Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill’s firewall-management capabilities match its stated purpose and require confirmation before changes, with installation and preview caveats.
Start with read-only permissions and grant only the write actions you need; deletion permission is unnecessary. Review the selected account, firewall IDs, and discovered route lists before confirming changes, and schedule disruptive switching off-peak. Verify the installer before execution and review CLI plugin updates. Treat dry-run as preventing writes, not guaranteeing offline execution. The referenced regression tests are absent from this package; inspection and stubbed checks did not validate live cloud behavior. After CIDR updates, verify the protected routes directly because built-in update verification checks only the firewall name.
The only supplied command updates CLI plugins, which is materially different from the declared firewall-management purpose. No surrounding implementation establishes it as a supporting setup step for a declared firewall operation.
The supplied shell command requests deletion via vpc-fw-lifecycle.sh delete --vpc-firewall-id vfw-example0001, directly contradicting the stated restriction that deletion/release is unsupported and must be performed in the console. The script implementation is not supplied, so successful deletion cannot be verified, but the invocation explicitly requests the excluded operation.
The supplied code presents test execution as its sole behavior, with no visible implementation of Alibaba Cloud firewall management. Although unit tests can support such an implementation, none is shown here. The mismatch is limited to the visible behavior; the unavailable script's internal actions cannot be assessed.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
top-level `version` field (a non-empty string) of `references/manifest.json`. `scripts/common.sh` loads it on startup and treats it as a **hard gate** - if the
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ery call** in that session, so all API calls of one session can be correlated. `scripts/common.sh` implements this on load - it reuses `SKILL_SESSION_ID` when a
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-switch.sh query [options]
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-switch.sh enable --vpc-firewall-ids "vfw-example0001,vfw-example0002" --yes
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-switch.sh disable --vpc-firewall-ids "vfw-example0001" --yes
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-lifecycle.sh assess --region cn-hangzhou
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-lifecycle.sh assess --local-vpc-id vpc-example0001 --local-region cn-hangzhou \
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-lifecycle.sh create \
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-lifecycle.sh update --vpc-firewall-id vfw-example0001 --vpc-firewall-name <name>
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-lifecycle.sh delete --vpc-firewall-id vfw-example0001 # refuses; prints guidance + impact report
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engine mode are NOT parameters of create/update - adjust them afterwards with `vpc-fw-engine.sh` (see Engine Settings below).
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-engine.sh ips --vpc-firewall-id vfw-example0001
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bash scripts/vpc-fw-engine.sh acl-engine --vpc-firewall-id vfw-example0001
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uery`, `enable`, `disable`, `assess`, `precheck`, `create`, `update`, and both `vpc-fw-engine.sh` subcommands all support `--member-uid <uid>` to operate a memb
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son` and `--peer-cidr-json` for a fully offline preview (zero API calls). Both `vpc-fw-engine.sh` subcommands always issue read-only calls first, because the im
The installation guide recommends piping a mutable remote script directly into Bash without an independent integrity check. Although this script only prints the command, a user or agent following it would execute whatever the endpoint supplies; compromise of that distribution channel could expose local cloud credentials and the user's execution privileges.
=== Alibaba Cloud CLI Installation & Setup Guide ===
1. Install CLI (>= 3.3.3):
curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash
2. Verify installation:
aliyun version
The download-to-shell pipeline makes remotely supplied bytes executable without a verification step. This is the same conditional unsafe-installation issue identified by SC2, not evidence of a separate malicious tool chain, and the enclosing heredoc only prints it.
=== Alibaba Cloud CLI Installation & Setup Guide ===
1. Install CLI (>= 3.3.3):
curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash
2. Verify installation:
aliyun version
The outdated-version warning recommends executing an unpinned remote installer directly in Bash. It does not execute the installer itself, but following the suggested remediation creates a conditional supply-chain code-execution risk in an environment likely to hold cloud credentials.
CLI_VERSION_OK="true"
else
CLI_VERSION_OK="false"
log_warn "CLI version ${CLI_VERSION} is below minimum ${MIN_CLI_VERSION}. Run: curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash"
fi
fi
else
The missing-CLI warning directs the operator to pipe a remote installer into Bash without verifying its contents or release integrity. This is printed guidance rather than automatic execution, but following it could execute compromised distribution content with access to the operator's files and credentials.
fi
fi
else
log_warn "Alibaba Cloud CLI not installed. Install with: curl -fsSL https://aliyuncli.alicdn.com/setup.sh | bash"
fi
# --- Check auto plugin install ---
Subtle instructions detected that may alter agent decision-making or introduce hidden biases.
> **KNOWN API BEHAVIOR:** `ModifyVpcFirewallSwitchStatus` returns only a `RequestId`. A success response means the request was **accepted**, NOT that the switch finished. Phase 3 verification is the only reliable confirmation. See `references/api-errors.md`.
> **MANDATORY: Batch Result Rule.** The script's JSON summary derives `success` from the per-ID results: it is `true` **only** when `failed_count` is 0 and `succeeded_count` > 0. On a partial failure `success` is `false` and `note` begins with `PARTIAL FAILURE`. Report per ID from the `succeeded` / `failed` arrays - never tell the user protection is on unless that specific ID appears in `succeeded` **and** Phase 3 shows `opened`.
### Phase 3: Result Verification
Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
# --- Subcommand: update ---
cmd_update() {
local FW_ID="" FW_NAME="" LOCAL_CIDR_JSON="" PEER_CIDR_JSON="" MEMBER_UID=""
local DRY_RUN=false SKIP_VERIFY=false YES=false
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
case "$1" in
The mandatory presentation rules require Chinese status annotations, a Chinese summary line, and Chinese empty-result text regardless of the user's language. No language choice or locale-specific justification is provided for these user-facing query results.