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Security audit

Voice Meme Maker

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it says: it sends text to SenseAudio to generate meme-style voice clips and saves the returned audio locally.

Install in a dedicated virtual environment, consider pinning `requests`, and avoid using sensitive, personal, or regulated text because the text is transmitted to SenseAudio and the generated audio is saved as a local MP3 file.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:40
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 40-44
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and integrity-unverified Python dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
## Prerequisites

```bash
pip install requests
text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill instructs users or agents to install `requests` without specifying an audited version, a lockfile, or cryptographic hashes. Consequently, the installed package and its transitive dependencies are determined dynamically by the configured Python package index at installation time and are not represented by the reviewed project artifact.

The package name itself is legitimate and no evidence shows that it is currently malicious. However, this installation practice creates a supply-chain exposure if a future package release, transitive dependency, configured package index, or local pip configuration is compromised. Installation in the active Python environment also risks changing dependencies used by unrelated applications.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises a future release of `requests`, one of its resolved dependencies, or a package index trusted by the victim's pip configuration.
2. A user or agent follows the Skill prerequisite and executes `pip install requests`.
3. Pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled or substituted distribution because no version or integrity hash is enforced.
4. Malicious code may execute while an installable source distribution is built, or later when the compromised package is imported by the example implementation.
5. The malicious code runs with the operating-system permissions of the user or agent that performed the installation or invoked the Skill.

This path requires compromise or substitution within the dependency delivery chain; the audited file does not itself contain a malicious dependency.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the invoking user or 
...[truncated 508 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin requests and all transitive dependencies to versions that have been reviewed and tested.
  2. Store dependencies in a dedicated requirements or lock file rather than using an unconstrained inline installation command.
  3. Record cryptographic hashes for every permitted distribution and enforce them during installation:
bash
python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
  1. Generate and review the locked dependency set using a tool such as pip-tools, then update it through a controlled dependency-review process.
  2. Recommend installation inside a dedicated virtual environment to prevent modification of the user's global or unrelated project environments.
  3. Use the official Python package index or an authenticated, controlled internal mirror, and warn against untrusted pip indexes or custom package sources.
  4. Run dependency vulnerability and provenance checks as part of release maintenance.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (8)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill sends user-supplied text to a third-party TTS service but does not clearly warn users that their input leaves the local environment. This can expose sensitive or personal text to an external provider, especially if users assume the tool operates locally because it primarily describes meme generation features rather than data handling.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This code transmits user-provided text and voice settings to an external HTTPS endpoint, which is a real data egress path. In context this is expected functionality for cloud TTS, but it still poses confidentiality risk because any sensitive text entered by the user is disclosed to a third-party service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
},
        "audio_setting": {"format": "mp3", "sample_rate": 32000},
    }
    resp = requests.post(
        "https://api.senseaudio.cn/v1/t2a_v2",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This code transmits user-provided text and voice settings to an external HTTPS endpoint, which is a real data egress path. In context this is expected functionality for cloud TTS, but it still poses confidentiality risk because any sensitive text entered by the user is disclosed to a third-party service.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
},
        "audio_setting": {"format": "mp3", "sample_rate": 32000},
    }
    resp = requests.post(
        "https://api.senseaudio.cn/v1/t2a_v2",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md
"audio_setting": {"format": "mp3", "sample_rate": 32000},
    }
    resp = requests.post(
        "https://api.senseaudio.cn/v1/t2a_v2",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}",
            "Content-Type": "application/json",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 116)May include surrounding context.

md
"audio_setting": {"format": "mp3", "sample_rate": 32000},
    }
    resp = requests.post(
        "https://api.senseaudio.cn/v1/t2a_v2",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}",
            "Content-Type": "application/json",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The custom meme function also sends arbitrary user text to the same third-party API, creating another external data transmission path. Because this variant allows fully custom parameters, users may be more likely to treat it as a general-purpose tool and inadvertently submit sensitive text.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

md
"voice_setting": {"voice_id": voice_id, "speed": speed, "pitch": pitch, "vol": vol},
        "audio_setting": {"format": "mp3", "sample_rate": 32000},
    }
    resp = requests.post(
        "https://api.senseaudio.cn/v1/t2a_v2",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=payload,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The custom meme function also sends arbitrary user text to the same third-party API, creating another external data transmission path. Because this variant allows fully custom parameters, users may be more likely to treat it as a general-purpose tool and inadvertently submit sensitive text.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 115)May include surrounding context.

md
"voice_setting": {"voice_id": voice_id, "speed": speed, "pitch": pitch, "vol": vol},
        "audio_setting": {"format": "mp3", "sample_rate": 32000},
    }
    resp = requests.post(
        "https://api.senseaudio.cn/v1/t2a_v2",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=payload,

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The workflow describes decoding and saving the returned audio to an MP3 file, but the skill metadata and user guidance do not clearly disclose that generated content is written to local storage. This can create privacy and persistence risks if users expect ephemeral processing or run the skill in shared environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.