Security audit

Scrapfly Alerting

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is coherent for managing Scrapfly alerts, but it documents API-key and webhook-secret handling in ways that could expose credentials, so it should be reviewed before use.

Review before installing. Prefer MCP or CLI flows that keep credentials out of URLs, avoid pasting real Scrapfly API keys into REST examples, and treat webhook signing keys returned by alert reads as secrets that should be redacted or rotated if exposed. The alert mutation features are expected for this skill, but users should confirm create/update/delete actions carefully.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

Location: SKILL.md:181
Finding: API Credential Exposed Through URL Query-String Authentication
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning

Location: SKILL.md:90
Finding: Webhook HMAC Signing Key Exposed by Routine Alert Read Operations
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (2)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Confidence: 80% confidence
Finding: Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 225)May include surrounding context.
md
Other endpoints follow the same shape: `GET /alert`, `GET /alert/:uuid`, `GET /alert/metric-families`, `GET /alert/count-active`, `GET /alert/:uuid/series`, `POST /alert/preview`, `PUT /alert/:uuid`, `DELETE /alert/:uuid`, `POST /alert/:uuid/snooze`, `POST /alert/:uuid/unsnooze`, `POST /alert/:uuid/test`.

Vague Triggers

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: This markdown skill explicitly says to use the skill when the user asks to perform several specific alerting tasks "or any task involving the Scrapfly alerting product." That final catch-all is broad and ambiguous, which weakens activation boundaries and could cause the skill to be invoked for general discussion or unrelated support tasks involving the product.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.