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Security audit

Weibo API - Users, Posts, Search, Hot Search

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Scavio API guide for retrieving Weibo data, with no hidden code, installation scripts, persistence, or unrelated access.

Install only if you are comfortable sending Weibo lookup targets and search terms to Scavio under its API terms. Avoid using it for sensitive investigations unless the user explicitly understands that the queried IDs, handles, post IDs, and keywords are sent to the provider.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill directs agents to send user-supplied identifiers, searches, and profile/post requests to Scavio's external API, but it does not clearly warn users that their queried data will be transmitted to a third-party service. This creates a privacy and consent risk, especially for searches involving sensitive people, topics, or investigative workflows.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"}

# 1. A user's profile, then their posts
info = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/user/info", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"uid": "7277477906"}).json()
posts = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/user/posts", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"uid": "7277477906", "page": 1}).json()
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/user/info", headers=HEADERS, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# 1. A user's profile, then their posts
info = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/user/info", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"uid": "7277477906"}).json()
posts = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/user/posts", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"uid": "7277477906", "page": 1}).json()

# 2. A post and its comments
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/user/posts", headers=HEADERS, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
json={"uid": "7277477906", "page": 1}).json()

# 2. A post and its comments
post = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/post", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"id": "5092682368025584", "is_get_long_text": "true"}).json()
comments = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/post/comments", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"id": "5092682368025584", "count": 50}).json()
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/post", headers=HEADERS, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# 2. A post and its comments
post = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/post", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"id": "5092682368025584", "is_get_long_text": "true"}).json()
comments = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/post/comments", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"id": "5092682368025584", "count": 50}).json()

# 3. Realtime keyword search and the hot-search board
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/post/comments", headers=HEADERS, json=

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
json={"id": "5092682368025584", "count": 50}).json()

# 3. Realtime keyword search and the hot-search board
realtime = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/search/realtime", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"query": "yu7"}).json()
hot = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/hot-search", headers=HEADERS,
    json={}).json()
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/weibo/search/realtime", headers=HEADERS, json=

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:37