Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md python3 scripts/ca_lifecycle.py plan --plan-file PLAN.json --intent-file INTENT.json \
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because it found a high impact policy activation flaw and could not fully inspect part of a script; the evidence is incomplete.
Consider not installing until the policy activation issue is fixed and the partially inspected script is fully reviewed. The verdict is suspicious, not malicious, and the medium overall confidence reflects that the evidence is incomplete.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
python3 scripts/ca_lifecycle.py plan --plan-file PLAN.json --intent-file INTENT.json \
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
python3 scripts/ca_lifecycle.py plan-delete --plan-file PLAN.json \
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
python3 scripts/ca_lifecycle.py apply --plan-file PLAN.json --approved-plan SHA256
The create flow calculates readback_match but enables a disabled policy before checking whether that comparison failed. Consequently, a policy already known to differ from the approved plan can become active; in conditional access, mismatched decisions or conditions could bypass intended restrictions or lock users out, and returning blocked afterward does not undo activation.
Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.
def run(argv, timeout=TIMEOUT):
env = os.environ.copy()
env['ALIBABA_CLOUD_USER_AGENT'] = user_agent()
return subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=env)
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
for app_id in app_ids:
argv.extend(['--app-id', app_id])
try:
proc = subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
evidence.append({'product': 'local', 'action': 'ca_preflight', 'error': 'timeout'})
return {'status': 'discovery_incomplete'}
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def run(argv, timeout=TIMEOUT):
env = os.environ.copy()
env['ALIBABA_CLOUD_USER_AGENT'] = user_agent()
return subprocess.run(argv, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,
stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, env=env)