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Security audit

YouTube Data API - Search, Videos, Comments, Transcripts, Channels

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward YouTube data integration through Scavio with disclosed API-key and network requirements.

Install only if you are comfortable using Scavio as a third-party YouTube data provider. Keep SCAVIO_API_KEY out of source control, watch credit usage before broad pagination or transcripts, and prefer a virtual environment or the direct HTTPS examples if you do not need the optional LangChain package.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:266
Finding
Unverified Third-Party Package Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:266` **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain exposure through an unverified public package **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash pip install langchain-scavio==4.0.2 ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs users to install `langchain-scavio` from pip's configured package index. Although the package version is pinned, the instruction does not provide package hashes, a reviewed source reference, a locked set of transitive dependencies, or signature verification. Installing a Python package can execute package build hooks or other installation-related code with the privileges of the user running pip. Pinning only the direct package version does not ensure the integrity of the downloaded artifact or its transitive dependencies. This installation is optional because the Skill already documents direct HTTPS API requests using `requests`. No evidence in the audited file establishes that `langchain-scavio==4.0.2` is malicious; the finding concerns the unverified supply-chain trust introduced by the installation instruction. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the named package, one of its transitive dependencies, or the package-index account used to publish it. 2. A user follows the Skill documentation and runs `pip install langchain-scavio==4.0.2`. 3. Pip retrieves the package and dependencies from its configured external index without validating project-supplied cryptographic hashes. 4. Malicious installation hooks or subsequently imported package code execute in the user's environment. 5. The payload operates with the permissions of the account or automation process that performed the installation. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the installing user's privileges. Depending on the execution environment, the affected scope could include: - Files and credentials accessible to the current user. - Environment variables, potentia ...[truncated 343 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the optional package installation instruction when the documented HTTPS API workflow is sufficient. 2. If the integration must be retained, publish a reviewed requirements or lock file containing the complete transitive dependency graph. 3. Pin every dependency to an exact version and include cryptographic hashes. Install with a command such as: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Document the authoritative package source and link to the reviewed source repository and release commit. 5. Verify package provenance or signatures where supported by the distribution process. 6. Install the package inside an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account. 7. Avoid installing packages with administrator privileges, and limit filesystem, secret, and network access during installation and execution. 8. Continuously scan the package and its transitive dependencies for known vulnerabilities and unexpected ownership or release changes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:38