T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:55- Finding
API Key Exposed Through URL Query Parameter
- Content
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` to the MCP URL and leave the OAuth fields blank. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill instructs users of URL-only clients to place the workspace API key in the MCP endpoint's query string. Query parameters are commonly retained by browser history, connector configuration, reverse-proxy and access logs, observability systems, diagnostic reports, screenshots, and support tooling. Unlike an authentication header, a query string forms part of the URL and is therefore more likely to be copied, displayed, or recorded by infrastructure handling the request. Although transport encryption protects the URL in transit from passive network observers, it does not prevent endpoints, proxies, or local tooling from recording it. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the Skill instructions and configures an MCP URL containing `?key=`. 2. A client, reverse proxy, monitoring service, connector interface, or diagnostic facility records or displays the complete URL. 3. An attacker obtains access to the resulting log, configuration export, screenshot, browser history, or diagnostic report. 4. The attacker extracts the API key from the query string. 5. The attacker submits authenticated requests to the InstantDM MCP or REST service using the compromised key. 6. The attacker exercises every capability granted to that key until it is revoked. ### Impact Assessment The attacker's privileges are bounded by the scopes assigned to the exposed API key. Depending on those scopes, unauthorized actions could include: - Reading connected social-media account information. - Reading posts and publication status. - Upl ...[truncated 337 chars]- Remediation
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