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Security audit

GoGlobal

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a real VPS proxy setup assistant, but it handles powerful server keys and admin passwords in exposed chat/browser flows and runs unpinned root installer code.

Review carefully before installing. Only use it on a disposable or dedicated VPS, assume any API key or generated control link shown in chat/browser history can control or erase that VPS, rotate the KiwiVM API key immediately after setup, change panel credentials over a safer channel, and avoid using the HTTP admin panel on untrusted networks. The unpinned root installer and affiliate/download steering are the main reasons this should not be treated as a low-risk helper.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (5)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
prompt.md:564
Finding

Mutable Remote Installer Is Downloaded and Executed with Root Privileges

Content
View full analysis
/root/goglobal-3xui-install.log 2>&1 & ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs the user to invoke the KiwiVM `basicShell/exec` endpoint, which runs a shell command on the VPS with administrative privileges. That command retrieves `install.sh` from the mutable `master` branch of an external GitHub repository and immediately passes its contents to Bash. No immutable commit, release artifact, checksum, or cryptographic signature is specified. Consequently, the code executed on the VPS can differ from the code that existed when this Skill was audited. Compromise of the upstream repository, maintainer account, branch, or content-delivery path would turn this workflow into arbitrary root-level remote code execution. Running the installation in the background with `nohup` does not mitigate this issue. It instead makes the retrieved payload continue executing after the API request returns. ### Attack Path 1. The user provides a KiwiVM API key to the agent. 2. The agent generates a `basicShell/exec` URL containing the key and the remote installation command. 3. The user opens the generated URL. 4. KiwiVM executes the command on the VPS with administrative privileges. 5. The V ...[truncated 813 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
prompt.md:62
Finding

Full-Control VPS API Key Is Embedded in Browser Query Strings

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
prompt.md:93
Finding

Skill Forces Commercial Referral and Operator-Controlled Download Destinations

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
prompt.md:635
Finding

Administrative Panel Credentials Are Exposed in Chat and Used over Plaintext HTTP

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
prompt.md:425
Finding

Broad Root-Level VPS Control Exceeds a Least-Privilege Deployment Design

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (33)

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs users to paste sensitive CSV data containing KiwiVM API keys and requires the agent to send back live control links embedding those keys. These keys authorize powerful remote actions on the VPS, so exposing them in chat content, browser history, screenshots, or logs materially increases the risk of account compromise and destructive server actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The workflow repeatedly asks the user to paste full API outputs and server-derived credentials, including panel usernames and passwords, back into the conversation. This unnecessarily centralizes secrets in the chat transcript and increases the blast radius if logs, agents, plugins, or other users gain access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs randomizing Reality camouflage targets to avoid fingerprint clustering and reduce blocking, which is operational guidance for evading network detection. In context, this is not merely configuration help; it optimizes covert proxy behavior and resilience against countermeasures.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill uses very broad activation phrases such as '帮我安装出海通' and '出海通开始' without clear scoping, confirmation, or capability boundaries. In a skill that can drive server provisioning and deployment workflows, generic triggers increase the risk of accidental invocation, unintended progression of sensitive steps, or social-engineering-style prompting that causes the agent to move into a high-risk operational flow too easily.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The troubleshooting phrases like '速度慢' and '连不上了' are overly generic and can be triggered in ordinary conversation, yet they imply the agent may initiate operational diagnostics or configuration changes. Given this skill's context—managing VPS networking, firewall exposure, BBR tuning, and service availability—ambiguous support intents can lead to unintended administrative actions or leakage of sensitive status information.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The activation guidance uses very broad natural-language triggers like “帮我安装出海通” and “出海通开始”, which can plausibly appear in ordinary conversation and cause the skill to activate unexpectedly. In this skill’s context, accidental activation is more dangerous than usual because the workflow solicits VPS control information and guides deployment of proxy infrastructure, so an unintended invocation could lead to privacy-sensitive data disclosure or unwanted infrastructure changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The setup flow asks users to buy a server, log into the provider, and then “复制服务器信息给 AI”, but the upfront installation/overview sections do not prominently warn that the process involves sharing sensitive server control data with the assistant. Although later sections mention API keys and risk acknowledgment, the warning is not clear and front-loaded at the point where users are first encouraged to begin, increasing the chance they disclose privileged credentials without informed consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The instruction "全程中文" mandates a single language for the entire interaction. This is a natural-language policy issue because it forces a locale/language choice without offering user opt-in or documenting a clear region-specific necessity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill steers users to a specific VPS vendor through affiliate purchase links even though vendor lock-in is not technically required for a deployment assistant. This creates a conflict of interest and can bias the agent to recommend infrastructure choices for monetization rather than user security, privacy, or suitability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This step directs the user to open an external API URL containing a live control secret and return the result, causing sensitive operational data to transit through a third-party endpoint and back into the chat. While the API call itself may be legitimate, the pattern is dangerous because it embeds privileged credentials in a URL and normalizes exfiltration of service metadata.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 371)May include surrounding context.

下一步我先检查机器基础信息。

请打开这个链接,把返回内容完整贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/getServiceInfo?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:phase=2, waiting_for=service_info_result, resume_hint=等用户贴getServiceInfo返回结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This instruction has the user query a live external control API using a URL that includes the API key and then paste the response back. That exposes privileged control material in browser history, referral surfaces, screenshots, and conversation logs without necessity.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 394)May include surrounding context.

现在再检查它是不是正在运行。

请打开这个链接,把结果完整贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/getLiveServiceInfo?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:waiting_for=live_status_result, resume_hint=等用户贴getLiveServiceInfo返回结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This step issues a start command through an external control API using a key-bearing URL. Because the URL itself is a privileged command invocation, anyone obtaining it could perform server actions, and the workflow trains users to handle such command links insecurely.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 408)May include surrounding context.

这台服务器现在没有在运行。

请先打开这个链接启动它,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/start?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:waiting_for=start_result, resume_hint=等用户启动VPS后贴返回结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This external status-check step again uses a secret-bearing URL and requests the full response in chat. Repetition increases cumulative exposure of sensitive account and infrastructure metadata and makes leakage more likely over the course of the workflow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 419)May include surrounding context.

现在再检查一次运行状态。 请打开这个链接,把结果完整贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/getLiveServiceInfo?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:waiting_for=live_status_result, resume_hint=等用户再次贴getLiveServiceInfo返回结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This instruction triggers remote shell execution as root via an external API URL containing the control key. Exposing executable command URLs to the user is highly dangerous because interception or reuse could allow unauthorized package installation and arbitrary server modification.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 435)May include surrounding context.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This step asks the user to invoke a stop action on the VPS through a visible external control URL. The link is effectively a destructive command token, and exposing it in browser and chat surfaces creates a denial-of-service risk for the server.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 471)May include surrounding context.

⚠️ 停机后这台服务器会立即断网,上面正在跑的所有服务全部中断。

请打开这个链接停机,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/stop?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:waiting_for=stop_result, resume_hint=等用户贴stop返回结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This instruction exposes a reinstallOS control URL with embedded credentials, enabling a destructive action that wipes the server. If the URL is leaked or replayed, an attacker could cause irreversible data loss and service destruction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 484)May include surrounding context.

⚠️ 重装会清空这台服务器上的所有数据和配置,不可恢复。

请打开这个链接,完成后把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/reinstallOS?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&os=ubuntu-22.04-x86_64

text

设置:waiting_for=reinstall_result, resume_hint=等用户贴重装结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This is another action-bearing external API URL for starting a server after reinstall. Although less destructive than reinstall itself, it still exposes privileged control capability and reinforces insecure handling of sensitive operational links.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 495)May include surrounding context.

重装好了。

请打开这个链接启动服务器,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/start?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:waiting_for=start_result_after_reinstall, resume_hint=等用户贴重装后启动结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

This status-check URL continues the pattern of sending live infrastructure metadata through a credentialed external endpoint and back into chat. Even read-oriented control endpoints can reveal system state useful for follow-on abuse if transcripts are exposed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 505)May include surrounding context.

好,给它30-60秒启动时间。

然后再打开这个链接,把结果完整贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/getLiveServiceInfo?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}

text

设置:waiting_for=live_status_result, resume_hint=等用户贴重装后getLiveServiceInfo返回结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This step uses the control API to read installation logs and command paths from the server, with the API key in the URL. Log retrieval can expose system details and, combined with visible credentials, meaningfully expands the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 521)May include surrounding context.

依赖安装已经开始了。

请等30秒,然后打开这个链接检查结果,把返回内容贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/basicShell/exec?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&command=tail%20-20%20%2Froot%2Fgoglobal-deps.log%3B%20command%20-v%20curl%3B%20command%20-v%20openssl

text
设置:waiting_for=deps_check_result, resume_hint=等用户贴依赖安装检查结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This external log-tail operation exposes privileged remote shell capability and returns server internals into the conversation. Repeated diagnostic shell access via client-visible URLs compounds the risk of credential leakage and unauthorized command reuse.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 530)May include surrounding context.

依赖安装返回不完整。

请打开这个链接查看日志,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/basicShell/exec?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&command=tail%20-30%20%2Froot%2Fgoglobal-deps.log

text
设置:waiting_for=deps_check_result

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This diagnostic step retrieves more complete logs through a root-capable API call in a visible URL. The combination of shell access, infrastructure diagnostics, and replayable credentials creates a significant opportunity for misuse if any part of the workflow is observed or archived.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 559)May include surrounding context.

依赖装得有点久,我先看一下完整日志定位问题。

请打开这个链接,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/basicShell/exec?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&command=tail%20-50%20%2Froot%2Fgoglobal-deps.log

text
设置:waiting_for=deps_check_result

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

This instruction launches a third-party installation script fetched from GitHub via a root shell command exposed in a key-bearing URL. It combines supply-chain risk with unsafe secret handling and arbitrary privileged execution, making compromise or misuse particularly impactful.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 572)May include surrounding context.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This log inspection step again exposes remote shell access and server internals through an external control URL. The immediate danger is not just data exposure, but the normalization of replayable root-level command links in user channels.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 589)May include surrounding context.

如果明确是timeout/killed/empty/not found: 先查日志:

text
https://api.64clouds.com/v1/basicShell/exec?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&command=tail%20-30%20%2Froot%2Fgoglobal-3xui-install.log

设置:waiting_for=xui_install_log, resume_hint=等用户贴安装日志

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This step checks service status through remote shell execution exposed as a key-bearing URL. Even seemingly harmless status commands preserve the same core weakness: a visible reusable credential authorizing privileged server actions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 605)May include surrounding context.

安装已经在后台开始了。

请等30秒左右,然后打开这个链接检查状态,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/basicShell/exec?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&command=x-ui%20status%202%3E%261%20%7C%7C%20echo%20NOT_INSTALLED

text

设置:waiting_for=xui_status_check, resume_hint=等用户贴x-ui status检查结果

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

This diagnostic log-tail action continues the pattern of privileged shell access through user-visible external URLs. In the context of a long workflow, each additional secret-bearing command increases the chance of leakage, replay, or accidental sharing.

Content

Scanner excerpt · prompt.md (reported line 627)May include surrounding context.

安装时间有点久,我先看一下安装日志。

请打开这个链接,把结果贴给我: https://api.64clouds.com/v1/basicShell/exec?veid={veid}&api_key={api_key}&command=tail%20-20%20%2Froot%2Fgoglobal-3xui-install.log

text

设置:waiting_for=xui_install_log, resume_hint=等用户贴安装日志tail