvalidated Response-Supplied Destination
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /active-campaign/api/3/contacts/{contactId}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /active-campaign/api/3/contactTags/{contactTagId}
The README documents cancellation, rescheduling, and deletion operations but does not warn that these actions are destructive or difficult to reverse. Because this skill operates through managed OAuth against user-authorized third-party services, an agent following the reference could cancel appointments or delete scheduling blocks in production with immediate business impact.
The documented DELETE endpoint takes a directly supplied block ID and performs a destructive action, which creates a parameter-abuse risk if an agent passes the wrong identifier or acts on unvalidated user input. In a multi-service API gateway context, this is more dangerous because the skill is designed for direct action against live external systems once OAuth authorization exists.
DELETE /acuity-scheduling/api/v1/blocks/{id}
The documented DELETE endpoint shows a direct pattern for deleting records via user-controlled query parameters, with no mention of validation, confirmation, or safeguards. In this API-gateway context, the skill enables access to real OAuth-authorized Airtable bases, so exposing destructive parameterized deletion guidance can be abused by prompt injection or mistaken agent actions to remove legitimate records.
DELETE /airtable/v0/{baseId}/{tableIdOrName}?records[]=recXXXXX&records[]=recYYYYY
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /asana/api/1.0/tasks/{task_gid}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /asana/api/1.0/webhooks/{webhook_gid}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /attio/v2/objects/{object}/records/{record_id}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /attio/v2/notes/{note_id}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /attio/v2/lists/{list}/entries/{entry_id}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /baserow/api/database/rows/table/{table_id}/{row_id}/
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /beehiiv/v2/publications/{publication_id}/subscriptions/{subscription_id}
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /box/2.0/folders/{folder_id}
DELETE /box/2.0/folders/{folder_id}?recursive=true
The recursive delete variant materially amplifies the destructive scope of a single operation and is presented without any guardrails or warning. In an API gateway skill used by agents, this can enable large-scale accidental deletion if model-generated parameters are accepted too readily.
DELETE /box/2.0/folders/{folder_id}
DELETE /box/2.0/folders/{folder_id}?recursive=true
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /box/2.0/files/{file_id}
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.
POST /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions
Content-Type: application/json
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
DELETE /box/api/2.0/files/upload_sessions/{session_id}
The trash section includes permanent deletion endpoints for files and folders from trash without any caution about irreversibility. In an agent-mediated environment, omission of such warnings materially increases the chance of destructive actions causing permanent data loss.
DELETE /files/{file_id}/trash permanently removes a trashed file, which is more dangerous than a normal delete and can bypass recovery expectations. In an agent-accessible gateway, omission of safeguards around this endpoint raises the risk of irreversible loss from prompt mistakes or ambiguous user requests.
GET /box/2.0/folders/trash/items
DELETE /box/2.0/files/{file_id}/trash
DELETE /box/2.0/folders/{folder_id}/trash