alibabacloud-oss-ossfs-mount-diagnosis

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 2:38 AM UTC
• Version: 0.0.1

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed read-only Alibaba Cloud OSS mount diagnostic, but it uses broad cloud-account metadata access and recommends an unpinned host CLI upgrade that users should review before installing.

Install only with a narrowly scoped temporary Alibaba Cloud role where possible. Expect the skill to call OSS and STS read-only APIs, possibly list bucket names visible to the credential, print account/principal metadata in reports, fetch official docs, and write a small docs cache. Avoid following the unpinned aliyun upgrade --yes instruction without separately verifying the CLI source/version, and treat privileged-container and metadata-endpoint steps as manual last-resort diagnostics.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (3)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning

• Location: scripts/ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py:568

Finding

Account-Wide Bucket Enumeration Exceeds the Scope of Single-Bucket Diagnosis

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Note

• Location: scripts/ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py:600

Finding

Unconditional Caller Identity Collection Exposes Account and Principal Identifiers

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:96

Finding

Unattended Upgrade to an Unpinned Latest CLI Version Creates Supply-Chain Risk

Content

View full analysis

Remediation

View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection

Findings (33)

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The skill is advertised as read-only mount diagnosis, but the specification also includes outbound documentation fetches and local cache writes under ~/.cache, which are not clearly disclosed in the top-level purpose. This mismatch can mislead operators about what data leaves the environment and what local state is modified, undermining trust and review assumptions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The skill is advertised as read-only mount diagnosis, but the specification also includes outbound documentation fetches and local cache writes under ~/.cache, which are not clearly disclosed in the top-level purpose. This mismatch can mislead operators about what data leaves the environment and what local state is modified, undermining trust and review assumptions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The skill is advertised as read-only mount diagnosis, but the specification also includes outbound documentation fetches and local cache writes under ~/.cache, which are not clearly disclosed in the top-level purpose. This mismatch can mislead operators about what data leaves the environment and what local state is modified, undermining trust and review assumptions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 27)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 153)May include surrounding context.

md

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py (reported line 321)May include surrounding context.

python

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py (reported line 427)May include surrounding context.

python

### 1. Credential file / credential chain

- ossfs 1.0: credential file `/etc/passwd-ossfs`, line format
  `<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`

Privileged Container / Container Escape

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 87% confidence

Finding

Recommending docker run --privileged=true is dangerous because it grants the container broad host-equivalent capabilities and can enable container escape or host compromise if followed in an unsafe environment. Even though the skill is read-only and cites official guidance, embedding a high-risk privileged-container workaround without strong least-privilege framing can lead users to adopt an unnecessarily dangerous configuration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

md

module and matching libfuse. `fuse: device not found, try 'modprobe fuse'`
  inside a container means the container lacks FUSE access - the official
  guidance is running the container with elevated privileges
  (`docker run --privileged=true ...`) or providing `/dev/fuse` (ossfs FAQ).
- `ossfs: error while loading shared libraries: libcrypto.so.1.1 ...` =
  installation package / OS mismatch - install the package matching the OS.
- ossfs only supports Linux (CentOS/Rocky/Alibaba Cloud Linux/Ubuntu/

Cloud Metadata Access

High

• Category: Server-Side Request Forgery
• Confidence: 85% confidence

Finding

The document instructs checking the cloud metadata endpoint http://100.100.100.200/..., which is a sensitive internal service. In many agent or tool-using contexts, guidance that encourages access to metadata endpoints can normalize SSRF-like patterns or lead to unintended exposure of instance role information if later operationalized by automation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

md

| `There is no enough disk space for used as cache(or temporary) directory` | tmp_space | free space on /tmp < `multipart_size * parallel_count`; shrink `multipart_size` or free space (guidance) |
| `Input/Output error` copying large files | io_error_bigfile | high disk load from large-part copying; lower `parallel_count` / `multipart_size`, or use ossutil multipart instead |
| `NSS error -8023` (CentOS 7.x HTTPS mount, ossfs >= 1.91.5; also `ls` Input/Output error) | nss_old | outdated NSS library; `yum update nss` then remount (guidance) |
| ram_role mount fails on ossfs >= 1.91.7 | imdsv2 | check `curl http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/<role>`; if reachable, add `-o disable_imdsv2` (guidance) |
| uploaded files all get Content-Type `application/octet-stream` | mime_missing | `/etc/mime.types` absent; install `mime-support`/`mailcap` or add the file, then remount |
| a folder object shows up as a plain file | folder_misrec | folder object has non-zero size or wrong Content-Type; mount with `-ocomplement_stat` or fix/remove the object via ossutil |

Privileged Container / Container Escape

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py (reported line 432)May include surrounding context.

python

"vars + ossfs2.conf with '--' prefixed keys (ossfs 2.0); "
            "(2) credential account owns the bucket; (3) endpoint region "
            "matches the bucket location; (4) FUSE kernel module available "
            "(containers need /dev/fuse or --privileged); (5) mountpoint "
            "exists and is empty (see "
            "references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md).")

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The skill requires shell, network, environment access, and filesystem read/write, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope or permission boundary. That creates unnecessary ambient authority: a runtime or orchestrator may grant broader capabilities than users expect, increasing the blast radius if the skill is misused or its scripts are compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unrestricted Tool Access

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Despite prohibiting certain commands, the skill explicitly instructs the agent to execute local scripts and shell commands, and no concrete sandbox/tool allowlist is declared in metadata. In practice this means the skill relies on prose restrictions instead of enforceable execution boundaries, leaving room for unintended command execution paths in environments that expose general shell access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md

## Absolute Rules

1. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (no execution):** Under **NO** circumstances may you execute, or generate for direct execution, any mount-class command - `ossfs`, `ossfs2`, `fusermount`, `mount`/`umount`, `modprobe fuse`, `kubectl apply`, or any command that changes bucket configuration (including PutBucketArchiveDirectRead, PutBucketPolicy, ACL changes). All corrective steps are output as MANUAL GUIDANCE for the user to run themselves.
2. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (read-only enforcement):** Never generate, write, or execute any command/script calling a mutating OSS API - e.g. `PutBucket*`, `DeleteBucket*`, `PutObject*`, `DeleteObject*`, RestoreObject, or any ACL/policy change, including commands "for the user to run manually" beyond the manual guidance allowed by rule 1's scope.
3. **MANDATORY entry-point enforcement:** All cloud-side checks MUST be performed by running the scripts under `scripts/` (`ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py` as the entry, `sts_token.py` for identity). The Agent is forbidden from assembling its own ossutil / SDK / curl commands against the OSS control plane or bypassing the scripts - the scripts embed timeout, error degradation, and observability guarantees that ad-hoc commands lack. Read the script output, interpret it, and compose the report; do not re-implement the queries.
4. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (credential handling):** Never read, print, or pass AK/SK/STS tokens explicitly. The OSS SDK resolves credentials exclusively from the environment variables of the default credential chain; the identity check uses the aliyun CLI default credential chain. Never accept AK/SK from the user or from another script, and never ask the user to paste them into the conversation.
5. **NO FABRICATION:** Every conclusion must be grounded in data actually returned by GetBucketInfo / ListBuckets / GetCallerIdentity or in the documented knowledge of `references/`. If a query fails or returns empty, record it and state the limitation - never invent bucket l
...[truncated 24 chars]

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

md

1. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (no execution):** Under **NO** circumstances may you execute, or generate for direct execution, any mount-class command - `ossfs`, `ossfs2`, `fusermount`, `mount`/`umount`, `modprobe fuse`, `kubectl apply`, or any command that changes bucket configuration (including PutBucketArchiveDirectRead, PutBucketPolicy, ACL changes). All corrective steps are output as MANUAL GUIDANCE for the user to run themselves.
2. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (read-only enforcement):** Never generate, write, or execute any command/script calling a mutating OSS API - e.g. `PutBucket*`, `DeleteBucket*`, `PutObject*`, `DeleteObject*`, RestoreObject, or any ACL/policy change, including commands "for the user to run manually" beyond the manual guidance allowed by rule 1's scope.
3. **MANDATORY entry-point enforcement:** All cloud-side checks MUST be performed by running the scripts under `scripts/` (`ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py` as the entry, `sts_token.py` for identity). The Agent is forbidden from assembling its own ossutil / SDK / curl commands against the OSS control plane or bypassing the scripts - the scripts embed timeout, error degradation, and observability guarantees that ad-hoc commands lack. Read the script output, interpret it, and compose the report; do not re-implement the queries.
4. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (credential handling):** Never read, print, or pass AK/SK/STS tokens explicitly. The OSS SDK resolves credentials exclusively from the environment variables of the default credential chain; the identity check uses the aliyun CLI default credential chain. Never accept AK/SK from the user or from another script, and never ask the user to paste them into the conversation.
5. **NO FABRICATION:** Every conclusion must be grounded in data actually returned by GetBucketInfo / ListBuckets / GetCallerIdentity or in the documented knowledge of `references/`. If a query fails or returns empty, record it and state the limitation - never invent bucket locations, storage c
...[truncated 25 chars]

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 141)May include surrounding context.

md

1. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (no execution):** Under **NO** circumstances may you execute, or generate for direct execution, any mount-class command - `ossfs`, `ossfs2`, `fusermount`, `mount`/`umount`, `modprobe fuse`, `kubectl apply`, or any command that changes bucket configuration (including PutBucketArchiveDirectRead, PutBucketPolicy, ACL changes). All corrective steps are output as MANUAL GUIDANCE for the user to run themselves.
2. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (read-only enforcement):** Never generate, write, or execute any command/script calling a mutating OSS API - e.g. `PutBucket*`, `DeleteBucket*`, `PutObject*`, `DeleteObject*`, RestoreObject, or any ACL/policy change, including commands "for the user to run manually" beyond the manual guidance allowed by rule 1's scope.
3. **MANDATORY entry-point enforcement:** All cloud-side checks MUST be performed by running the scripts under `scripts/` (`ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py` as the entry, `sts_token.py` for identity). The Agent is forbidden from assembling its own ossutil / SDK / curl commands against the OSS control plane or bypassing the scripts - the scripts embed timeout, error degradation, and observability guarantees that ad-hoc commands lack. Read the script output, interpret it, and compose the report; do not re-implement the queries.
4. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (credential handling):** Never read, print, or pass AK/SK/STS tokens explicitly. The OSS SDK resolves credentials exclusively from the environment variables of the default credential chain; the identity check uses the aliyun CLI default credential chain. Never accept AK/SK from the user or from another script, and never ask the user to paste them into the conversation.
5. **NO FABRICATION:** Every conclusion must be grounded in data actually returned by GetBucketInfo / ListBuckets / GetCallerIdentity or in the documented knowledge of `references/`. If a query fails or returns empty, record it and state the limitation - never invent bucket locations, storage c
...[truncated 25 chars]

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 259)May include surrounding context.

md

1. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (no execution):** Under **NO** circumstances may you execute, or generate for direct execution, any mount-class command - `ossfs`, `ossfs2`, `fusermount`, `mount`/`umount`, `modprobe fuse`, `kubectl apply`, or any command that changes bucket configuration (including PutBucketArchiveDirectRead, PutBucketPolicy, ACL changes). All corrective steps are output as MANUAL GUIDANCE for the user to run themselves.
2. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (read-only enforcement):** Never generate, write, or execute any command/script calling a mutating OSS API - e.g. `PutBucket*`, `DeleteBucket*`, `PutObject*`, `DeleteObject*`, RestoreObject, or any ACL/policy change, including commands "for the user to run manually" beyond the manual guidance allowed by rule 1's scope.
3. **MANDATORY entry-point enforcement:** All cloud-side checks MUST be performed by running the scripts under `scripts/` (`ossfs_mount_diagnosis.py` as the entry, `sts_token.py` for identity). The Agent is forbidden from assembling its own ossutil / SDK / curl commands against the OSS control plane or bypassing the scripts - the scripts embed timeout, error degradation, and observability guarantees that ad-hoc commands lack. Read the script output, interpret it, and compose the report; do not re-implement the queries.
4. **ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION (credential handling):** Never read, print, or pass AK/SK/STS tokens explicitly. The OSS SDK resolves credentials exclusively from the environment variables of the default credential chain; the identity check uses the aliyun CLI default credential chain. Never accept AK/SK from the user or from another script, and never ask the user to paste them into the conversation.
5. **NO FABRICATION:** Every conclusion must be grounded in data actually returned by GetBucketInfo / ListBuckets / GetCallerIdentity or in the documented knowledge of `references/`. If a query fails or returns empty, record it and state the limitation - never invent bucket locations, storage c
...[truncated 25 chars]

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

Lines L043-L049 state that the trigger conditions are 'the same list the description advertises'. Later, L235-L243 documents another supported symptom ('mounted directory does not show files uploaded by SDK'), which contradicts that claim of equivalence between advertised triggers and actual supported behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 209)May include surrounding context.

--endpoint oss-cn-hangzhou.aliyuncs.com --symptom "ossfs mount failed" --platform ecs

text

Report the `verdict` (endpoint region vs bucket location), the `archive_verdict` (storage class), the pre-flight checklist recommendations, and declare any auto-filled parameters. All remediation (credential file, chmod 640, remount) is output as manual guidance.

**Example 2 - container storage volume mount 403**

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The manifest description and trigger list constrain the skill to ossfs mount failure, disappeared mountpoints, container mount 403, and archive-read 403 scenarios. However, Example N introduces a different use case—mounted directory not showing SDK-uploaded files due to caching semantics—which is not one of the declared triggers and broadens the skill beyond the stated diagnostic scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 31)May include surrounding context.

md

`<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`
  when others can read it; fix with `chmod 640 /etc/passwd-ossfs`
  (ossfs FAQ, permission / mount sections).
- ossfs 2.0: credentials come from the environment variables
  `OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` / `OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET`; an unset pair surfaces as

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.

md

`<bucket>:<AccessKeyId>:<AccessKeySecret>`; the file permission MUST be
  restricted - ossfs refuses to start with
  `credentials file /etc/passwd-ossfs should not have others permissions`
  when others can read it; fix with `chmod 640 /etc/passwd-ossfs`
  (ossfs FAQ, permission / mount sections).
- ossfs 2.0: credentials come from the environment variables
  `OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID` / `OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET`; an unset pair surfaces as

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

md

responding. Verify the credential's account UID against the bucket owner
  UID (the entry script's GetCallerIdentity + GetBucketInfo owner_id pair
  provides this evidence).
- Never ask the user to paste AK/SK into the conversation; guide them to
  fix the credential file / environment on their own host.

### 2. Endpoint

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_resource_identifier

Plaintext HTTP endpoint targets a CGNAT/Tailscale-range address.

Critical

• Code: suspicious.exposed_resource_identifier
• Location: references/ossfs-mount-knowledge.md:163