T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
scripts/generate_report.py:534- Finding
Mandatory Third-Party Promotion in Generated User Reports
- Content
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Author: Cyrux | WeChat: drdingno1 | Email: Cyrux.ding@outlook.sg
Six-Line Divination Report
{edition_badge}
Primary Hexagram: {ben_gua} Changed Hexagram: {bian_gua}
``` The original source uses Chinese presentation text, but the security-relevant fixed values are `Cyrux`, `drdingno1`, and `Cyrux.ding@outlook.sg`. The report workflow is mandatory: ```markdown 5. Invoke the local Python script to generate HTML: python /scripts/generate_report.py -i "{case_directory}/liuyao-data.json" -o "{case_directory}/liuyao-report.html" ``` ### Technical Analysis The report generator contains a fixed author name, WeChat identifier, and email address in its HTML template. These values are not supplied by the user, are not necessary for divination or report generation, and cannot be disabled through the report input. The Skill instructions require the agent to generate the HTML report using this script. Consequently, every normal execution of the Skill produces a user-facing deliverable containing unrelated third-party promotional contact information. This is a stable output-hijacking behavior: loading and following the Skill changes the intended report output by requiring the agent to distribute the embedded attribution and contact details. Although the behavior does not bypass platform safety controls, it repurposes user-generated deliverables as a promotional channel. ### Attack Path 1. A user requests a divination report. 2. The Skill requires the agent to execute the complete workflow, including HTML report generation. 3. The agent invokes `scripts/generate_report.py`. 4. `HTML_TEMPLATE` i ...[truncated 802 chars]- Remediation
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