Alibabacloud Network Connect With Ipsec Vpn

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 4:15 AM UTC
• Version: 0.0.1-beta.1

Overview

The skill is a coherent VPN setup guide, but it includes unsafe SSH, credential, installation, and firewall guidance that should be reviewed before use.

Install only if you are comfortable reviewing and tightening the operational steps: verify Aliyun CLI downloads, avoid passing cloud secrets through command-line flags or logs, remove StrictHostKeyChecking=no, generate a unique PSK and never print it, restrict firewall rules to confirmed VPN gateway peers, and confirm paid cloud resource creation before execution.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions

Findings (5)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error

• Location: references/cli-installation-guide.md:38

Finding

Mutable Aliyun CLI Binary Is Installed Without Integrity Verification

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/cli-installation-guide.md:21-30, 38-45, 51-58, 64-71
Vulnerability Type: Unverified third-party binary installation
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

bash

# Download
wget https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/aliyun-cli-linux-latest-amd64.tgz

# Extract and install
tar -xzf aliyun-cli-linux-latest-amd64.tgz
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Equivalent unverified installation procedures are also provided for macOS, CentOS/RHEL, ARM64 Linux, and Windows.

Technical Analysis

The guide downloads a mutable archive identified as latest, extracts it, and places the resulting executable in the privileged /usr/local/bin directory. It does not pin a specific release, validate a publisher-provided checksum, or verify a cryptographic signature.

HTTPS authenticates the transport endpoint but does not make the artifact reproducible or protect users if the CDN, release pipeline, origin server, or associated credentials are compromised. Running aliyun version after installation confirms only that the binary executes; it does not establish authenticity.

The installed CLI subsequently receives Alibaba Cloud credentials and invokes APIs capable of creating and deleting VPN gateways, customer gateways, VPN connections, and routes.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the binary distribution origin, CDN, DNS path, TLS termination point, or release process.
2. The attacker replaces the mutable latest archive with one containing a modified aliyun executable.
3. A user follows the guide and downloads the archive without validating its digest or signature.
4. The executable is moved into /usr/local/bin, making it available system-wide.
5. The user or Agent executes the substituted binary during version checks and later cloud operations.
6. The malicious binary captures cloud credentials, changes requested API operations, ...[truncated 666 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Pin an exact Aliyun CLI release rather than downloading a mutable latest archive.
2. Publish the expected SHA-256 or stronger digest in the guide and verify it before extraction.
3. Prefer publisher-signed packages or releases and verify the signature against a separately obtained, trusted signing key.
4. Use an operating-system package manager or other authenticated package repository where available.
5. Download into a dedicated temporary directory with restrictive permissions.
6. Inspect the archive contents before extraction and reject unexpected paths or files.
7. Install only after verification succeeds, and fail closed if no trusted checksum or signature is available.
8. Document a secure upgrade process that applies the same pinning and verification controls.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: references/cli-installation-guide.md:100

Finding

Cloud Access Keys and Security Tokens Are Passed Through Exposed Channels

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/cli-installation-guide.md:100-108, 125-139, 156-168, 229-243, 262-275, 377-383
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext credential exposure through command arguments and environment variables
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

bash

aliyun configure set \
  --mode AK \
  --access-key-id {your-access-key-id} \
  --access-key-secret {your-access-key-secret} \
  --region cn-hangzhou

bash

aliyun configure set \
  --mode StsToken \
  --access-key-id LTAI5tXXXXXXXX \
  --access-key-secret 8dXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX \
  --sts-token v1.0:XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX \
  --region cn-hangzhou

bash

export ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_ID=your_access_key_id
export ALIBABA_CLOUD_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET=your_access_key_secret
export ALIBABA_CLOUD_SECURITY_TOKEN=your_sts_token
export ALIBABA_CLOUD_REGION_ID=cn-hangzhou

The guide states that non-interactive command-line flags are the recommended approach for scripts, CI/CD pipelines, and Agent-driven automation.

Technical Analysis

Access keys, secret keys, and STS tokens supplied as command-line arguments can be retained in shell history, terminal transcripts, Agent conversation records, CI logs, process-monitoring systems, and audit telemetry. Depending on operating-system protections, another local process may also be able to inspect command arguments while the command is running.

Environment variables avoid some command-line exposure but are inherited by child processes and may be captured in crash reports, debugging output, CI environment dumps, or process-inspection interfaces. The recommendation to use non-interactive flags in Agent automation increases the probability that plaintext credentials will enter retained logs.

Restricting ~/.aliyun/config.json to mode 600 is useful after configuration but does not protect secrets while they are being entered through these channels.

Attack Path

...[truncated 1191 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Prefer ECS RAM roles, workload identity, OAuth, or another credential provider that does not require exposing static secrets.
2. Use short-lived, narrowly scoped STS credentials when a role-based provider is unavailable.
3. Do not recommend passing AK/SK values or tokens directly as command-line arguments.
4. Use an interactive, no-echo credential prompt or a protected file descriptor supported by the CLI.
5. If a protected credential file is unavoidable, create it with mode 600, keep it outside the repository, and securely delete or rotate it when no longer needed.
6. Disable command echoing and redact secrets in CI/CD and Agent execution logs.
7. Avoid exporting credentials globally; scope them to the minimum process and lifetime.
8. Document immediate credential revocation and rotation procedures for suspected disclosure.
9. Prefer a dedicated RAM identity restricted to the exact regions, resources, and API actions required by the VPN workflow.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:145

Finding

SSH Host-Key Verification Is Explicitly Disabled

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md:145-149
Vulnerability Type: SSH server authentication bypass
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

bash

ssh -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -i {SSH_KEY_PATH} {SSH_USER}@{SSH_IP}
ip addr show && ip route show

Technical Analysis

StrictHostKeyChecking=no causes SSH to accept an unverified host key instead of requiring confirmation that the remote endpoint is the intended server. This removes SSH's protection against server impersonation during first connection or when no trusted host key has been provisioned.

The connection uses a private key and is followed by administrative network configuration. During the broader workflow, the session may handle the VPN pre-shared key, StrongSwan configuration, firewall changes, and privileged commands. Authenticating the remote host is therefore essential.

This issue does not modify or write the SSH private key itself. The risk arises from using that key to authenticate to an endpoint whose identity is not securely verified.

Attack Path

1. An attacker gains a network interception position or redirects the configured SSH IP through DNS, routing, ARP, or infrastructure compromise.
2. The attacker presents an arbitrary SSH host key.
3. Because strict host-key checking is disabled, the Agent accepts the key without validating a trusted fingerprint.
4. The Agent authenticates and sends server inspection or configuration commands to the attacker's endpoint.
5. Subsequent configuration material, including network details and potentially the VPN PSK, can be observed or manipulated.
6. The attacker can return fabricated command output, causing the Agent to make incorrect cloud or server changes.

Impact Assessment

Exploitation can disclose sensitive VPN configuration and administrative commands, cause operations to be performed against an attacker-controlled or incorrect server, and undermine the int ...[truncated 380 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no.
2. Obtain the server's SSH host-key fingerprint through a trusted, independent channel.
3. Pre-populate a dedicated known_hosts file with the verified key.
4. Use StrictHostKeyChecking=yes and a dedicated UserKnownHostsFile for the workflow.
5. Fail closed if the host key is absent, changed, or does not match the expected fingerprint.
6. Do not rely on unauthenticated ssh-keyscan output without independently verifying its fingerprint.
7. Keep SSH agent forwarding disabled unless explicitly required.
8. Require explicit user confirmation of the SSH endpoint, port, username, key path, and host-key fingerprint before connecting.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

• Location: references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md:7

Finding

Quick-Start and Troubleshooting Guidance Can Disclose or Encourage Reuse of the VPN PSK

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md:7-13, 230-240; references/troubleshooting.md:18-22
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext secret disclosure and insecure example credential
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

text

| Parameter | Master Tunnel | Backup Tunnel |
|-----------|---------------|---------------|
| VPN Gateway IP | 39.106.36.158 | 39.105.20.65 |
| Server Public IP | 203.0.113.10 | 203.0.113.10 |
| PSK | e6qrIPE1oyY6V2T4wLgb | e6qrIPE1oyY6V2T4wLgb |
| Local Subnet (VPC) | 172.16.0.0/16 | 172.16.0.0/16 |
| Remote Subnet (Server) | 10.0.0.0/24 | 10.0.0.0/24 |

bash

# Verify PSK matches
sudo cat /etc/swanctl/swanctl.conf | grep -A3 "secrets"

The troubleshooting reference similarly instructs users to print the secrets section from /etc/swanctl/swanctl.conf.

Technical Analysis

The quick-start presents a concrete PSK in a guide designed for copying and adaptation. Users may mistake it for an acceptable default or fail to replace it. A public, reusable PSK provides no secrecy.

The troubleshooting command prints the deployed secrets section to standard output. In an Agent-driven workflow, this output may be retained in terminal logs, shell transcripts, support records, or conversation history. File mode 600 protects the configuration at rest but is bypassed when an administrator deliberately prints the secret.

The main Skill separately recommends generating a random PSK and not echoing it. The quick-start and troubleshooting instructions conflict with that safer policy.

Attack Path

1. A user copies the quick-start configuration and retains the published example PSK, or configures a unique PSK and later follows the troubleshooting command.
2. In the first case, the PSK is already known publicly. In the second case, the real PSK is printed into a terminal or Agent transcript.
3. An attacker reads the public gui ...[truncated 813 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Replace the concrete PSK with an unmistakable placeholder such as {GENERATE_A_UNIQUE_PSK}.
2. State explicitly that example credentials must never be used in any environment.
3. Preserve the main workflow's random PSK generation requirement and enforce a sufficient entropy and length policy.
4. Remove commands that print the secrets section.
5. Diagnose PSK mismatches by securely re-entering and rotating the secret rather than displaying it.
6. If comparison is unavoidable, compare a cryptographic fingerprint generated in a controlled context and ensure the original secret is never logged.
7. Configure terminal, CI, and Agent output redaction for sensitive values.
8. Rotate any PSK that has appeared in command output, documentation, logs, or support transcripts.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning

• Location: references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md:89

Finding

Persistent IP Forwarding and Firewall Rules Are Broader Than Required

Content

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Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md:89-108
Vulnerability Type: Overly broad firewall exposure and persistent global forwarding
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

bash

echo "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1" | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.conf
sudo sysctl -p

# IKE (UDP 500)
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 500 -j ACCEPT

# NAT-T (UDP 4500)
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p udp --dport 4500 -j ACCEPT

# ESP (Protocol 50)
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p esp -j ACCEPT

# AH (Protocol 51) - optional
sudo iptables -A INPUT -p ah -j ACCEPT

Technical Analysis

The firewall rules accept IKE, NAT-T, ESP, and optional AH from every source address and on every interface. The documented VPN uses ESP; AH is not required by the stated configuration. The rules therefore exceed the minimum network exposure necessary for two known Alibaba Cloud VPN gateway peers.

The guide also enables global IPv4 forwarding and appends it permanently to /etc/sysctl.conf. It does not limit forwarding to the intended interfaces or subnets, check for an existing setting, obtain separate confirmation for persistent forwarding, or provide corresponding rollback commands. Repeated execution can also append duplicate configuration entries and duplicate firewall rules.

IP forwarding is legitimate for a server routing traffic between a local subnet and the VPN. However, global persistent forwarding without scoped firewall policy can permit unintended routing between other attached interfaces.

Attack Path

1. An administrator follows the quick-start on a host connected to both trusted and untrusted networks.
2. Global forwarding becomes active and persists across reboot.
3. Unrestricted INPUT rules expose StrongSwan-related protocols to every reachable source rather than only the two VPN gateways.
4. An attacker sends crafted IKE, NAT-T, ESP, or AH traffic to the server, increasing ...[truncated 744 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Restrict UDP 500, UDP 4500, and ESP rules to the two confirmed Alibaba Cloud VPN gateway IP addresses.
2. Restrict rules to the intended public interface.
3. Remove AH unless the confirmed VPN configuration explicitly requires it.
4. Add explicit FORWARD rules limited to the confirmed local and remote CIDRs instead of relying on unrestricted global forwarding behavior.
5. Set a deny-by-default forwarding policy where compatible with existing host requirements.
6. Use the distribution's persistent firewall manager, such as nftables, firewalld, or ufw, rather than unmanaged append-only commands.
7. Check for existing rules and sysctl entries before adding them to make the procedure idempotent.
8. Place the forwarding setting in a dedicated file such as /etc/sysctl.d/90-alibabacloud-ipsec.conf.
9. Require explicit user confirmation before making persistent firewall or kernel changes.
10. Provide exact rollback commands that remove only the rules and sysctl configuration created by this Skill.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (129)

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 93)May include surrounding context.

md

| 6 | Backup VSwitchId | Same as above (must be different AZ) | Same as above |
| 7 | Server Public IP | User input (validate IPv4, warn if RFC1918) | — |
| 8 | SSH Username | User input (default: root) | — |
| 9 | SSH Private Key | User input (path to key file, default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa) | — |
| 10 | LocalSubnet | Recommend full VPC CIDR from Step 2 | VpcId |
| 11 | RemoteSubnet | User input (MUST be internal subnet, NOT public IP, NOT 0.0.0.0/0) | Server info |
| 12 | PSK | Auto-generate `openssl rand -base64 24` (min 16 chars) | — |

Credential Access

High

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 129)May include surrounding context.

md

| 6 | Backup VSwitchId | Same as above (must be different AZ) | Same as above |
| 7 | Server Public IP | User input (validate IPv4, warn if RFC1918) | — |
| 8 | SSH Username | User input (default: root) | — |
| 9 | SSH Private Key | User input (path to key file, default: ~/.ssh/id_rsa) | — |
| 10 | LocalSubnet | Recommend full VPC CIDR from Step 2 | VpcId |
| 11 | RemoteSubnet | User input (MUST be internal subnet, NOT public IP, NOT 0.0.0.0/0) | Server info |
| 12 | PSK | Auto-generate `openssl rand -base64 24` (min 16 chars) | — |

Missing User Warnings

High

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 99% confidence

Finding

The document exposes a concrete pre-shared key and presents it as a usable configuration value. If reused in testing or production, anyone with access to the guide could impersonate a peer or decrypt/establish unauthorized VPN sessions, especially because the text does not prominently require replacing it before deployment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

4. Enable IP Forwarding

bash

echo "net.ipv4.ip_forward = 1" | sudo tee -a /etc/sysctl.conf
sudo sysctl -p

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config.md (reported line 21)May include surrounding context.

Ubuntu/Debian

bash

sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y strongswan strongswan-swanctl libcharon-extra-plugins

CentOS/RHEL

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to SSH with -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no, which disables host key verification and makes man-in-the-middle interception of the administrative SSH session much easier. In this context the session is used to inspect and later configure a VPN endpoint, so a successful MITM could expose server details, alter commands, or compromise the server and VPN setup.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

This reference file materially expands the skill from an IPsec VPN connectivity scenario into a broad Alibaba Cloud CLI administration guide, including authentication modes, profile management, plugin installation, and general service usage. In an agent skill context, that scope creep increases the chance an agent is granted or uses excessive cloud-management capability unrelated to the stated task, which can lead to over-privileged operations or misuse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 45)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/cli-installation-guide.md (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 118)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 119)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 187)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 190)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 193)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 196)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 199)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 202)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 205)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 208)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 221)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium

• Category: Privilege Escalation
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/strongswan-config-templates/QUICKSTART.md (reported line 224)May include surrounding context.

md

tar -xzf aliyun-cli-macosx-latest-amd64.tgz

# Move to PATH
sudo mv aliyun /usr/local/bin/

# Verify
aliyun version

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.