T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Undisclosed High-Impact Data Access, Tax Submission, and Payment Operations
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:8,SKILL.md:290,SKILL.md:496,SKILL.md:511,SKILL.md:523,SKILL.md:526, andSKILL.md:582
Vulnerability Type: Authorization-boundary violation and excessive privilege use
Risk Level: CriticalVulnerable Code
text metadata: {"openclaw": {"requires": {"bins": ["jq"], "env": ["OPENCLAW_DATA_DIR"]}, "notes": "Instruction-only skill. Prepares E1 tax return data from local files. Does not submit to AADE directly — submission is handled by greek-compliance-aade skill with human approval."}} openclaw individual collect-employment-docs --year 2025 openclaw individual process-tax-emails --year 2025 openclaw individual submit-e1-form --digital-signature --confirm-receipt openclaw individual import-bank-data --verify-salary-deposits --track-investments openclaw individual process-tax-payments --schedule-installments --confirm-payments cloud_storage: "Secure document archive with retention policies"Technical Analysis
The skill metadata defines it as an instruction-only, local-file preparation skill and explicitly states that it does not submit returns directly to AADE. It further claims that submission is delegated to another skill and requires human approval.
The subsequent workflow instructions contradict that boundary by directing the agent to:
- Collect employment and tax documents.
- Process tax-related email.
- Import banking and investment data.
- Submit an E1 return using a digital signature.
- Schedule and confirm tax payments.
- Store sensitive documents in unspecified cloud storage.
These operations require access to substantially more sensitive resources than local tax-return preparation legitimately needs. The skill does not define mandatory per-operation consent, an enforceable human-approval checkpoint, least-privilege scopes, allowlisted storage destinations, transaction limits, or safeguards for credentials and ...[truncated 2409 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove email processing, bank import, cloud storage, AADE submission, and payment-processing instructions from this local preparation skill.
- Delegate every external or consequential operation to separately audited integration skills with narrowly scoped permissions.
- Enforce a non-bypassable human-approval checkpoint immediately before:
- Accessing email or banking data.
- Uploading records to external storage.
- Applying a digital signature.
- Submitting an E1 return.
- Scheduling or confirming a payment.
- Display a complete action preview that identifies the taxpayer, destination, return data, payment amount, payment date, and external service before approval.
- Use least-privilege, short-lived authorization scopes and prohibit reuse of TAXIS, banking, email, or digital-signature credentials.
- Require explicit destination allowlists for external services and cloud storage. Document the provider, jurisdiction, retention policy, encryption controls, and deletion procedure.
- Encrypt sensitive records in transit and at rest, redact secrets and personal data from logs, and maintain an auditable consent record.
- Separate read-only document import from write, submission, and payment permissions.
- Add transaction limits, duplicate-submission prevention, rollback or cancellation procedures where supported, and independent submission-receipt verification.
- Make the metadata accurately describe every required permission and external effect. If the skill remains local-only, enforce that restriction technically rather than relying on descriptive text.
- Add security tests verifying that external access, digital signing, submission, storage, and payments cannot occur without explicit approval.