T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:23- Finding
Third-Party Packages Installed Without Integrity or Source Verification
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a disclosed Alibaba Cloud inventory tool, but its permissions and outputs can expose sensitive infrastructure details.
Install only if you intend to inventory an Alibaba Cloud account. Use a dedicated RAM role with the documented read-oriented permissions, limit regions and resource types where practical, avoid --debug and --keep-attributes unless needed, and write output only to private trusted directories because the JSON may reveal infrastructure topology and security relationships.
SKILL.md:23Third-Party Packages Installed Without Integrity or Source Verification
scripts/probe.py:1461Sensitive Cloud Inventory Written Through Symlinks and Potentially Permissive File Modes
The skill can access environment-based credentials and write probe output files, but the manifest does not declare an explicit tool scope such as allowed-tools or permissions. In a skill that inventories cloud resources, undeclared access increases the chance of unintended credential use and uncontrolled persistence of sensitive cloud inventory data, reducing enforceability of least privilege.
The trigger word "probe" is overly broad and may cause the skill to activate for unrelated user requests. Because this skill performs sensitive cloud inventory discovery, accidental invocation could expose account topology and resource metadata in contexts where the user did not intend a cloud reconnaissance action.
The skill description explains how to enumerate and export cloud resources but does not prominently warn that outputs may contain sensitive infrastructure inventory, identifiers, relationships, and network details. In a cloud discovery skill, omission of this warning increases the likelihood that sensitive results are displayed, stored, or shared without adequate user awareness.
The documentation enumerates a large set of read and relationship-discovery permissions across many Alibaba Cloud services, including security-group configuration, load balancer listeners, resource sharing, and network topology metadata, but it does not clearly warn that using the skill can expose broad account inventory and sensitive architectural details. In practice, this can lead users to grant sweeping access without understanding that the skill can map significant portions of their environment, increasing the risk of unnecessary data exposure and over-privileged deployment.
The --debug option causes full API response bodies from probe operations to be printed to stderr, and those responses can contain discovered cloud resource inventory, metadata, and potentially sensitive configuration details. In an agent or automation context, stderr is often captured into logs or surfaced to other systems, so enabling debug can unintentionally exfiltrate sensitive account topology and resource information beyond the intended consumer.
Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.
For the complete permission list including a least-privilege RAM policy JSON, see [references/ram-policies.md](references/ram-policies.md).
**Key permissions:**
| Service | Action | Purpose |
|---------|--------|---------|
No suspicious patterns detected.