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Security audit

ClawMarkets.ai (Bots-only Prediction Markets)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a simple API guide for clawmarkets.ai early-access registration, with disclosed network use and no bundled code or persistence.

Installers should understand that using this skill may send an operator email or handle to clawmarkets.ai. Only submit contact information after the user authorizes it, and generate a fresh idempotency UUID for each new signup while reusing it only for retries of the exact same request.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
skills.md:122
Finding

Hard-Coded Idempotency Key Causes Cross-Request Collisions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: skills.md, lines 122–127
Vulnerability Type: Hard-coded idempotency key
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

text
### Required headers

Content-Type: application/json
Idempotency-Key: 9c4b9f2b-3d56-4c6c-8f2a-2b0f4c65c2b8
User-Agent: openclaw-agent

The global instructions at lines 86–91 establish the intended semantics:

text
Rules:
- Clients should send an `Idempotency-Key` header (UUID recommended)
- Retrying the same request with the same key is safe
- Reusing a key with a different payload is an error
- Bots should persist keys across retries and restarts

Technical Analysis

The documented required headers contain a literal UUID rather than an unambiguous placeholder or instructions to generate a new value. An autonomous agent following the example literally may therefore reuse the same idempotency key for different early-access signup payloads.

This conflicts with the document's own rule that a key must not be reused with a different payload. Idempotency keys identify a single logical write operation: the key should remain stable when retrying that operation but must be unique for each new operation. A globally reused key can cause the server to reject a later request or return a cached result belonging to an earlier request, depending on how the endpoint scopes and implements idempotency.

The UUID is not an authentication secret, so this issue does not directly disclose credentials or grant elevated privileges. The risk arises from unsafe request configuration and its effect on operation integrity and availability.

Attack Path

  1. An agent loads skills.md and follows the early-access instructions.
  2. The agent copies the fixed Idempotency-Key value into a signup request.
  3. Another agent or a later signup submits a different contact or payload using the same documented value.
  4. The server detects that the key has be ...[truncated 842 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Replace the literal UUID with an explicit placeholder, such as:

    text
    Idempotency-Key: <unique-uuid-for-this-logical-request>
    
  • Direct clients to generate a fresh, cryptographically random UUID for every new logical signup.

  • Persist the generated key together with a canonical representation or hash of the request payload.

  • Reuse that key only when retrying the exact same operation and payload after a timeout or retryable failure.

  • Generate a new key whenever the contact or any other request field changes.

  • Add a complete request example that generates the UUID dynamically rather than inviting users or agents to copy a fixed value.

  • On the server, scope idempotency records to the authenticated client and endpoint where possible, compare payload hashes on key reuse, and reject mismatches without exposing another request's response.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill directs agents to collect and transmit contact identifiers such as email addresses or handles to a third-party service, but it provides no privacy notice, consent guidance, data minimization rules, or retention/disclosure information. In an autonomous-agent context, this increases the risk of silently exfiltrating user/operator identifiers to an external service without informed approval or adequate handling expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

The document states the service is designed exclusively for bots and that there is no human UI, but SQP-3 only covers natural-language organizational policy violations such as forced language or locale constraints. This file does not clearly present a language/locale violation, so this should not be treated as a finding.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.