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Security audit

Alibabacloud Sas Malware Detection

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This malware-scanning skill has a coherent purpose, but it should be reviewed because it asks agents to install and update unverified Alibaba CLI components and handles cloud credentials and file uploads in risky ways.

Install only after reviewing and tightening the setup: avoid `curl | bash`, avoid unverified latest binaries and sudo PATH installs, pin and verify the Aliyun CLI and only the required SAS plugin, do not enable broad auto-plugin updates permanently, use a dedicated least-privilege RAM identity or short-lived credentials, and scan only files or directories you explicitly intend to upload to Alibaba Cloud.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (5)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:27
Finding

Unverified Remote Installer Is Executed Directly by Bash

Content
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Run `aliyun version` to verify >= 3.3.3. If not installed or version too low, > run `curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash` to install/update, > or see `references/cli-installation-guide.md` for installation instructions. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the Agent to download a mutable shell script and pass its contents directly to Bash. The downloaded payload is not pinned to a release and is not checked against a cryptographic hash or vendor signature before execution. HTTPS protects the transport connection but does not establish payload immutability or protect against compromise of the origin, CDN, DNS/TLS trust chain, or vendor publishing infrastructure. Because the response is executed immediately, there is no opportunity to inspect or validate the effective code. Installing the CLI may be necessary for the declared malware-scanning function, but direct remote script execution is not the least-privileged or safest installation method. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent determines that Aliyun CLI is missing or older than version 3.3.3. 2. It follows the installation instruction in `SKILL.md`. 3. The remote origin, CDN, or delivery chain returns a modified `setup.sh`. 4. `curl` sends the response directly to Bash. 5. The malicious response executes with all privileges available to the Agent or invoking user. 6. The payload can access local files, environment variables, cloud configuration, and any credentials available to that account. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation permits arbitrary command execution under the invoking user’s identity. Depending on that user’s privileges, an attacker could read or alter local files, steal Alibaba Cloud credentials, install persistence, modify executables, or make authenticated cloud API r ...[truncated 204 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
SKILL.md:31
Finding

Automatic Plugin Installation and Unscoped Plugin Updates Introduce Supply-Chain Risk

Content
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[MUST] run `aliyun configure set --auto-plugin-install true` to enable automatic plugin installation. > [MUST] run `aliyun plugin update` to ensure that any existing plugins are always up-to-date. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill permanently enables automatic plugin installation and mandates updating all existing plugins. It does not pin the required SAS plugin to a reviewed version, verify plugin integrity, restrict updates to the plugin needed by this Skill, or restore the previous auto-install setting. The declared task requires only the Alibaba Cloud SAS functionality. Updating unrelated plugins and changing global CLI behavior exceed the minimum changes needed to scan files. The use of mutable latest plugin versions also means that executable behavior may change after the Skill has been audited. ### Attack Path 1. The Agent enables global automatic plugin installation. 2. The Agent runs an unscoped update affecting all installed plugins. 3. A compromised repository, publishing account, metadata response, or newly released plugin supplies malicious or vulnerable code. 4. The CLI installs or replaces local plugin components. 5. A current or future CLI invocation loads the modified plugin. 6. The plugin executes in the context of a user who may have authenticated Alibaba Cloud credentials. ### Impact Assessment A malicious plugin could execute local code, access files and environment variables available to the user, intercept CLI arguments or responses, and abuse the user’s cloud credentials within their assigned RAM permissions. The permanent configuration change also affects unrelated future sessions. Although this is persistent state, the reviewed content does not establish that it is intended as a ba ...[truncated 78 chars]
Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
references/cli-installation-guide.md:39
Finding

Unverified Latest Binaries Are Installed into a Privileged System PATH

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/cli-installation-guide.md:103
Finding

Cloud Credentials Are Recommended in Command-Line Arguments and Plaintext Configuration

Content
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\ --access-key-secret \ --region cn-hangzhou ``` All `aliyun configure` commands support non-interactive flags, which is the recommended approach — it works in scripts, CI/CD pipelines, and agent-driven automation without hanging on stdin prompts. ``` The guide also documents plaintext credential storage: ```json { "current": "default", "profiles": [ { "name": "default", "mode": "AK", "access_key_id": "LTAI5tXXXXXXXX", "access_key_secret": "8dXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX", "region_id": "cn-hangzhou", "output_format": "json", "language": "en" } ] } ``` ### Technical Analysis Passing access keys and STS tokens as command-line arguments can expose them through shell history, process inspection, terminal recording, CI logs, debugging output, or automation telemetry. Persistent plaintext storage in `~/.aliyun/config.json` also creates a sensitive local target, particularly if restrictive permissions are not enforced at creation time. This guide conflicts with the stronger safeguards in `SKILL.md:55-58`, which prohibit asking for credentials in the conversation or command line and prohibit using literal credentials with `aliyun configure set`. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the installation guide and substitutes real secrets into the command. 2. The shell records the command in history, or a local process observes its argument list while it executes. 3. Alternatively, a log collector, terminal capture, or CI system records the command. 4. The CLI persists cr ...[truncated 845 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/malware_scan.sh:148
Finding

API-Supplied Upload Destination Is Used Without Scheme or Host Validation

Content
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&2; exit 1 fi echo "Uploading file ($file_size bytes)..." >&2 local http_code http_code=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \ --connect-timeout 10 --max-time 300 \ -X POST "$public_url" \ -F "key=$oss_key" \ -F "policy=$policy" \ -F "OSSAccessKeyId=$access_id" \ -F "Signature=$signature" \ -F "success_action_status=200" \ -F "file=@$abs_path") ``` ### Technical Analysis The script uploads the selected local file to `PublicUrl`, which is taken from CLI/API output. It verifies only that the URL and OSS key are nonempty. It does not require HTTPS, validate the hostname against documented Alibaba Cloud OSS domains, restrict ports, reject embedded user information, or explicitly prevent redirects. Uploading files is part of the declared scanning architecture. However, accepting an unconstrained destination means that compromise or spoofing of the CLI or upstream response can redirect sensitive files and temporary upload credentials to an attacker-controlled server. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker replaces or compromises the local `aliyun` executable, a plugin, or the upstream API response path. 2. The `CreateFileDetectUploadUrl` response contains an attacker-controlled `PublicUrl`. 3. The script extracts the URL and checks only that it is nonempty. 4. `curl` submits the local file, OSS key, acces ...[truncated 788 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (19)

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The instruction to execute curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash downloads and immediately runs a remote script with full shell privileges, without integrity verification or pinning. If the remote host, transport path, or script content is compromised, the user or agent could execute arbitrary code, leading to full system compromise, credential theft, or persistence.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

md
**Pre-check: Aliyun CLI >= 3.3.3 required**
> Run `aliyun version` to verify >= 3.3.3. If not installed or version too low,
> run `curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash` to install/update,
> or see `references/cli-installation-guide.md` for installation instructions.

**Pre-check: Aliyun CLI plugin update required**

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 149)May include surrounding context.

md
bash scripts/malware_scan.sh check-service --region <RegionId>

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 192)May include surrounding context.

md
bash scripts/malware_scan.sh check-service --region <RegionId>

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 202)May include surrounding context.

md
bash scripts/malware_scan.sh check-service --region <RegionId>

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 220)May include surrounding context.

md
bash scripts/malware_scan.sh check-service --region <RegionId>

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill invokes shell commands extensively but does not declare any tool scope such as allowed-tools or permissions. That omission weakens execution boundaries and reviewability, making it easier for an agent to run powerful commands like curl, bash, and local file operations without an explicit least-privilege contract.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

This markdown/manifest content explicitly lists activation triggers, and "file scan" is generic enough to match many benign workflows such as format checks, document scanning, or filesystem inspection. The description narrows the domain somewhat, but the trigger list itself lacks constraints or negative examples to prevent unintended invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/acceptance-criteria.md (reported line 66)May include surrounding context.

aliyun sas create-file-detect-upload-url --type 0 --hash-key-list "$md5"

text

## 5. OSS Form Upload via curl

#### CORRECT
```bash

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md
tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md
tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

md
tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 71)May include surrounding context.

Extract and install

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-linux-latest-arm64.tgz sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

text

### Windows

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The guide instructs users to create long-lived AccessKey pairs and store secrets for CLI use, which introduces persistent credentials into local config and automation contexts. For a malware-detection skill, this is riskier than necessary because compromise of the host, logs, or config file could expose reusable cloud credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

md
1. Log in to Aliyun Console: https://ram.console.aliyun.com/
2. Navigate to: AccessKey Management
3. Create a new AccessKey pair
4. Save the secret immediately — it's only shown once

### Configuration Modes

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file documents privileged authentication modes including role assumption, cross-account access, and elevated session patterns that are unnecessary for a malware-scanning skill. In an agent setting, these instructions normalize granting broad cloud privileges, which could be abused to access or modify resources outside the intended detection scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 404)May include surrounding context.

bash
# Restrict permissions
chmod 600 ~/.aliyun/config.json

Troubleshooting

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The guide encourages installation and listing of arbitrary Alibaba Cloud product plugins, expanding the skill's effective capability far beyond malware detection. In an agent context, this broadens the command surface and can enable unrelated cloud operations, increasing the risk of misuse or prompt-driven capability creep.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The phrase "malicious file" can appear in descriptive or explanatory conversation without indicating that the user wants this skill executed. Because the trigger list does not distinguish between discussion of malware and an explicit request to perform scanning, it may cause accidental activation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The documentation references are explicitly Chinese-language URLs (/zh/) and the skill does not indicate that users may choose another language or that Chinese-only documentation is required for a justified regional reason. This can violate language/locale policy when users are not given an opt-in or alternative.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The sample configuration explicitly sets "language": "en" in the stored config example. Because this markdown guide does not indicate that language selection is optional or provide alternatives, it can be read as prescribing a fixed locale, which conflicts with the policy against forcing a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.