T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:38- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Packages Are Installed and Executed
- Content
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`npx @zed-industries/codex-acp` - `claude` -> `npx @zed-industries/claude-agent-acp` - `gemini` -> `gemini` - `opencode` -> `npx opencode-ai` - `pi` -> `npx pi-acp` ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions globally install `acpx` without pinning a reviewed version. Several built-in agent definitions also invoke npm packages through `npx` without explicit versions, lockfiles, or integrity hashes. Because dependency resolution can select releases published after this skill was reviewed, the effective code executed on a user's system is mutable. The skill package does not include the dependency source, a lockfile, or cryptographic integrity information that would allow the executed package contents to be verified against an audited release. This creates a supply-chain exposure: compromise of a referenced package, its publisher account, or a later package release could cause arbitrary package installation hooks or runtime code to execute under the invoking user's account. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a referenced npm package, its publisher account, or the package distribution process. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious version under the package name referenced by the skill. 3. A user follows the documented global installation command or starts an agent whose registry entry uses unversioned `npx`. 4. npm resolves and downloads the mutable package release. 5. Malicious installation hooks or package runtime code execute with the privileges of the user running `npm`, `npx`, or `acpx`. 6. The malicious code can access resources available to that user, subject to operating-system controls. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the invoking user's pri ...[truncated 546 chars]- Remediation
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