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Security audit

HEB Grocery Data API - Search, Product Detail, Store Locator

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s grocery lookups, API access, and data sharing are clearly documented and proportionate to its purpose.

Scavio receives your search terms, product references, and supplied ZIP code or city. Requests consume API credits. Keep your key private, and restrict the optional MCP setup to HEB if you do not need its other platforms.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

The workflow transmits user queries and location information to Scavio without a privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to send search queries, product identifiers, and user-supplied ZIP codes or cities to Scavio's third-party API. Although the API provider and request format are documented, the skill does not warn users that their shopping queries and location information will be shared with that provider.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

Examples

bash
curl -X POST https://api.scavio.dev/api/v1/heb/search \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SCAVIO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query": "organic milk", "page_size": 5}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 108)May include surrounding context.

Examples

bash
curl -X POST https://api.scavio.dev/api/v1/heb/search \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SCAVIO_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"query": "organic milk", "page_size": 5}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 124)May include surrounding context.

md
HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}"}

def heb(endpoint, body):
    r = requests.post(f"{BASE}/api/v1/heb/{endpoint}", headers=HEADERS, json=body)
    r.raise_for_status()
    return r.json()["data"]

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.exposed_secret_literal

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
SKILL.md:36