alibabacloud-sas-vul-repair

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 11, 2026 · 10:09 AM UTC
• Version: 0.0.1

Overview

The skill fits Alibaba Cloud vulnerability repair, but it includes risky installation, credential, and privileged repair-command guidance that users should review before installing.

Install only after reviewing the CLI installation and credential sections. Prefer a verified package-manager install, avoid pasting or storing AccessKey secrets through agent-driven commands, use least-privilege SAS permissions, and do not run API-returned repair commands as root unless you independently validate the exact command and have backups/snapshots for affected servers.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (4)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:24
• Finding: Unverified Remote Installer and Binary Execution<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:24`; `references/cli-installation-guide.md:14`; `references/cli-installation-guide.md:36-43` **Vulnerability Type**: Unverified remote payload retrieval and execution **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # SKILL.md:24 /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh)" ``` ```bash # references/cli-installation-guide.md:14 /bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh)" ``` ```bash # references/cli-installation-guide.md:36-43 wget --connect-timeout=10 --read-timeout=120 --tries=3 -qO- https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/aliyun-cli-linux-latest-amd64.tgz | tar xz sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/ wget --connect-timeout=10 --read-timeout=120 --tries=3 -qO- https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/aliyun-cli-linux-latest-arm64.tgz | tar xz sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/ ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the user or Agent to download mutable content and immediately execute or install it. The installation script is passed directly to Bash, while the alternative workflow streams an archive into `tar` and then moves the resulting executable into a system-wide executable directory. No exact release is pinned, and the instructions provide no checksum, cryptographic signature, or independent integrity verification. HTTPS protects transport under normal conditions but does not protect against compromise of the distribution origin, CDN, signing infrastructure, DNS or certificate ecosystem, or vendor publication pipeline. The use of a `latest` archive further prevents reviewers from determining which effective payload will execute after the Skill has been audited. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises or gains publication access to the installer endpoint, CDN, archive, or associated distribution infrastructure. 2. The attacker replaces `setup.sh` or a `latest` archive with a modified payload. ...[truncated 1270 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove all `curl | bash`, command-substitution execution, and streamed archive extraction instructions. 2. Pin a specific CLI version rather than downloading a mutable `latest` artifact. 3. Prefer a trusted operating-system package manager or Homebrew package with package-signing verification. 4. If manual installation is required: - Download the archive to a non-executable temporary directory. - Download the vendor-published checksum and detached signature through an independently authenticated channel. - Verify the signature and SHA-256 checksum before extraction. - Inspect the archive file list and reject absolute paths, traversal entries, links, and unexpected files. - Extract without elevated privileges. - Show the exact source, version, checksum, destination, and requested privilege change to the user. - Obtain explicit user approval before moving the verified binary into a system directory. 5. Verify the installed binary's checksum and version after installation. 6. Document a trusted rollback process for restoring the previous CLI binary. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: references/scenario-repair.md:204
• Finding: Root Execution of Commands Supplied by a Remote API Response<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/scenario-repair.md:204-215` **Vulnerability Type**: Untrusted command execution and command injection risk **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```text 1. Get the repair command and fixability determination: aliyun sas describe-vul-list --type app --name <vulnerability-name> --current-page 1 --page-size 20 --user-agent AlibabaCloud-Agent-Skills/alibabacloud-sas-vul-repair/<session-id> - Take the repair command from the response's ExtendContentJson.RpmEntityList[].UpdateCmd; check CanFix (yes/no) and CanUpdate to determine current one-click/upgrade fix conditions. - cve/sca types can also use describe-can-fix-vul-list to get the fixable list and commands. 2. Emergency vulnerabilities (emg): first check the Solution in describe-vul-details (official repair solution) and guide the user accordingly — do not give generic commands from experience. 3. Guide the user to log in to the server and execute the command in UpdateCmd (with root/admin privileges; command content is subject to the API response — never rewrite key parameters). ``` ### Technical Analysis The workflow treats the `UpdateCmd` field returned by a cloud API as an executable command and instructs the user to run it with root or administrator privileges. It does not require the command to be parsed, restricted to an allow-list, checked for shell metacharacters, or independently validated against the expected package and version. The instruction to preserve the returned command without rewriting key parameters increases the risk because an unexpected or malicious command may be reproduced verbatim. User confirmation for cloud write operations does not adequately protect this path: execution occurs manually on the target host and the document does not define a command-specific safety review gate. Potentially dangerous content includes command chaining, command substitution, redirection, arbitrary URLs, deletion operations, servic ...[truncated 1363 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Treat `UpdateCmd` and `Solution` as untrusted data, not executable instructions. 2. Parse returned commands into a structured representation and allow only explicitly supported package-manager actions. 3. Reject commands containing: - Shell chaining or substitution operators. - Redirections or pipelines. - Downloaders such as `curl` or `wget`. - Interpreters such as `sh`, `bash`, or PowerShell. - File deletion, permission changes, service manipulation, or arbitrary script execution. 4. Validate package names and target versions against the vulnerability record and trusted repository metadata. 5. Display the exact command, source API field, affected package, target version, host scope, and expected side effects. 6. Require explicit, command-specific user approval after the safety review. 7. Prefer generating a known-safe package-manager command from structured package and version fields instead of executing the server-provided command string. 8. Require a snapshot or tested backup for privileged changes and verify the host state after execution. 9. If a command cannot be safely parsed and validated, provide it only as non-executable reference text and direct the user to vendor support. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: references/cli-installation-guide.md:72
• Finding: Plaintext Cloud Credentials Exposed Through Command-Line and Environment Configuration<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/cli-installation-guide.md:72-79,120-176,183-209` **Vulnerability Type**: Plaintext sensitive credential handling **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash aliyun configure set \ --mode AK \ --access-key-id <your-access-key-id> \ --access-key-secret <your-access-key-secret> \ --region cn-hangzhou ``` ```bash aliyun configure set \ --mode StsToken \ --access-key-id <your-access-key-id> \ --access-key-secret <your-access-key-secret> \ --sts-token <your-sts-token> \ --region cn-hangzhou ``` ```bash export ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<your-access-key-id> export ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=<your-access-key-secret> export ALIBABA_CLOUD_REGION_ID=cn-hangzhou ``` ```bash export ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID=<your-access-key-id> export ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=<your-access-key-secret> export ALIBABA_CLOUD_SECURITY_TOKEN=<your-sts-token> export ALIBABA_CLOUD_REGION_ID=cn-hangzhou ``` ### Technical Analysis The referenced guide recommends passing long-lived AccessKey credentials and temporary security tokens as command-line arguments and exporting them into the shell environment. Command-line credentials can be retained in shell history, terminal transcripts, automation logs, audit telemetry, and process-inspection output. Environment variables may be exposed to child processes, crash diagnostics, debugging tools, CI/CD output, or other processes operating under the same account. This guidance also contradicts the primary Skill's explicit credential rules in `SKILL.md:48-54`, which prohibit requesting credentials or using `aliyun configure set` with literal credential values. Because the insecure guide is directly linked from the primary instructions, users can reasonably follow it despite the higher-level prohibition. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the referenced configuration guide and substitutes real AK/SK or STS values into a command. 2. The command is reta ...[truncated 1125 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove examples that place AK/SK or STS tokens in command-line arguments. 2. Remove recommendations to persist sensitive credentials in ordinary shell environment variables. 3. Make the installation guide consistent with `SKILL.md` by prohibiting direct credential entry during Agent-driven sessions. 4. Prefer authentication methods in this order: - OAuth or other browser-based short-lived authentication. - ECS RAM roles or workload identity. - Assume-role workflows using short-lived credentials. - A secure interactive credential helper that does not echo or log secrets. 5. If static keys are unavoidable: - Configure them outside the Agent conversation. - Use a no-echo interactive prompt or approved secret manager. - Restrict the profile file to mode `0600`. - Apply a least-privilege RAM policy. - Rotate the keys regularly. 6. Warn users not to paste credentials into chat, shell history, CI definitions, issue trackers, or terminal recordings. 7. Avoid debug logging during authentication unless output is verified to redact credential material. 8. Add credential-leak response guidance covering immediate revocation, key rotation, log review, and audit of recent cloud activity. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: references/scenario-errors.md:56
• Finding: Destructive RPM Database Recovery Without Mandatory Backup and Validation<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `references/scenario-errors.md:56` **Vulnerability Type**: Unsafe destructive system-recovery procedure **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash yum-complete-transaction --cleanup-only rm -f /var/lib/rpm/__db.* rpm --rebuilddb yum clean all ``` The error-code guidance recommends the latter commands in sequence when error code `256` is interpreted as RPM database corruption. ### Technical Analysis The procedure deletes RPM database files and rebuilds package metadata. This is a privileged and potentially disruptive host operation. Error code `256` is described as covering several unrelated conditions, including invalid repositories, signature errors, unfinished transactions, package conflicts, and database corruption. Consequently, the error code alone does not establish that deleting RPM database files is appropriate. The instructions do not require a verified corruption diagnosis, package database backup, filesystem snapshot, maintenance window, check for active package-manager processes, or rollback plan before deletion. If used for the wrong sub-case, or interrupted during rebuilding, the procedure can leave package management in an inconsistent state. ### Attack Path 1. A repair operation returns the broad error code `256`. 2. The user or Agent selects the database-corruption branch without establishing that the RPM database is actually corrupt. 3. The user runs the documented deletion and rebuild commands with root privileges. 4. RPM metadata is removed or rebuilding is interrupted or fails. 5. Package installation, upgrade, removal, or vulnerability remediation stops working correctly. 6. Recovery requires manual restoration, snapshot rollback, or operating-system repair. ### Impact Assessment This issue does not directly grant an attacker additional privileges, but it can cause privileged destructive changes to the target host. Potential consequences include: - Corruption or loss ...[truncated 398 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Do not route to database deletion based only on error code `256`. 2. First distinguish among repository failure, signature failure, unfinished transactions, dependency conflicts, and confirmed RPM database corruption. 3. Before database recovery: - Confirm no `yum`, `dnf`, or `rpm` process is running. - Verify filesystem health and available disk space. - Collect diagnostic output using distribution-supported read-only checks. - Create a filesystem snapshot or host backup. - Back up the complete RPM database directory. - Schedule a maintenance window and obtain explicit user confirmation. 4. Follow the operating-system vendor's distribution- and version-specific recovery procedure. 5. Use a dedicated backup directory rather than immediately deleting files. 6. Verify the rebuilt database, installed-package inventory, dependency state, and package-manager functionality afterward. 7. Document an explicit rollback process if rebuilding fails. 8. For production or fleet-wide systems, test the recovery procedure on a clone or single canary host before wider execution. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults

Findings (26)

Self-Modification

High

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

**Pre-check: Aliyun CLI >= 3.3.3 required**
> [MUST] Verify: `aliyun version` — must be >= 3.3.3.
> - **First install or major upgrade:** `/bin/bash -c "$(curl -fsSL --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 120 https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh)"`
> - **Routine update (CLI >= 3.3.5):** `aliyun upgrade` — prefer this built-in self-update over re-running the install script.
> - See [references/cli-installation-guide.md](references/cli-installation-guide.md) for full installation instructions.

**Pre-check: Aliyun CLI plugin update required**

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs the agent to install or upgrade software by executing a remote shell script fetched via `curl | bash` and to run `aliyun upgrade`, which modifies the local execution environment. This is dangerous because a skill should not self-modify tooling or change host state without strong trust controls, and a compromised distribution endpoint, MITM scenario, or mistaken invocation could lead to arbitrary code execution or persistence on the host.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High

• Category: Anti-Refusal

Content

> **[CRITICAL] Do NOT refuse to help:** When an error occurs, NEVER use refusal phrases such as "I cannot help", "I am unable to help", or equivalents in any language. Instead, explain the specific error, its cause, and the exact steps the user should take to resolve it, then hand the decision back to the user.

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: Skill instructs the agent to never refuse or to always comply. Suppressing the agent's ability to decline removes a core safety control and enables downstream harmful requests to succeed.

Self-Modification

High

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

aliyun version
```

### Self-Update (CLI >= 3.3.5)

Once the CLI is at version 3.3.5 or newer, routine updates can use the built-in self-update subcommand instead of re-running the install script:

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Self-Modification

High

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

### Self-Update (CLI >= 3.3.5)

Once the CLI is at version 3.3.5 or newer, routine updates can use the built-in self-update subcommand instead of re-running the install script:

```bash
aliyun upgrade

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

| 8037 | Could not resolve host: mirrors.cloud.aliyuncs.com (cannot access the Alibaba Cloud intranet repository; typical: non-Alibaba-Cloud / public-network-only hosts configured with the intranet repository) | Troubleshoot connectivity and blocking to mirrors.cloud.aliyuncs.com; if the server can access the public network, replace mirrors.cloud.aliyuncs.com with the public repository mirrors.aliyun.com in the repo files under /etc/yum.repos.d/, then retry repair |
| 8084 | Some index files failed to download (cannot access the download source; package metadata update failed) | Check whether security groups/firewalls block access to the download source |
| 8090 | The highest version upgradable from the current repository is lower than the minimum version required by the vulnerability fix | Check whether the current repository configuration is outdated or abnormal; update the repository configuration and retry |
| 256 | No more mirrors to try (third-party repository invalid, e.g., docker-ce repo 404/403) | Enter /etc/yum.repos.d/, locate the repo file with `grep -r "<invalid-repo-domain>"`, set `enabled` to 0 to disable it, then retry. Same-code scenario: **Bad GPG signature** (repository signature verification failure, typically because the server is not using the Alibaba Cloud official source) — check the current repository list with `yum repolist`, switch to the Alibaba Cloud official source (intranet mirrors.cloud.aliyuncs.com / public mirrors.aliyun.com, see Step 2), refresh the cache, and retry. Other scenarios with the same code: unfinished transactions — run `yum-complete-transaction --cleanup-only`; corrupted rpm database — run `rm -f /var/lib/rpm/__db.*`, `rpm --rebuilddb`, `yum clean all` in sequence to rebuild, then retry |
| 202 (Linux scenario) | timeout: patch installation timed out | Retry later; if the error details contain `[Errno 12] Timeout on http://mirrors.aliyun.com/...`, it is a Yum repository access timeout — troubleshoot per DNS and network
...[truncated 25 chars]

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Anti-Refusal Statement

High

• Category: Anti-Refusal

Content

Dispatch success judgment: a RequestId is returned and `PushTaskRsp.PushTaskResultList` has no failure record for that server (or Online=true, Success=true). Field-tested note (pitfall record): a targeted task dispatched by `modify-push-all-task` may not immediately appear in the `describe-once-task` task list (initially only the schedule periodic task is visible — there is a registration delay). Judge dispatch success by PushTaskResultList; the task list is only auxiliary corroboration — do not judge dispatch failure just because it is absent from the list.

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: Skill instructs the agent to omit warnings, disclaimers, or ethical commentary. Stripping safety caveats hides risk from the user and is a common jailbreak preamble.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The parameter table sets `--lang` default to `zh`, which establishes a specific language preference by default rather than offering the user a choice. Under the policy, locale or language constraints should be opt-in or clearly justified as region-specific; this line does neither.

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

#### Scenario 0: Triage of Vague Requests

When the user's request is vague (e.g., "my server has vulnerabilities, what should I do"), do NOT call any tool first. Collect three items, then route:
1. Vulnerability type (Type): Linux software (`cve`) / Windows system (`sys`) / application (`app`, `sca`) / emergency (`emg`), or a CVE ID provided by the user
2. Affected assets: which server(s)
3. Goal: view the list only / repair now / verify an already-applied fix

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

Reason: `AlibabaCloud-Agent-Skills/alibabacloud-sas-vul-repair/{session-id}` is this skill's invocation observability identifier for call tracking and auditing; this skill does not inject UA via exported env vars (not persistent across shell invocations) — every command explicitly carries `--user-agent`.

## 5. Write Operations Require Prior Confirmation

All write operations (repair, ignore, delete, scan trigger, configuration change, etc.) must first present the change list to the user and obtain explicit confirmation; execution before confirmation is forbidden.

• Confidence: 60% confidence
• Finding: Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

❌ **Incorrect example:**

```
User says "fix this vulnerability for me" → immediately execute modify-operate-vul (no change list presented, no reboot/snapshot inquiry, no confirmation)
```

Reason: write operations directly affect the user's asset state (may trigger reboots and billing); you must first present "what changes, which machines are affected, whether a reboot is needed, whether billing applies" and then obtain confirmation; write-operation failures must also not be auto-retried without explanation.

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

| API style | RPC style |
| RegionId | RegionId is optional for most APIs. SAS is centrally deployed, so region is usually unnecessary — the region of the current aliyun CLI profile applies (some APIs have deprecated RegionId or use it only in specific scenarios such as container images). The SAS service only exposes two endpoints: cn-shanghai (China site) and ap-southeast-1 (International site); International-site accounts must ensure the CLI profile region points to the International site (or pass `--region ap-southeast-1` explicitly), otherwise requests resolve to the wrong site |
| Invocation format | aliyun CLI plugin mode: `aliyun sas <lowercase-hyphenated-command> [parameters]` (e.g., DescribeVulList → `aliyun sas describe-vul-list`) |
| OpenAPI online debug link | `https://api.aliyun.com/api/Sas/2018-12-03/<APIName>` (e.g., `https://api.aliyun.com/api/Sas/2018-12-03/DescribeVulList`) |
| Observability requirement | Every command that calls a cloud API must include `--user-agent AlibabaCloud-Agent-Skills/alibabacloud-sas-vul-repair/<session-id>`, where `<session-id>` is the 32-char lowercase hex string generated at session start. Local commands (configure/plugin/version) are excluded |
| Response field convention | Response fields cited in scenario document examples are subject to actual API response JSON; field casing follows this reference document |

• Confidence: 50% confidence
• Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: This reference file is materially out of scope for a skill that is supposed to support SAS vulnerability repair. By embedding a general Alibaba Cloud CLI installation and account-configuration guide, the skill widens the actions an agent may take, increasing the chance of unnecessary credential handling, account changes, and misuse of unrelated cloud services.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The guide recommends executing a remote shell script directly via curl-to-bash without any integrity verification or prominent warning. This is dangerous because compromise of the download endpoint, CDN path, or transport trust chain could lead to arbitrary code execution on the host running the install command.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

**x86_64**
```bash
wget --connect-timeout=10 --read-timeout=120 --tries=3 -qO- https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/aliyun-cli-linux-latest-amd64.tgz | tar xz
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
```

**ARM64**

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

**x86_64**
```bash
wget --connect-timeout=10 --read-timeout=120 --tries=3 -qO- https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/aliyun-cli-linux-latest-amd64.tgz | tar xz
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/
```

**ARM64**

• Confidence: 70% confidence
• Finding: Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: The examples normalize storing long-lived AccessKey credentials in CLI configuration and environment variables without a strong, front-loaded warning about plaintext exposure and credential theft risks. In automation or shared-host settings, these patterns can lead to secrets leaking through files, shell history, process inspection, logs, or CI/CD environment capture.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

1. Log in to Aliyun Console: https://ram.console.aliyun.com/
2. Navigate to: AccessKey Management
3. Create a new AccessKey pair
4. Save the secret immediately — it's only shown once

### Configuration Modes

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The guide instructs users to create persistent AccessKey pairs for CLI use, which encourages durable credential issuance and retention. In the context of a vulnerability-repair skill, this is more dangerous because the task does not require broad persistent identity creation and could instead rely on OAuth, STS, or instance roles to reduce credential lifetime and blast radius.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The documentation teaches broad CLI authentication modes, profile management, plugin installation, and general service access that go far beyond SAS vulnerability remediation. In an agent context, this expands capability from a bounded security-maintenance task into general cloud administration, which can enable lateral actions across ECS, VPC, RDS, and other services if credentials are supplied.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation

Content

```bash
# Restrict permissions
chmod 600 ~/.aliyun/config.json
```

## Troubleshooting

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 91% confidence
• Finding: Line L70 states that the agent should fetch Chinese pages first and use English only as a fallback. This is a natural-language locale policy constraint that does not offer the user a language choice or require opt-in, which can violate language/locale policy requirements.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The file provides mandatory quoted user communication templates exclusively in English for multiple branches, but does not indicate that the assistant should adapt to the user's language or obtain user opt-in for English. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user choice is a natural-language locale violation.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

- Result explanation template: "Under the current filter conditions, X vulnerabilities were detected, of which Y are high-severity. Top priority to handle: `<vulnerability-name>` (affecting Z servers, first detected on `<date>`)." Numbers must come from actual API responses — never fabricate.
- No-result phrasing: "No vulnerability records were found under the current filter conditions", and suggest possible reasons: filter conditions too strict, asset not connected, Agent offline causing stale data (guide to the install-agent scenario), or the vulnerability type is genuinely clear.
- Guidance phrasing: when query results show many high-severity unfixed vulnerabilities, naturally transition to the repair scenario (see references/scenario-repair.md), but never initiate any write operation without confirmation.

## Notes and Boundaries

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

aliyun sas modify-push-all-task --uuids <server-uuid> --tasks OVAL_ENTITY,SYSVUL --user-agent AlibabaCloud-Agent-Skills/alibabacloud-sas-vul-repair/<session-id>
```

Dispatch success judgment: a RequestId is returned and `PushTaskRsp.PushTaskResultList` has no failure record for that server (or Online=true, Success=true). Field-tested note (pitfall record): a targeted task dispatched by `modify-push-all-task` may not immediately appear in the `describe-once-task` task list (initially only the schedule periodic task is visible — there is a registration delay). Judge dispatch success by PushTaskResultList; the task list is only auxiliary corroboration — do not judge dispatch failure just because it is absent from the list.

⑤ Scan task progress verification:

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: This markdown file contains natural-language guidance stating that the `Lang` parameter defaults to `zh` and only optionally supports `en`. Under the policy for language or locale choice, presenting a forced/default language without explicit user opt-in can violate locale expectations unless the user is offered a choice or the constraint is clearly justified as region-specific.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Confidence: 86% confidence
• Finding: This section says `Lang` defaults to `zh` for asset queries, but does not instruct the skill to obtain user preference first. Because this is natural-language behavior guidance in a markdown file, it can amount to forcing a specific language/locale without opt-in.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.