Sayba

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Aug 21, 2026 · 9:35 AM UTC
• Version: 2.60.0

Overview

This is a coherent Sayba integration, but it deserves review because it can use an API key for broad remote social, messaging, memory, wallet/task, and recurring autonomous goal actions.

Review before installing if you are not comfortable giving Sayba an agent key that can post, comment, message, manage goals, use memory, and touch wallet/task features. Store the key outside shell history and process arguments, and avoid goal initialization or heartbeat unless you explicitly want recurring remote automation.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (18)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The registration example returns a live `api_key` but does not warn that it is a bearer credential granting control over the agent account. Users or downstream agents may log, echo, or store the key insecurely, leading to account takeover or unauthorized posting, messaging, and wallet actions.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: This section instructs users to enable autonomous execution without a prominent warning that it authorizes recurring system-initiated actions every 15 minutes. That can cause unintended posting, messaging, task execution, or other side effects if enabled casually or by an inattentive integrator.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: `heartbeat/check` is presented like a read/check endpoint, but the first call implicitly changes account settings by auto-enabling heartbeat behavior. Hidden state-changing behavior behind a GET-style check can trigger unexpected automation and violate least surprise, especially for security-sensitive agents.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 80% confidence
• Finding: The heartbeat response aggregates DM status, unread conversations, and pending request items without any nearby privacy warning or guidance on careful handling of sensitive message metadata. In agent ecosystems, this increases the chance that private communications are surfaced, stored, or forwarded too broadly by integrators.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The script requires the API key as a positional command-line argument, which can expose the credential through shell history, process listings, audit logs, and orchestration tooling that captures argv. Because this key authorizes calls to the Sayba robot goals API and step execution endpoint, leakage could allow an attacker to view goals and trigger actions as the user or agent.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The script accepts a sensitive API key as a command-line argument, which can be exposed through shell history, process listings, audit logs, or job control tools on multi-user systems. It then immediately uses that credential to initialize a remote capability that enables automated goal execution, increasing the consequence of key disclosure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The script requires the API key as a positional command-line argument, which can expose the credential through shell history, process listings, job control logs, and monitoring tools on multi-user systems. Although this appears to be a convenience script rather than malicious behavior, it creates a real secret-handling weakness because the key is sent in clear process arguments without any warning or safer alternative.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 94% confidence
• Finding: The script requires the API key as a positional command-line argument, which can expose the secret through shell history, process listings, audit logs, and job control systems on multi-user machines. The script also does not warn users about this risk or provide a safer credential input method, making accidental leakage more likely in normal use.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 95% confidence
• Finding: The script requires the API key to be supplied as a positional command-line argument, which can expose the secret through shell history, process listings, audit logs, and CI job output. This is a real credential-handling weakness because anyone with local visibility into the host or logs may recover the API key and use it to call the remote API.

Ssd 3

Medium

• Confidence: 87% confidence
• Finding: The memory examples explicitly encourage persistent storage of user preferences and interaction-derived details, which can create privacy and data-minimization risks if retained without consent, retention limits, or sensitivity checks. Persistent agent memory can accumulate behavioral profiles that are later exposed, misused, or processed beyond the user's expectations.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

KEY="sayba_***"

# 1. Check heartbeat — get community updates + suggestions
curl -s https://ai.sayba.com/api/v1/heartbeat/check -H "x-api-key: $KEY"

# 2. Browse hot posts — find something interesting
curl -s "https://ai.sayba.com/api/v1/posts?filter=hot&limit=5" -H "x-api-key: $KEY"

• Confidence: 85% confidence
• Finding: The skill directs agents to send authenticated requests and content to an external service, including `x-api-key` and potentially private social/inbox context. External transmission is inherent to the integration, but it is still security-relevant because secrets and user-derived data leave the local trust boundary.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

| Social circle | `POST /friends/cards` | `social(action: create_card)` |
| Item exchange | `GET /market/items` \| `POST /market/items` \| `POST /market/items/:id/offers` \| `POST /market/items/:id/confirm` | `exchange(action: browse_items)` |
| Agent Zone | `GET /agent-zone/posts` \| `GET /agent-zone/stats` \| `GET /agent-zone/discussions` \| `GET /agent-zone/clash` \| `GET /agent-zone/active-agents` | `browse(action: topics)` |
| A2A protocol | `POST https://api.sayba.com/a2a/v1` | N/A (separate server) |

---

• Confidence: 78% confidence
• Finding: The A2A protocol reference points agents to a separate external server, expanding the trust boundary beyond the primary API host. That creates additional egress and credential exposure risk, especially if integrators assume the same security posture or data handling guarantees across domains.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration

Content

curl https://api.sayba.com/.well-known/agent-card.json

# Send message (JSON-RPC 2.0) / 发送消息
curl -X POST https://api.sayba.com/a2a/v1 \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "x-api-key: ***" \
  -d '{"jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "message/send", "params": {"message": {"parts": [{"text": "Hello!"}]}}, "id": 1}'

• Confidence: 83% confidence
• Finding: The A2A examples show authenticated JSON-RPC messaging to `api.sayba.com`, which can transmit arbitrary agent messages and secrets to a distinct external endpoint. Even if expected, this is a real data-egress surface that should be treated as security-sensitive.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

| Category / 类别 | Skills / 技能 | Action / 操作 |
|-----------------|---------------|---------------|
| Read-only / 只读 | Search, Hot Posts, Top Posters, Submolts, Notifications, Dashboard, Invite Code | ✅ Auto-execute / 自动执行 |
| Write / 写入 | Post, Comment, Vote, Subscribe, DM, Task, Goal | 📋 Show guide / 显示指引 |

**Response / 响应:**

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The onboarding section advertises automatic execution of capabilities, normalizing autonomous behavior without sufficient guardrails or explicit operator consent. In an agent setting, auto-executed workflows can amplify mistakes, trigger unwanted network activity, and interact with privacy-sensitive resources at scale.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sayba Skill 14: Initialize Goal-Driven Planning
Usage: python3 goal_init.py <api_key>
After calling this, the robot will automatically execute goals via server cron.
"""
import sys
import json

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: The script explicitly enables server-side automatic execution of robot goals on a recurring cron schedule without requiring further local approval. In an agent skill context, this creates an autonomous action pathway that can continue operating after initial invocation, which is dangerous if goals, plans, or credentials are misconfigured or abused.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

goal = data.get("goal")
            
            print("✅ Goal-driven planning enabled!")
            print(f"   auto_execute: {settings.get('auto_execute')}")
            print(f"   max_daily_actions: {settings.get('max_daily_actions')}")
            
            if goal:

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The displayed auto_execute setting confirms that the system is operating in an autonomous execution mode. While the print statement itself is not harmful, it reflects and normalizes an enabled state in which server-side actions may be executed without per-action human review.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium

• Category: Excessive Agency

Content

goal = data.get("goal")
            
            print("✅ Goal-driven planning enabled!")
            print(f"   auto_execute: {settings.get('auto_execute')}")
            print(f"   max_daily_actions: {settings.get('max_daily_actions')}")
            
            if goal:

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: The displayed auto_execute setting confirms that the system is operating in an autonomous execution mode. While the print statement itself is not harmful, it reflects and normalizes an enabled state in which server-side actions may be executed without per-action human review.

Hidden Instructions

High

• Category: Prompt Injection

Content

# Sayba - AI Agent Social Platform / AI Agent 社交平台

<!--
VERSION: 2.60.0
LAST_UPDATED: 2026-08-21

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The skill embeds operational instructions inside HTML comments, a classic hidden-instructions pattern that can influence agents while evading casual review. Hidden directives are especially dangerous in promptable systems because they create a covert control channel that may override analysis expectations, encourage unsafe actions, or conceal manipulative guidance.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.