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Security audit

scanning-market-movers-ti

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed crypto market-scanning skill with ordinary file export and dependency-install cautions, but no hidden persistence, credential handling, destructive behavior, or exfiltration instructions were found.

Install only in a dedicated Python environment, review or pin dependencies before use, and provide explicit output paths when exporting results. Also note that this package did not include the referenced scanner scripts, so functionality and runtime behavior depend on files or plugins outside the inspected artifact.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:35
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Python Dependencies

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 35–39
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and insufficiently verified third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
Install required dependencies:

```bash
pip install requests pandas
text

### Technical Analysis

The installation command does not specify dependency versions, package hashes, a lockfile, or a trusted package repository. Consequently, the packages installed can change between executions even if the audited skill remains unchanged.

Although `requests` and `pandas` are established projects, resolving mutable package names without integrity verification leaves installation dependent on the current contents of the configured Python package index. The risk can become exploitable if an upstream release, dependency, configured mirror, or package index is compromised. It can also cause unreviewed breaking or vulnerable versions to enter the environment.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises an upstream package release, transitive dependency, package repository, or package mirror used by the victim.
2. The attacker publishes or substitutes a malicious version under a dependency name resolved by the documented command.
3. A user follows the skill's prerequisite instructions and runs `pip install requests pandas`.
4. Because no versions or hashes are enforced, `pip` resolves and installs the attacker-controlled artifact.
5. Malicious package installation or import-time logic executes in the user's Python environment when installed or subsequently imported.

This path requires compromise or manipulation of the dependency supply chain; the audited artifact does not itself contain a malicious package or remote payload.

### Impact Assessment

Malicious dependency code would generally execute with the privileges of the account running `pip` or the scanner. Potential scope includes:

- Reading or modifying files a
...[truncated 615 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Replace the direct installation command with a reviewed and version-controlled dependency file containing exact versions.
  2. Generate and enforce cryptographic hashes, for example:
    bash
    python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
    
  3. Maintain dependencies through a lockfile generated by a tool such as pip-tools, Poetry, or uv.
  4. Explicitly document the trusted package index and prevent fallback to untrusted extra indexes.
  5. Install dependencies inside a dedicated virtual environment rather than a shared or system Python environment.
  6. Avoid running package installation as root or with administrator privileges.
  7. Regularly scan locked dependencies for known vulnerabilities and review updates before changing pinned versions.
  8. Include the missing implementation files in the distributable artifact so dependency usage and runtime behavior can be independently audited.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (2)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The trigger list includes broad natural-language phrases such as "what's moving" and "market scan," which can overlap with ordinary user requests and cause unintended invocation of this skill. In an agentic environment with Bash and file-write capabilities, accidental activation increases the chance of unnecessary command execution, dependency use, or filesystem changes even if the skill itself is not overtly malicious.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly supports outputting results to files like JSON and CSV, but it does not warn that running these commands modifies the local filesystem. This can mislead users or higher-level agents into treating the skill as read-only, increasing the risk of unintended file creation or overwrite, though the impact is limited because the write behavior is user-directed and not hidden.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.