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Security audit

Indeed Jobs API - Job Search and Full Posting Detail

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Indeed jobs API guide that uses a disclosed Scavio API key and paid API calls, with no hidden persistence or destructive behavior found.

Before installing or using the optional SDKs, prefer direct HTTPS calls if you want the smallest local execution footprint. If you use the SDK, install it in an isolated environment, do not run installs as administrator, and expose only the SCAVIO_API_KEY needed for this service. Also note that API calls consume paid credits, including empty results and some errors.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:225
Finding

Third-Party SDK Installation Without Integrity Verification

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (6)

Behavior Manipulation

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Subtle instructions detected that may alter agent decision-making or introduce hidden biases.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`radius`** is one of `0, 5, 10, 15, 25, 35, 50, 100` miles. Ask for 7 miles and Indeed bills you for a search covering fifty. Indeed's own default is `50`.
- **`max_age_days`** is one of `1, 3, 7, 14`.
- **`min_salary` filters on Indeed's own ESTIMATE for the role, not on a posted figure.** Postings that publish no salary at all still match. Never tell the user a result set is "jobs paying at least $X" - it is "roles Indeed estimates at $X or more".

### Pagination

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 134)May include surrounding context.

md
HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"}

# 1. Keyword + location, inside a radius Indeed actually honours
found = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/search", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"query": "data engineer", "location": "Austin, TX",
          "radius": 25, "max_age_days": 7, "job_type": "full_time"}).json()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 147)May include surrounding context.

md
HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"}

# 1. Keyword + location, inside a radius Indeed actually honours
found = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/search", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"query": "data engineer", "location": "Austin, TX",
          "radius": 25, "max_age_days": 7, "job_type": "full_time"}).json()

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 141)May include surrounding context.

md
job_key = found["data"]["jobs"][0]["job_key"]

# 2. One posting in full, including the original ATS link
job = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/job", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"job_id": job_key}).json()

print(job["data"]["title"], job["data"]["original_job_url"])

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 151)May include surrounding context.

md
json={"location": "Austin, TX", "remote": False}).json()

# 4. The employer, then its reviews (copy the slug, do not build it)
company = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/company", headers=HEADERS,
    json={"company": job["data"]["company_slug"]}).json()

reviews = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/company/reviews", headers=HEADERS,

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 154)May include surrounding context.

company = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/company", headers=HEADERS, json={"company": job["data"]["company_slug"]}).json()

reviews = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/indeed/company/reviews", headers=HEADERS, json={"company": job["data"]["company_slug"], "page": 1}).json()

text

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:37