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Security audit

Memory Feedback

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned but needs review because it automatically stores sensitive accounting interaction data and uses it to propose persistent skill changes.

Install only in a controlled OpenClaw deployment after treating /data/memory as sensitive accounting data. Add redaction or pseudonymization for AFMs, usernames, raw queries, command lines, and correction text; set finite retention for derived records; restrict filesystem access; clarify GitHub token handling; and require security review for proposals that affect permissions, confirmations, data disclosure, or tool use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:149
Finding

Unrestricted Collection and Indefinite Retention of Sensitive Interaction Data

Content
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Remediation
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T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:188
Finding

Untrusted Interaction Records Can Influence Persistent Skill Instructions

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (7)

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

bash
export OPENCLAW_DATA_DIR="/data"
which jq || sudo apt install jq

# Optional: for GitHub PR workflow
export GITHUB_TOKEN="ghp_your_token"

Context Window Stuffing

Medium
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.

Content

Scanner excerpt · EVALS.json (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

json
"Records what_happened and what_should_have_happened fields",
      "Includes the human correction details",
      "Tags the failure for pattern detection: vat_rate_misclassification",
      "Does not exceed token budget for memory operations"
    ],
    "files": []
  },

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill persistently logs identifiable user and client data, including usernames, AFMs, queries, corrections, and operational history, yet the description lacks any privacy warning, retention caveat, or data-minimization guidance. In this context, the omission increases the risk of overcollection, unauthorized retention, and accidental exposure of sensitive financial and personal data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

bash
export OPENCLAW_DATA_DIR="/data"
which jq || sudo apt install jq

# Optional: for GitHub PR workflow
export GITHUB_TOKEN="ghp_your_token"

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

md
## Core Philosophy

- **Semi-Automatic by Design**: The agent owns its memory files — episodes and failures are written without approval. Skill files govern behaviour and require human review before any change takes effect. This boundary is non-negotiable
- **Pattern Detection, Not Gut Feel**: Improvements are proposed only when a pattern appears with sufficient frequency and confidence. A single failure is a data point. Three failures of the same type with the same trigger is a pattern
- **Human in the Loop for Skill Changes**: Every proposed skill improvement becomes a GitHub pull request. The accountant or developer sees exactly what changed, why, and what evidence led to the proposal. Merge = accepted. Close = rejected and never re-proposed
- **Rate Limited to Protect the Machine**: Memory operations are token-budgeted. Pattern scans run overnight. Storage limits are enforced. The system cannot consume itself

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The natural-language configuration specifies that pattern detection runs at '02:00 Athens time,' which imposes a locale-specific behavior. While the skill has Greek/accounting context, this file does not explicitly justify the locale constraint or present it as configurable or opt-in, so it matches the policy category for locale-specific language or regional defaults.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata and setup section state that GitHub PR functionality uses the GITHUB_TOKEN environment variable and that this token is optional. In the GitHub integration flow, the prerequisites instead say the token is stored in /data/auth/github-token.enc, which is an active contradiction in the documentation about how the skill authenticates for PR creation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.