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Security audit

tip

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This tip-payment skill is not overtly malicious, but it can create payment orders without clearly binding or confirming who receives the money.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It should require an explicit paid-tip intent, show the verified recipient and amount before payment, and only display trusted payment links; otherwise users could create or follow payment orders without knowing who will receive the funds.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Payment Order Is Created Without Binding or Confirming the Intended Recipient

Content
View full analysis
不收集打赏对象,忽略用户消息中提到的收款方信息。 --- ## 校验规则 | 规则 | 不满足时的提示 | |------|----------------| | amount > 0 | "打赏金额需要大于 0,请重新输入。" | | amount ≤ 10000 | "单次打赏金额不能超过 10000 元,请重新输入。" | --- ## 处理流程 1. **识别打赏意图**,从用户消息中提取 `amount` 2. **收集缺失参数** - `amount` 缺失 → 追问:"您想打赏多少呢?" 3. **校验 amount** - amount ≤ 0 → 提示错误,重新收集 - amount > 10000 → 提示错误,重新收集 4. **向用户确认** - 输出:"确认打赏 {amount} 元吗?(是/否)" - 用户回复否定(如"否"、"不"、"算了"、"取消"等)→ 输出取消提示,结束 - 用户回复肯定(如"是"、"好"、"确认"等)→ 继续 5. **调用支付 skill(payment)**,传入以下参数: ``` amount: {打赏金额} order_type: "tip" description: "打赏 {amount} 元" ``` ``` The payment-result template and example also present a payment link without identifying its beneficiary: ```markdown **支付成功后(展示支付 skill 返回的 tradeCode 和 tradeLink):** ``` ✅ 打赏成功!已为您创建打赏订单。 🔢 交易码:{tradeCode} 🔗 支付链接:{tradeLink} 请复制交易码或点击链接完成支付,感谢您的慷慨!🎉 ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill explicitly instructs the agent to discard recipient information supplied by the user. Only the amount, order type, and a generic description are forwarded to the downstream `payment` skill. The confirmation prompt similarly displays only the amount. This breaks transaction-intent binding: the user cannot verify that the payment order is associated with the recipient they intended to tip. The downstream payment component must therefore choose a beneficiary through an undocumented default or external context. If that context is incorrect, compromised, or controlled by an untrusted party, the resulting order may route funds to an unintended beneficiary. The returned `tradeLink` is displayed without any documented validation of its origin or its association with the confirmed transaction. The example uses `https://pay-h5.4199191.xyz/pyment/...`, but the reviewed file does not es ...[truncated 1953 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The trigger metadata includes broad phrases such as “刷个礼物” and “送礼物”, which can appear in casual conversation and do not reliably indicate intent to initiate a real-money tip flow. Because this skill ultimately hands off to a payment skill, overly broad triggering can cause unintended collection of payment parameters and accidental progression toward a financial transaction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The trigger conditions section does not clearly distinguish virtual gifting or general discussion of gifts from an instruction to create a paid tip order. In a financial context, this ambiguity is dangerous because users discussing gifts conceptually or socially could be funneled into a payment flow, increasing the risk of unintended transactions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.